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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines, via a single case-study – The Colombian 
Government's "Land and Property Protection Program" (LPPP) – 
whether non-military state-led programs developed to help civil 
populations during conflict impacts on the conflict; and whether the 
impact is positive or negative. The rationality for this is that studies 
on activities of reconstruction after armed conflicts usually include 
assessments of the positive and negative impacts of such activities 
on the conflict itself; and a consensus in academia and field-work 
practice that peace can be built through proper reconstruction 
programs. However, a similar level of scholarly interest does not exist 
regarding reconstruction during warfare. Such reconstruction is 
conflated with notions which regard it as being part of a war effort 
and commanded by the military and/or a matter of political necessity. 
This research proposes that both: Post-war reconstruction and 
During War Reconstruction (DWR), must be studied under the 
complexity of 'Reconstruction' in general. 
 
This empirical thesis demonstrated the existence of and studied a 
State-led non-military DWR program which – as defined – is not used 
for military purposes by the Colombian' state and whose final goal 
must be to repair the political link between citizens and the state. It 
was found that the LPPP seeks to restore confidence in the state, 
either by approaching populations that historically have been 
abandoned by the state and trying to win back their confidence; or 
returning property rights to those from whom it was unjustly removed. 
Three main recommendations flowing from the research: the first 
claims for more academic studies about DWR; the second for the 
study and design of protective programs reinforcing the role of the 
state as primary protector of private property in society; the third for 
more in-depth studies of the LPPP and the dual behaviour of 
'violence corridors' and 'illicit crops' problems in Colombia. 
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Introduction 
 
In this empirical thesis I am presenting a single case study – The 
“Land and Property Protection Program” (LPPP), led by the 
Colombian Government – as an exemplar case of a successful 
reconstruction strategy in the middle of war. The single case study is 
a useful method in social science where data is collected 
retrospectively (i.e. asystematic, qualitative and anecdotal 
information [Nock et al, 2008]) in order to identify complexities or 
singularities that are ‘unique’ in some characteristics but, at the same 
time, could be useful as a model or generalisation for certain other 
cases. This thesis collects data through three separate fieldworks 
over two years, involving 118 interviews and the interrogation of 
documents in order to analyse how the LPPP is working in two sets 
of towns in a specific region of Colombia. Based on this information I 
make inferences regarding the role and interest of the Colombian 
state in developing reconstruction programs during war, and its 
potential impact on the Colombian conflict. There are logistical and 
epistemological advantages associated with the single case study: 
The logistical advantages are concerned with resources and 
accessibility to the fieldwork, geared towards maximising the 
likelihood of completing the research. The epistemological 
advantages relate directly to the general conditions of studying 
conflict and reconstruction through the study of the Colombian 
conflict.  
 
In this introduction I present the research objectives, the structure of 
the thesis and the rationality for the research design. 
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Research objectives 
 
The objectives of the research are to understand how During-war 
reconstruction (DWR) programs operate, and the effect of those 
programs on conflict. Five objectives are proposed: 
 
Objective 1: Prove that those reconstruction strategies developed 
during warfare are not neutral in terms of the confrontation.  
 
Objective 2: Determine what kind of Reconstruction during war can 
help shorten war and have a subsequent positive impact on peace. 
 
Objective 3: Assess the impact of activities of ‘protection of housing, 
land and property rights’ in preventing escalations of violence and 
mitigating the effects of war on civil population.  
 
Objective 4: Examine the ‘Land & Property Protection Program’ for 
Internally Displaced Persons in Valle del Cauca, Colombia. 
 
Objective 5: To use Micro-analysis techniques to assess the impact 
of DWR activities. 
 
Thesis structure 
 
This thesis presents the particularities and experiences of human 
beings in the studied area, and it uses Micro-analysis techniques to 
better understand the information gathered in the fieldwork. Chapter 
one discuss the relevant academic debates for the case study; 
Chapter two presents the methodological design and the details of 
the research strategy used to perform this single case study. Then 
chapters four and five present the case-study and the micro-analysis. 
Finally, last chapter summarizes the conclusions and proposes new 
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areas for further research (Chapter 6). Following, there is a detailed 
description for each chapter: 
 
Chapter 1, During-war reconstruction, introduces the discussion 
about what is meant by During War Reconstruction (DWR), and by 
‘state-led non-military DWR’. It also presents the actual and relevant 
academic debate about the Colombian conflict.  
 
Chapter 2, Conflict and land protection, establishes the existing 
lacuna in academic and humanitarian studies about protection of 
land rights during conflict; and valuates and compares the protection 
and restitution strategies of reconstruction.  
 
Chapter 3, Methodology, firstly, presents the qualitative approach: 
field research and ethnographic work complemented by documentary 
research. The second section presents how the fieldwork and 
associated issues were developed. Then, the third section introduces 
the use of micro-analysis techniques to analyse the data collected 
during the fieldwork. 
 
Chapter 4, Fieldwork findings, details the ethnographic work of this 
thesis around the “Land and Property Protection Program” (LPPP) in 
two sets of towns in Valle del Cauca region. It presents the data 
collected during the three fieldworks in Colombia: February-March, 
October-November 2009 and October-December 2010. The findings 
concerning the operation and guidance of the LPP program from an 
institutional point of view are contrasted with the findings from the 
fieldwork interviews with beneficiary and non-beneficiary IDPs; Non-
displaced rural population (non-beneficiary); and state officials. 
 
Chapter 5, analysing the impact of DWR on conflict, details the 
logic of the perceptions and explanations present in the micro-data in 
a structured way. 
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Chapter 6, Conclusions, examines the extent to which the purpose 
and aims of this research were fulfilled. First, the findings about the 
LPP program and about the Colombian’ government’s DWR politics 
are presented; second, the extent of the contribution of the thesis to 
extant literature on the Colombian conflict and to reconstruction 
studies is presented. The chapter concludes with three main 
recommendations flowing from the research: the first argues for more 
academic studies about DWR; the second for the study and design of 
protective programs reinforcing the role of the state as primary 
protector of private property in society; the third for more in-depth 
studies of the LPPP and the dual behaviour of ‘violence corridors’ 
and ‘illicit crops’ problems in Colombia. 
 
The chapter also reaches conclusions about the violence associated 
with rural territories and the achievements of the "democratic 
security" policy used by the state to regain legitimacy. Finally, this 
chapter presents new research directions and policy 
recommendations to the Colombian government.  
 
Research design 
 
This qualitative research was designed to study the “effects” of the 
"Protección de Tierras y Patrimonio de la Población Desplazada” 
(Protection of Land and Property of the Displaced Population) 
program in two sets of towns in the Valle del Cauca region to restore 
normality before the end of the actual conflict. The research design 
was based on field research and ethnographic work complemented 
by documentary research. This empirical research presents the data 
of three separate fieldworks over two years, conducting 118 
interviews, and compiling documents in Colombia.  
 
The analysis is performed using micro-analysis techniques 
contrasting users’ perceptions and practices with central politics, also 
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identifying behavioural practices derived from collective knowledge. 
The analysis of the experiences and stories collected during the 
fieldwork is contrasted with a theoretical framework defining DWR 
and with hard data and studies on the Colombian conflict. 
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Chapter one:  During-war Reconstruction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In this chapter, I will discuss the relevant academic debates for the 
case study. Firstly, I will introduce the discussion about what is 
meant by During War Reconstruction (DWR), and by ‘state-led non-
military DWR’. Secondly, I will introduce the case study and I will 
present the actual and relevant academic debate about the 
Colombian conflict – it should be noted that the literature on violence 
and armed conflict in Colombia is extremely abundant and it is not in 
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the scope of this thesis to cover it all. Thirdly, I will present how the 
proposed case study contributes to these debates. 
 
War and reconstruction 
 
Reconstruction refers to two main sets of activities. The first set 
includes the construction activities being developed in response to 
destruction activities (for example, repairing or re-building a bridge 
that has been destroyed). The second set includes construction 
activities that are not in response to the destruction itself, but 
activities seeking to prevent, in the future, the same level of 
destruction caused by a particular event (for example, strengthening 
a bridge or building a new alternative bridge). In the first case, the 
reconstruction is ‘reactive’; in the second case it is 'proactive'. The 
reconstruction activities portfolio is extensive and includes, inter alia, 
physical reconstruction, rehabilitation of injured persons and the 
reconstruction of basic services (including financial and social 
services). It also includes the reconstruction of the social fabric; 
government; memories; stories and events. Reconstruction can 
relate to activities that affect the material and the social relationships 
of individuals. The same is true for destruction e.g. property damage, 
damage to social relationships, or the destruction of lives. The loss of 
lives caused by the destruction cannot be repaired, but the truth(s) 
and the memories of those who have died can be redeemed. 
Importantly, both destruction and reconstruction activities can be 
performed by ‘state’ or ‘non-state’ actors.  
 
The kind of destruction referred to in this research is the one derived 
from or developed in the wake of war. Many other kinds of 
destruction can occur: caused by natural phenomena, such as 
tsunamis, earthquakes, and droughts; or, by human failures, such as 
flaws in the design of buildings, ships and aircraft. Compared to other 
types, the key characteristic of destruction caused by war is that it is 
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directed, it is not accidental. War, as used in this thesis, refers to the 
classical version of the formal acceptance of a state of war by the 
armies of two or more nations1 plus the Uppsala Conflict Data 
Program definition2 of “armed conflict”: “An armed conflict is a 
contested incompatibility which concerns government and/or territory 
where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least 
one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related 
deaths”, again, the expansion of it to a “non-state conflict” where the 
“use of armed force between two organized armed groups, neither of 
which is the government of a state, which results in at least 25 battle-
related deaths in a year”. I will simplify these statements as: the 
armed confrontation between two or more groups with the goal of 
resolving conflict through the subjugation of the other’s will – this to 
be achieved through the constant destruction and seizure of property 
and lives of the other groups. 
 
The study of Reconstruction activities during war is controversial.3 
This controversy is not limited to a discussion of the dangers of 
taking sides with any of the parties in conflict, thereby risking the 
‘impartiality’ principle; or to the controversial ‘perversion’ of 
humanitarian principles when they are used for military purposes. 
Arguably, the main controversy is that the study of Reconstruction 
activities during war challenges the traditional point of view of war as 
                                                 
1  In legal terms, the Charter of United Nations in Chapter VII gave to the 
Security Council the power “to decide” when there exists “any threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression” between states, according to Article 39. 
This sanction of what is war – and the following attribution to the Security Council – 
gave war the ‘status’ of an international matter, and separated the dirty business of 
war between states as a ‘breach of peace’ from war as a legitimate use of force 
when practiced by the international community. Before WWII, the ‘ius bellum’ 
principle established the legitimate use of force for any state (in attack or defence 
situations); nowadays, this principle has been replaced by the “maintenance of 
international peace and security” by the Security Council, as Article 48 says. 
2  Both definitions (armed conflict and non-state conflict) could be found in 
the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at the Uppsala University 
webpage: http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions 
3  Roger Mac Ginty refers to the controversy about the “(…) pre-war planning 
for the post-war reconstruction of Iraq” because this “(…) may involve the co-option 
of some sections of the NGO community into military operations.”, melding the “(…) 
categories of security and development.” (2003:601). 
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a destructive process.4 Nowadays, war is increasingly handled by 
technicians and administrators5 (Clark, 2004; Shaw, 2005) creating a 
‘gap’ for academics who do not want to be ‘part’ of any war effort. 
Some war-workers are directly in the battlefield under contracts 
providing support for privatized soldiers, intelligence agents, local or 
international agencies; while other emerging war-workers abroad 
(Engineers, doctors, mathematicians, physicists, economists, 
administrators, etc.) feel that although their activities effect changes 
in the battlefield, they remain unaffected because they are not on the 
battlefield themselves. In addition, humanists – particularly political 
scientists and philosophers – usually have been left with no capacity 
to intervene directly over the conduct of war. With the possible 
exception of sociologists and historians recreating the “historical 
discourse” of warfare (Mac Ginty, 2003), the subject of war, generally 
speaking, and the study of Reconstruction activities during war, have 
remained out of reach. 
 
On the other hand, there is no doubt that the resurgence of studies 
related to peace, peace processes, and the maintenance of peace 
have created new spaces for scholar discussion that allows 
academia to maintain its distance from the dirty business of war, 
without losing the opportunity to comment on it. Concepts such as 
‘Peace building’6 or ‘Peacemaking’7 are boarding the interlude at the 
end of armed resistance and the beginning of political resurgence, 
whilst studies and theories about the ‘Peace process’8 are focused 
                                                 
4  As presented by Mac Ginty (2003) who ironically describes the melding of 
reconstruction and war as a “sanitizing” process of war where “(…) war is not 
framed as a wholly destructive enterprise” (2003: 613). 
5  In the same vein as “peace” is currently handled by the military (Williams, 
M. 1998; Keen, 2001; Barry, 2002, Alliez, 2003; Williams, G. 2005). 
6  Addressed with extensive literature from authors such as Galtung, 2003; 
Pugh, Cooper and Turner, 2008; Dayton and Kriesberg, 2009; Borer, 2006 (truth in 
peace-building); Bryden and Hängsi, 2005 (security in peace-building). 
7  Addressed, inter alia, by Wimmer and Schetter, 2003; Darby and Mac 
Ginty, 2003 and Paris, 2004. 
8  Investigated by von Trotha, 2004; Foblets and Truffin, 2004; Varela and 
Romero, 2006 and Mac Ginty, 2006. 
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on the end of conflict. Moreover, studies on ‘Peace and conflict’9 or 
‘Peace and international relations’10, studies on the relationship 
between peace and ‘international aid’11 and the problem of 
‘international security’12 are works about peace studying specific 
aspects of reconstruction activity, allowing authors to comment about 
the war process directly or indirectly without being centered on the 
whole subject.13 In this thesis, I am not following this path; I will study 
directly reconstruction during war and inquiring into its relationship 
with war or peace developments during war.  This thesis is not a 
historical discourse about the Colombian conflict or an academic 
approach to the peace in Colombia; but it contributes with the 
narrative of the recent situation and also with understanding the 
complexity of peace and war in this country. In the next section, I will 
approach the Post-war reconstruction concept and this study will help 
me build on the concept of During-war reconstruction. 
 
Post-war reconstruction 
 
In terms of the origin of academia’s work about Reconstruction 
related with war, the literature is centered on the Post-war 
reconstruction (PWR) theme.  Williams in 'Reconstruction' before the 
Marshall Plan (2005), argues that Austria is the first and clearest 
example of international-led reconstruction, pre-dating the Marshall 
                                                 
9  Developed by authors such as Keeley, 1996; Doyle, 1997; Fawcett, 2002; 
Iriye, 2002 and Barash and Webel, 2002. 
10  Investigated in the work of Richmond, 2002; 2005; 2008; Clark, 2004; 
Costy, 2004; Meltzer and Rojas, 2005; Picciotto and Weaving, 2006 and Durch, 
2006. 
11  Examined in Boyce, 2001; 2002; Muscat, 2002 and Stockton, 2004. 
12  Addressed in Buzan, 1984; Cha, 2000; Lieber, 2000, Keen, 2001 and 
Schnabel and Ehrhart, 2005. 
13  Similarly, other topics include ‘Peacekeeping’ (Williams, 1998; Wirtz and 
Larsen, 2009); ‘Nationbuilding’ (Mandani, 2002; Donini and Wermester, 2004; 
Roeder and Rothchild, 2005); ‘Peace operations’ (Looney, 2006; Leckie, 2009) and 
‘Conflict resolution’ (Rupensiengh and Naraghi, 1998). 
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Plan14. The reconstruction of Austria in between the First and Second 
World Wars as an 'Economic protectorate' meant that it avoided 
paying the costs of 'reparation,’ and – assisted by the League of 
Nations – allowed a restoration of its economy. The same path was 
followed by Hungary. However, these actions did not stop World War 
II. The United States blames the failed peace between the wars on 
the high cost of 'reparations'. Looking for a new foundation for peace, 
the United States, during the Second World War, commenced post-
War Reconstruction preparation leading a British-American alliance 
opposed to France and based on three conditions. First, after the 
First World War the ensuing economic recession was a major cause 
of conflict and suffering – “(...) the liberal establishment was terrified 
of a renewed wave of isolationism and recession in the United States 
once the beneficial economic effects of war had receded” (ibid 
2005:548). Second, the interests of the United States – in opposition 
to France’s pretensions for 'reparation,' and British pretensions for 
'imperial restoration' – led them to establish a new agreement: “ 
‘Reparation’ was to be transformed into ‘reconstruction’”. (ibid 
2005:550). Third, the doctrine of relief processes (including civilian 
programs) worked simultaneously with armies advancing over 
liberated territories devastated by war; this practice would shorten 
the war and bring stability after the war because it would help to 
consolidate the markets in the post-war period. This is a clear path in 
the relationship between reconstruction and conflict avoidance. 
                                                 
14  He also argues that the PWR concept was not only a United States policy 
developed after WWII, but, rather, a British-American policy from the 19th century. 
For the United States it was based on the American Civil War, which featured two 
prominent characteristics that determined the ensuing reconstruction process: the 
intended replacement of a productive social system (slavery) in the South; and the 
development of new, highly lethal technology and equipment. The result was that 
at the end of the war the United States possessed unmatched military capabilities 
and had the fortitude to settle the Southern and the Western territories. For 
England, the Boer War and European imperialist expansion in Africa meant that in 
the 19th century reconstruction was seen as the most effective vehicle for 
commerce and market expansion. According to Liberal thinkers: 'Commerce is 
opposed to war', not just because war stops commerce but also because it is more 
effective than war as a means of conquering new territories. Probably, this was in 
mind at the end of the First World War, but it failed because of French pretensions 
of 'war reparation'. 
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Williams states that some military officials were skeptical about 
'civilians' doing reconstruction over a 'battlefield'. This reconstruction 
effort was developed by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation 
Administration (UNRRA) from the United States State Department. 
Here, the “United Nations” was limited to the United States and 
Britain. 
 
Following the post-WWII process and, mainly, the Marshall Plan, the 
issue of Reconstruction became a serious academic topic. This 
approach is seen as an opportunity to do the ‘right thing’ in a 
destruction landscape. In that sense, an immeasurable quantity of 
discussion, research and analysis led to the development of a body 
of thought, theorizing and institutionalization – both academic and 
practical – about what PWR is and how to do it. This discussion did 
not stop at the European experience or at the new world order 
emerging from the Second World War, and has spanned the second 
half of the 20th century to the present time. One way to understand 
the trends of these discussions is to understand whether they are 
focused on ‘small’ reconstruction processes (specifically designed 
and covering local problems) usually derived from civil led programs 
of ‘peace building,’ ‘development,’ or ‘peacemaking,’ (Barash, 2002); 
or are focused on ‘long-spectrum’ reconstruction operations (both, in 
subject and in scope) which are military planned, led and conducted 
– reflecting the idea of ‘security governance’ (Bryden, 2005) – and 
comprising: security sector reforms (SSR); disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration (DDR); rehabilitation; rule of law and 
transitional justice.15 Another aspect of this discussion concerns 
objectives, distinguishing three big topics: the direct and technical 
position that conceives PWR as just another disaster where “the 
primary goal of the recovery process is to reverse these damaging 
                                                 
15  The new operational theatre of Afghanistan and Iraq is pushing forward the 
comprehensive idea of “SSTR”: Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction 
(Wirtz, 2009). 
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effects and, in doing so, restore victims' lives” (Coppola: 300-301).16 
Or the mixed position that combines political and technical 
prescriptions, as proposed by the Post-war Reconstruction and 
Development Unit (PRDU) at the University of York, for example. The 
PRDU accepts the possibility of PWR as part of a conflict’s solution,17 
with its seven pillars proposal: Vision, Participation, Security, 
Reconciliation and Justice (which are sections of the peace building 
part of PWR); Equity (which is the base that prevents new violence), 
Reconstruction for development (indicated as the complex task of 
“returning the whole fabric of society” [Barakat, 2004b:259]), and 
finally Capacity (described as the possibility for successful PWR 
processes). But it also includes the radical political position of the 
Network University group’s idea that “there are few truly post conflict 
situations (...) in which open warfare has come to an end” (Junne, 
2004:1), and that when this happens PWR is an opportunity to forge 
a new social contract.  
 
According to the PRDU proposal, PWR is a process developed 
through activities and discussions about the subject have been 
mainly shaped by the points of view of the war winners (mainly the 
United States); and PWR’s relation to war is one of basically 
‘repairing’ the (war) mess but also the remains of conflict. The 
following discussion of this topic is concerned with 'who' leads and 
develops the reconstruction. Additionally, Barakat (2004) also 
proposes three different approaches to reconstruction based on how 
                                                 
16  Works such as those of Kane (1999); Stiefel (1999); Byman (2000); 
Ikenberry (2001); Adebajo and Lekha (2001); Ankersen (2007); Barakat (2004; 
2004a); Coppola (2007) and Özerdem (2008) follow one argument with three basic 
principles: War is a man-made disaster; from many wars many lessons are 
learned; those lessons could be shared and finally the disaster could be managed 
and reduced. However, this idea of war as a disaster diminishes the war to an 
undesirable manageable activity to be dealt with. Moreover, this same idea allows 
the design of technical proposals for post-war reconstruction programs and 
packages designed to 'fix' the disaster. 
17  Recently (2008), this position moved forward to a direct link between 
reconstruction and development: “It is the experience of the PRDU that an 
inclusive concept of reconstruction and development, which encompasses the key 
stages of relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction leading to sustainability, is the 
most appropriate” (Barakat, 2008: 261). 
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deep external actors are involved with the rehabilitation processes 
and its effects on violence: the traditionalist, the humanitarian and the 
new humanitarianism. The main lessons that serve our analytical 
purpose are synthesized in two points that affect how we understand 
PWR: “... the strong relationship between the concepts and practice 
of development and of post-war reconstruction” (ibid 2004:31); and, 
“... the changing nature of international and intra-national conflicts 
themselves and how they have been perceived...” (ibid 2004:31). The 
first point links the definition of PWR to the concept of Development; 
the second to the concept of Security. So far, historically, all PWR 
has been developed following “strategic interest”. The meaning of 
strategic interest is, possibly, changing too. Barakat argues that 
strategic interest after 9/11 refers to “long term security” achievable 
“by reducing vulnerability to conflict through integrated post-war 
reconstruction as a corrective measure but… yet to be effectively 
translated into practice” (ibid 2004:32). Nowadays the range of 
possibilities that presents PWR as man-made disaster relief is 
manifold. Amongst academia and practitioners, the logic is quite 
simple: there exists a disaster somewhere that needs to be 
technically or professionally repaired. In sum, the group at the PRDU 
has worked around definitions of PWR typified by Barakat (2004: 7):  
 
“... a range of holistic activities in an integrated 
process designed not only to reactivate economic 
and social development but at the same time to 
create a peaceful environment that will prevent a 
relapse into violence”.  
 
As Mac Ginty summarizes, five reasons could be presented for this 
surge in post-Cold War academic studies: a) During-war the military 
dominance reduces the options for academic or humanitarian 
activities “(…) until after violent hostilities had ceased.” (2003:602); b) 
The visibility of conflicts in a mass media globalized culture plus the 
Balkans conflict prompted the curiosity and commitment of more 
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academics on the subject; c) The contemporary “dysfunctional 
peace” (2003:602) associated with post-war situations do not 
address the roots of conflict and sustain only an unsatisfactory (and 
often violent) recovery; d) The increased technical knowledge of 
humanitarian agencies, international organizations and governments 
about the subject; and, e) growing awareness of the dangers of failed 
post-war processes for the international community. 
 
On the specifics of conflict and reconstruction, one branch of PWR is 
focused on the study of the problems of violence for people during 
peace time, which may coexist with: low levels of direct violent 
engagement between parties; sporadic indirect violence between 
individuals and groups; violence inside spoiler groups, and personal 
vendettas. Solving or preventing this situation is one of the main 
objectives of PWR: “(…) the need for a new legitimacy that will 
reposition the relationships to power within a society.” (Foblets, 
2004:270). This process refers to more than residual violent waves 
hung-over from war time: it is also a ‘moment’ of opportunity for 
spoiler groups, warlords, gangs, ex-combatants, traffickers, and 
many interest groups to re-ignite the war. The violence may be 
deliberate or accidental, but in the end, this spoiler violence mitigates 
against any peace process (Mac Ginty, 2006). The only option for 
security is to fight or appease the emergent violence and strengthen 
the social fabric that prevents recourse to it. In post-conflict situations 
internal violence could transform itself, evidencing new forms of ‘soft’ 
violence – such as gender related and domestic violence, slave 
labour or street criminality. But armed violence also comes from the 
outside. Mueller (2004: pp.141-160) proposes the expression 
‘policing wars’ to describe the application of military force by 
developed countries to ‘correct’ conditions in post-war zones, in 
conjunction with other forms of sanctions and force, including 
commercial blockades, asset-seizing, and propaganda. This means 
that after victory (via revolution or seizing power) emerging powers in 
countries or regions may need to defend their victories from 
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international intervention. This has been the case since the 
contrasting Cold War operations of ‘democracy support’ and 
‘communist solidarity,’ to recent humanitarian interventions, efforts to 
reinforce human rights, preventive wars, and the fight against 
terrorism. As expected, the theme of war during reconstruction 
(Arévalo, 2002; Darby and Mac Ginty, 2003; Foblets and von Trotha, 
2004a; Paris, 2004; Bryden and Hängsi, 2005; Mac Ginty and 
Richmond, 2009; Muggah, 2009) is at the center of contemporary 
debates for a reason. However, the specific scope of this thesis does 
not permit an analysis of ‘war actions during reconstruction’. These 
studies are commonly made as part of studies of peace building or 
peace processes, but are not focused on the relation between war 
and reconstruction that interest me. I am focused on the activities of 
reconstruction during war time (Looney, 2006) – looking into war’s 
relationship with reconstruction and construction, not just destruction.  
 
During-war reconstruction 
 
The existence of During-War Reconstruction (DWR) is a fact: in the 
middle of armed conflicts, institutional governments, partisan armies 
and ordinary people simultaneously practice recovery and 
destruction (economically, socially and militarily). Essentially, there is 
no a single type of reconstruction, or a single scheme of what or how 
it can be done. However, the common grounds for all reconstruction, 
in political terms, is based on how to neutralize the previous and 
latent risk; the threat. A conflict is – without a doubt – an attempt to 
overcome a ruling or emerging power, and this means that the 
primary objective during or after war is to prevent – to neutralize – 
any threat. Consequently, the most obvious and imperative 
solution/necessity for all actors is to develop activities to strengthen 
their own power and capabilities. It implies, and is based on, the 
reconstruction of the productive apparatus damaged by the conflict.18 
                                                 
18  John Ikenberry (2001) solves the question about “what do states do after 
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Three kinds of reconstruction activities could be developed. The first 
kind of activities could be named as relief of war-destruction, and 
involves activities of recovering infrastructure, services and a return 
to a ‘normal life’ even under fire. The second set of tasks could be 
named as strengthening of war opportunities, and allows for the army 
– or group who survived, or emerges victorious from combat – to 
consolidate their capabilities. The third set is focused on the 
containment / fighting of unresolved conflicts and the building of 
peace. Historically, the differences between activities of recovery 
during war that helps the military effort, and those that do not help – 
or activities led by military necessity or not – have not been a real 
problem. For people, the necessity of ending the war, winning the 
war and surviving the war is the same as returning to normality. 
 
Recently, in contrast with the view that the existence of DWR is a 
fact, a huge debate has emerged around the blurred military-civilian 
interface in countries such as Afghanistan or Iraq. According to 
Ankersen (2007), the recent Civil-Military cooperation exhibits an 
“(…) intentional blurring of lines between civilian and military, 
humanitarian and intelligence functions” (ibid:xv), which is neither 
practical nor convenient. Or, as Barry (2002) points out, peace 
operations with “(…) military actions supporting non-military efforts to 
establish and maintain peace” (p. 3) have nothing in common with 
humanitarian work. Stockton (2004) argues that in the case of 
Nation-building the tendency now is no longer “(…) to treat peace 
and development as apolitical products created from a set of discrete 
technical tasks (…)” (ibid:30) but rather to take sides. On the other 
                                                                                                                            
winning war?” in a slightly different way: he said that states keep the power and 
make it last… finding ways to set limits on their power and make it acceptable to 
others. I believe that the first part of the idea could be claimed as a rule, but not the 
second. The study of Ikenberry is based on how super-powers (specifically Britain 
and the United States) acted after multi-scaled conflicts; and, even if the second 
part of the idea can be incorporated as a ‘motto’, I hardly believe that it constitutes 
an explanation for most of the cases, not only in terms of intra-state conflicts, but 
also in most international conflicts. Nevertheless, I agree with Ikenberry’s 
explanation that this could be done using the opportunities and incentives that the 
war has created. 
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hand, there is an increasing pressure to direct military resources 
toward reconstruction processes (Wirtz, 2009; Gibson, 2008; 
Williams, 2005). Clark (2004) exposes how the press, the military 
and the aid industry are profiting from their activities in war-zones, 
and Costy (2004) expresses this situation as a “dilemma” when 
humanitarian and military personnel are involved in “(…) active 
combat operations, intelligence collection, psychological operations, 
and the conduct of ‘hearts and minds’ campaigns through the 
provision of what is termed humanitarian assistance, food 
distribution, and small infrastructure projects” (ibid:157). Orthodoxy 
now views “aid militarization” as inevitable in order to achieve long- 
term political and security objectives; and as Schultz (2007) argues, 
the distinction between war (offensive and defensive), and crisis 
(stability and support) serves more for illustrative purposes, because 
the “reality is dynamic between both of them” (ibid:124). For some 
professors and fieldworkers the only options are to retreat, or remain 
impartial at all cost. In real life, both options, including civil-military 
involvement, are evident. My research contributes to this debate by 
analyzing the Colombian case. 
 
During-war reconstruction is connected with war not only because it 
is developed during war, but also because it could affect the course 
of the war: prolonging or curtailing the end; and/or, protracting or 
solving the conflict. DWR could prolong the war because it allows 
one side to recover military capabilities and helps those in a weak 
position to fight longer. It could shorten the war in the same way if it 
helps those in a strong position to gain military advantage. Some 
activities of reconstruction during war could protract a conflict by 
generating new conflicts, or could overcome its causes. Accordingly, 
I can further argue that the main consequence of developing 
reconstruction activities during wartime is that they directly affect the 
result of the war itself, and may strengthen one of the parties in 
conflict. Further, DWR is associated with a blurred situation where it 
is not clear whether the activities are performed for military or 
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humanitarian purposes. In terms of the distinction between 
humanitarian or military activities I propose to differentiate between 
military outcomes and socio-political outcomes. Unsurprisingly, this 
distinction is controversial and vulnerable to interpretation. 
 
Military reconstruction during-war is a reconstruction activity 
developed in the middle of war with the purpose of strengthening 
military power and defeating the enemy. It implies taking sides in a 
conflict, and directly helping the military campaign. It has been 
developed over the years in military academies and as part of military 
training and advice. In the classic strategy of “Winning hearts and 
minds” the idea is to get local people to support the military effort 
through the use of available resources, both material and human, 
and thus limit the resources available to the enemy. It is also about 
guiding processes of production and living conditions, to restore and 
increase local production and increase the supply of resources 
available for the military effort. Through this strategy, two additional 
results are sought; the first one is to "pacify" the area, seeking to 
control the exercise of violence. The second is to "militarize" the 
area, seeking public support for the provision of resources and 
information in order to decrease the combat capability of the enemy 
(either by denying them access to information and resources or 
deploying such resources against them). My research is not focused 
on this kind of strategy. 
 
Non-military DWR activities are those developed by the state or the 
parties in conflict in the midst of a war beyond the military effort. In 
the case of the modern state (a) the acceptance of the state’s 
legitimacy and power19 must remain even during wartime and (b) the 
                                                 
19  The modern state must have the capability to exercise legitimate violence; 
to do it, the state allows the control of large territories through an administrative 
apparatus, and regulates the economy in that territory through the collection of 
taxes. In doing so it establishes a different system of government and a social pact 
than that associated with feudal societies: taxes replace servitude of land to the 
King, and wages replace the servitude of individuals. This process is possible with 
the consolidation of four mechanisms for strengthening rule: "bureaucracy, 
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social contract,20 where rulers and ruled are linked by historically 
specific principles, must be kept alive; if both go away then the state 
disappears. The modern state is obliged to manage both peace and 
war; thus during war time the state must support a war economy, 
handle the humanitarian crisis and deal with any social challenges. 
This need to alleviate the miseries of war is achieved through 
programs of economic and social recovery and, clearly, it is not easy 
to separate their ends from those of military objectives. But, I can 
propose that social objectives are more focused on the need to 
maintain the state’s legitimacy, not its power. In the case of non-state 
parties, the purpose is not to maintain, but to gain legitimacy.  
 
No doubt, this is a theoretical approach about politics, and reality not 
only differs, but also features all kinds of multicultural diversity. 
However, the reality for states or parties vis-a-vis conflict during war 
time does not differ much from the aforementioned principles: the 
need to survive as a political and representative entity using 
                                                                                                                            
monopoly of force, creation of legitimacy and homogenization of the population" 
(Wallerstein, 1984: t.1, page 191). In this way the state is set in a territory known 
as "sovereign". In the international system of states, sovereignty equates to the 
effective capacity of producing (goods), trade, and policing of the interior of a 
territory within a global trading system. Inside States this sovereignty translates 
into Security for individuals through the regulation of violence in the exercise of its 
authority and power, or in defence of property, providing the means for the 
productive development of society. In the modern capitalist State this form of 
property is private property. This means that the state proclaims a social order in a 
territory under its control, arranged in a capitalist system of production for 
individuals to achieve the satisfaction of their needs. In this way, the state 
maintains the economic order of society by controlling production within the 
territory. 
20  The classical analysis of politics by Held in Political Theory and the Modern 
State (1989) refers to Hobbes’s assertion of a transfer of self-governing rights from 
individuals to a single authority as the consolidation of the modern state. But 
according to Locke, it is not a transfer as such but rather a union around the state. 
This creates a responsibility from the state for the defence of peoples’ natural 
rights to enjoy the fruits of their work and to hold property. Pointing out the 
fulfilment of these objectives, Bentham and Mill concluded that “(...) the overriding 
motivation of human beings is to fulfil their desires, maximize their satisfactions or 
utilities, and minimize their suffering; society consists of individuals seeking as 
much utility as they can get from whatever it is they want; (…)” (Held, 1989:24). In 
addition Rousseau argues that individual’s ‘surrendering’ and equating of their 
interests to those of the state is an impulse guided by individual’s desire for 
survival against individual misfortune, common miseries and disasters. Even if 
there is no transfer of sovereignty, this relationship between people and state 
remains valid on account of necessity. 
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programs of economic and social reconstruction. This does not mean 
that states or parties are effectively solving people’s problems or 
adequately tackling the roots of conflict and unambiguously achieving 
socio-political milestones; probably the parties in the conflict are just 
expending resources on maintaining popular support during war. In 
any situation their motives could be altruistic – driven by a need to 
‘alleviating suffering’– or practical – wishing to avoid internal uprising 
or enemy sympathizing. Thus, non-military DWR programs are not 
oriented through a military campaign, and are usually accepted as a 
special administrative mode of state activity designed to act in 
accordance with the circumstances of the conflict. For example: 
programs to help Internal Displaced People (IDP); humanitarian food 
relief; and temporary laws regarding mobility, settlement, property 
and production, etc. 
 
To study this kind of reconstruction, I am presenting the Colombian 
case in order to address the issues identified above. Firstly I will 
briefly introduce the Colombian conflict; secondly I will present the 
general context of academic study of Colombian conflict; and thirdly, 
the specifics of the LPP program in Colombia. 
 
Land and conflict in Colombia 
 
The research subject is a reconstruction program in the middle of 
war, and to understand this, it is necessary to advance in a 
contextual explanation of why and how Colombia ended up 
implementing the Land and property protection program (LPPP). 
Contemporary history of Colombia started at the end of the so-called 
"Thousand Days’ War", 1902, followed by the loss of the territory of 
Panama in 1903. After this event, the country entered into a process 
of reconstruction which lasted almost thirty years. During this time, 
the country experienced relative "peace"; however, during this 
process of reconstruction, the foundations were laid for the conflicts 
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that were to plague the country until the 1990’s. The reaction of the 
elites to the loss of Panama was to curb any political discussion, any 
manifestation of ideological, social, or cultural openness, and in a 
deliberate manner direct the country toward international ostracism. 
The further eruption of violence is explained by the shift lived in the 
30’s from a Conservative party hegemony to a Liberal government 
and followed by the economic openness of Colombian economy in 
the period between World Wars which revealed the scarcity of rural 
life in contrast with that in industrialized areas. For the next sixty 
years, between 1930 and 1990, the armed conflict that waged in 
Colombia was one of the most deadly, bloody and fratricidal events 
of 20th century. The original social conflict sought political reform 
(labor rights, women's emancipation, access to land, right of 
association, cultural openness, and industrialization) was met, by the 
most conservative of the national elite, not only with political 
opposition – these elites feared a loss of political control, and due to 
the absence or weakness of the State and the rule of law, were also 
able to use violence to limit reforms. In the mid-1940’s, La Violencia 
became the symbol of the country. Today’s guerrillas emerged in the 
sixties after a perverse peace agreed by the elite with the National 
Front, and are a continuation of this conflict. In the nineties, a new 
ingredient was added and shifted the conflict: the drug trade. 
Colombia’s recent history has made its stamp, and the country’s 
violence is now defined by and for the business of illicit drugs. 
 
Following the historical recount, after the assassination of Jorge 
Eliecer Gaitán on April 9th 1948, which ignited El Bogotazo, the 
country was unable to stop the violence, discover the motives, the 
people and the interests behind the crime, or advance a protective 
system for political life. As a result, the militaries were charged with 
restoring order through the Military government of General Gustavo 
Rojas Pinilla between 1953 and 1957, and the Military Junta in 1957. 
During Rojas Pinilla’s presidency two peace processes (1953 and 
1954) – including demobilization and social restoration – were 
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developed. However, these ended with the killing of the Liberal 
guerrilla leader Guadalupe Salcedo (González, 2007). Paradoxically, 
at the same time that the civil war started its worst period, it is clear 
that Colombia’s recent history of political, social and economic 
restoration also started. The government of Rojas Pinilla is 
remembered as the “openness” of the Conservative ostracism as 
mentioned before (Murgueitio, 2005). 
 
In general terms, between 1958 and 1994 the country experienced 
constant processes of pardon, reintegration, treason and uprising; 
during this period although Rojas Pinilla and the National Front 
policies evidenced a new emphasis on reconstruction, the evils of 
recent times were also present in embryonic form. As professor Alejo 
Vargas says: “(…) while the National Front was an adequate therapy 
for inter-party violence, it also created the foundation – along with 
other structural and economic factors – for the emergence of a new 
kind of violence: violence against the political regime and against the 
State, usually known as the 'revolutionary violence' featuring the 
National Front” (Vargas, 2008:322).21 Not only because of the 
absence of real democracy, but by legitimating a perverse system of 
regular Pardons without punishment, which allowed the private use 
of violence. After the Military Junta period, when the government was 
restored to civilians, the result was the Frente Nacional. This unique 
bi-factional system of government was practiced between 1958 and 
1974, and is at the root of the re-birth of violence in Colombia after 
Rojas Pinilla “pacification”. This new spiral of violence reached its 
peak with the bloodiest armed assault on the Palacio de Justicia 
(Justice Court) by the M-19 guerrilla on November 6, 1985; and a 
subsequent armed assault by the army on November the 7th.  This 
armed assault was the last act of a dramatic war between the 
                                                 
21  “(…) si bien el Frente Nacional fue una terapia adecuada para la violencia 
interpartidista, creó las bases, junto con otros factores estructurales y 
coyunturales, para el surgimiento de un nuevo tipo de violencia: la violencia contra 
el régimen político y contra el Estado, que generalmente se conoce como la 
‘violencia revolucionaria’ característica del Frente Nacional” (Vargas, 2008:322). 
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traditional parties in the government and the armed guerrillas, fuelled 
by and masking the emerging prosperous illicit drug business. As a 
result, the country woke-up from its dreams and decided to face the 
reality: in rural areas, it was a country at war. This drama ignited the 
war against the drug cartels and the desire for a peace agreement 
with guerrillas; but both objectives only deepened the violence. 
Between 1986 and 1990, the country experienced its darkest days. 
The peace agreement with the FARC guerrillas in 1985 was followed 
with the assassination of over 3,000 members of the Union Patriotica 
party by paramilitary groups; in complicity with sections of the State 
itself. In the following years, five presidential candidates or prominent 
national politicians were killed: Jaime Pardo Leal (1987); Luis Carlos 
Galán (1989); José Antequera (1989); Bernardo Jaramillo (1990); 
Carlos Pizarro (1990). The list added with the assassination in 1994 
of Manuel Cepeda Vargas, and in 1995 of Alvaro Gómez Hurtado, 
the sixth and seventh prominent political leaders killed by this 
violence wage.  
 
One consequence of the coca business and the surrounding violence 
is the penetration of the traditional social, economic and political 
elites by the ‘capos (drug leaders)’, the ‘new wealthy class’. This 
allowed the dismantling of the traditional repressive system of the 
state by the corruption of money and power. This disassembly 
penetrates so deep inside the country that the elites and 
conservative society allowed a new foundational process (not a new 
reconstruction as before, after the “Thousand Days’ War”). As a 
result, in 1991, the country saw the promulgation of a new 
Constitution as a panacea. Under Cesar Gaviria’s Presidency the 
country achieved the biggest demobilization of guerrilla groups and 
their integration into political life: “ ‘Movimiento 19 de Abril de 1970’ – 
M-19; a faction of the ‘Ejército de Liberación Nacional’ (ELN) known 
as ‘Corriente de Renovación Socialista’ – CRS; the ‘Partido 
Revolucionario de los Trabajadores’ – PRT; the ‘Movimiento Armado 
Manuel Quintín Lame’ – MAMQL; and a faction of the ‘Ejército 
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Popular de Liberación’ – EPL” (Benavides, 2011:9).22 This ‘re-birth of 
the State, and compromise in the fight against crime, drugs and 
political corruption was broken in the next presidential round in 1994 
with the scandal of drug money attached to the presidential and 
parliamentary elections of President Ernesto Samper. The following 
uncertainty allowed the rise of paramilitary and guerrilla forces with 
the associated risk of a state failure. During this period the political 
life of the country was dominated by party fragmentation and political 
opportunism. The peak of this situation was the promulgation of the 
‘Zona de Despeje’ in the Caguan region in 1999 by recently elected 
President Andrés Pastrana. This act symbolized the resignation by 
the state that it was not the only authority in the territory. The 
dramatic end of this FARC-land in 2002, and the United States 
support through the Plan Colombia changed the political life of the 
country again. The leadership of President Alvaro Uribe allowed the 
dismantling and reintegration of paramilitary armed groups (30,000 
fighters); also, the final condemnation of guerrilla groups as criminals 
and the recovery of the State’s presence in all Colombian territories. 
But, again, the political system was at risk ’idolizing’ this leader and 
the attempts to reinstate him as a permanent president – changing 
the Constitution to enable a second term and attempting to change it 
again to enable a third period in office. 
 
                                                 
22 “Movimiento 19 de Abril de 1970 M-19, una facción del Ejército de Liberación 
Nacional conocida como Corriente de Renovación Socialista CRS, el Partido 
Revolucionario de los Trabajadores PRT, el Movimiento Armado Manuel Quintín 
Lame MAMQL y una facción del Ejército Popular de Liberación EPL” (Benavides, 
2011:9). 
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Studies about Colombia’s conflict23 
 
In terms of theories about how to “describe” the Colombian conflict, 
the range is limited. According to Huma Haider, an armed conflict is a 
conflict of incompatible interest between groups who do not trust 
each other and “resort to the use of force to secure their goals” 
(2012:2).24 In the armed conflict in Colombia the parties are clearly 
defined but we do not find consensus about which are the 
“incompatible interest” or the disputed “goals”. Following Dan Smith 
                                                 
23  The literature about Colombian conflict is vast, but mainly focused on 
historical reviews. Most authors are exposing the history of the armed actors in 
Colombian conflict, the peace processes and interviews with relevant figures of the 
violence. Some of the ‘classics’ to follow the academic studies of the Colombian 
conflict are Guzmán, Fals Borda and Umaña (1962) whose compilation of 
testimonies on the violence since its inception in the mid-twentieth century is 
considered the origin of the academic debate in Colombia about the violence. As 
claimed by Carlos Miguel Ortiz (1994), before the book of Guzman, Fals & Umaña 
(1962) in Colombia we found what is so-called “factional” literature (written by the 
two historical parties: Liberales and Conservadores) where a) leaders of both 
parties are compiling ‘memories’; b) factions are ‘denouncing’ crimes; c) books are 
reporting or compiling documents about tragedies (i.e. Jorge Eliécer Gaitán 
assassination); d) journalist of both parties are exonerating or incriminating the 
other faction; e) fighters are remembering their battles; or f) writers are producing 
fictional or semi-fictional novels (Ortiz, 1994:383-387). Following this academic line 
we found the work by Oquist (1978), who was the first who used quantitative 
methods to study the violence and identified a regional dimension of the conflict (in 
his English version of 1975) (Ortiz, 1994:399). Sánchez and Peñaranda (1986) 
where the history and study of violence in Colombia is revisited; Medina Gallego’s 
(1990) analysis of paramilitary groups; Pizarro’s (1991) history of FARC; García-
Durán’s (1992) history of peace processes; Camacho and Leal, F. (1999) who 
focused on importance of the political agenda to the achievement of peace; 
Bejarano’s, (1995) and Leal’s, (1999) launching of the study of peace in Colombia 
as a specific field of study; Archila’s (2003) presentation of how the background of 
social unrest feeds the armed conflict and Pecaut’s (2006) retrospective of how the 
conflict has been handled by all the previous Colombian governments. Equally, we 
must point out the seminal works on the interrelationships between paramilitaries 
and guerrillas by Duncan (2006) and by Gutiérrez (2008). 
24  Talking in general about the causes of war, few factors have been 
identified as a cause of war: the existence of bad neighbours who tend to do evil 
things; revenge on said neighbours; bad times that affect crops, homes, and 
livelihoods; and bad leaders (Keeley, 1996). When a society believes in ‘the 
leadership and capability of their government’, and believes in ‘real reasons behind 
political decisions’, the possibility of war increases. There exists a social tendency 
to “follow the leader” until the final consequences (Galtung, 2003). More recently, 
Paul Collier’s thesis about “Greed and Grievance” – where greed is the main 
motive of war – has been weakened. Nowadays greed is no longer accepted as a 
strong motive for war, but a weak opportunity for it (Ballentine, 2003). The 
motivation for this is that “greed” is not always profitable. It means that war cannot 
be sustained only by the motive of greed (Berdal, 2000). But the opposite is also 
true: sometimes war is highly profitable, and this can protract the conflict (Pugh, 
2008). 
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and the Berghof Center the “causes” – the incompatible interests in 
dispute – could be divided into three main groups: “environmental, 
political and economic factors” (2004:5). This dismisses the ethnic 
factor and the psyche of the individual or the group as an explanation 
of conflict25. According to Smith, in the first group we found the 
“Environmental degradation” theory of Thomas Homer-Dixon (1999); 
in the second group – the political regime factor – theories such as 
the “Not quite democratic, not quite autocratic regimes” (Hegre, 
Gates and Gleditsch, 1999) or the risk of conflict in “Transition 
towards democracy” (Jaggers and Gurr, 1995); in the economic 
conditions factor the “Low level of economic development” theory 
(Hauge and Ellingsen, 1998). Haider (2012:6) summarizes the 
factors proposed by Smith as follows: 
 
“Political and institutional factors: weak state institutions, elite 
power struggles and political exclusion, breakdown in 
social contract and corruption, identity politics. 
Socioeconomic factors: inequality, exclusion and 
marginalization, absence or weakening of social cohesion, 
poverty. 
Resource and environmental factors: greed, scarcity of national 
resources often due to population growth leading to 
environmental insecurity, unjust resource exploitation”. 
 
In terms of the Colombian conflict, it is clear that all three factors are 
present, and the explanations could be divided according to the 
emphasis on each one. In terms of theories about Colombian conflict 
                                                 
25  “It is not ethnic diversity as such that is a cause of armed conflict, but 
rather ethnic politics. It is the injection of ethnic difference into political loyalties, 
and the politicisation of ethnic identities, that is so dangerous”. (Smith, 2004:11). 
“While the theoretical conclusions in this literature so far are necessarily limited, 
they are also important, because they direct our attention towards the key issues of 
poor economic conditions, lack of political openings, and environmental damage, 
while at the same time warning us not to regard ethnic diversity as such as a cause 
of armed conflict.” (Smith 2004:13). This objection is referred to in the theories as 
the “Relative deprivation theory” (Gurr, 1970) or the “Group entitlement theory” 
(Horowitz, 1985). 
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where ‘Political and institutional’ factors are preeminent, we found the 
explanation based on Durkheim’s theory about the ‘social anomie’ 
(Lipman and Havens, 1965; Parales, 2004; Waldmann, 2007); the 
‘weak or fragmented state’ theory (Oquist, 1978; Pecaut, 1987) or 
explanations based on Galtung’s theory of ‘structural violence’ 
(Gonzalez, 1999; Pérez, 2011). Another theory was developed from 
1987, when the government of President Betancourt established the 
so-called “Comisión de estudios sobre la violencia” (Committee for 
the studies on violence). This academic group concluded that the 
violence in Colombia is derived from a ‘violent culture’ and that 
armed conflict is sustained in time by this social behavior (Comisión, 
1995). Theorists who give priority to the socioeconomic factor are 
Gilhodes (1974), LeGrand (1984), Reyes (1987; 2009), Reyes and 
A.M. Bejarano (1988), Forero (2008), Moncayo et al (2008); all 
pointing to the long-standing agrarian problem in Colombia. Theories 
with emphasis on the third factor, the ‘greed and grievance’ theory 
(Collier and Hoeffler, 2004), are often dismissed (Richani, 2004; 
Nasi, 2009) as ‘reductionist’. However, in the analysis of Gorbaneff 
and Jacome (2000) it is clear that the economic factor is key in terms 
of the insurgents’ recruitment and the government 
offensive/defensive position, and the economics of war is directly 
related to natural resources – in Colombian conflict, the source of 
resources for war is narcotics (Cocaine, cannabis) and minerals (Oil, 
Coltan, Gold, Emeralds). 
 
The majority of the literature explaining the Colombian conflict uses 
‘mixed’ positions, without making specific emphasis on any of the 
aforementioned factors. Academic debate is based on two positions 
that could be identified: 1) Authors who accept the “incompatible 
interest” of the actors in conflict; 2) Authors who do not accept the 
existence of “incompatible interest”. In the first group Socorro 
Ramirez and Luis Alberto Restrepo (1989) and William Ramírez 
Tobón (1990) are strongly in favor of the existence of ‘antagonistic 
interest’ between the actors in the armed conflict; Nasi, Ramírez and 
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Lair (2003) explain this antagonistic interest via armed confrontation 
as the existence of a ‘civil war’ in Colombia; Alexandra Guaquetá 
(2003) investigates the ‘rational’ demands of the actors in conflict. In 
a recent book (IEPRI, 2006) the position of the academics at IEPRI, 
about the “interest” of the armed factions, moves one step to the 
side, explaining the convergence of criminal and political interests in 
the conflict. In the second group Rubio (1998a) and Rangel (1998) 
differentiate between the groups and the political goals, explaining 
the motivation of individuals to use political flags for their own rational 
interests. Pécaut (2001) promotes the idea of a ‘war against the 
society’, exposing armed actors as criminals attacking unarmed 
civilians. Recently, Gustavo Duncan (2006) underpinned the idea of 
a new period in Colombian conflict (since 1991) when the armed 
conflict was transformed into a ‘war of lords’ with regional armies 
under the command of drug enterprises (mixing members of the 
guerrilla, the paramilitary groups, the national army or police, the 
local and national politician, judges, academics, businessmen, etc.). 
 
In this thesis, we are following the idea that actors in conflict do not 
have “incompatible interest” but accepting the convergence of 
criminal and political interest which is, by definition, “incompatible”. In 
terms of criminal confrontation, I strongly agree with the idea of 
“incompatible interest”, but in the political conflict I believe that actors 
are “moving” positions in a long-lasting conflict. In this sense, the 
idea of Duncan (2006) of a “war of lords” is just explaining the 
criminal confrontation, but not the political one. In fact, facing this 
range of options to explain the Colombian conflict, some authors – 
including myself – prefer to write about the “violence(s)” and the 
“conflict(s)” in plural (Marcella and Schulz, 1999) as a way to 
understand that the long-lasting presence of armed gangs is 
transforming the conflict (Salamanca, 2007), allowing the debate to 
remain open. 
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In the analytical field we have studies on the “causes” of the conflict, 
theories about the persistence and resilience of the conflict, and 
some works proposing solutions. In this direction, Pizarro (1996) 
explains the guerrillas as a social and political phenomenon, 
analyzes their roots and exposes the objectives of the subversion; 
Becker (1968) and Posada (1995) later attempt to discover and 
analyze the causes of the conflict from the point of view of economic 
inequality. Also – following this direction –, is the work of Nazih 
(1997), who argues that the violence is the result of a combination of 
land distribution inequities with the stronghold of guerrilla groups and 
mishandling by military institutions. Differently, Sanin (2006) shows 
how the violence associated with criminal activities is the real 
problem as opposed to the violence resulting from the armed conflict. 
Another branch of studies is focused on the “state security” problem 
(Leal, F, 1994; 2002) or the human security approach (Mason and 
Tickner, 2002; Mason, 2004); the “correlations” between the 
Colombian conflict and regional issues (Pizarro, 1996; Rangel, 2001; 
Nasi, 2002); or the international impact of this conflict (Tickner, 2003; 
Mason and Tickner, 2003; Ramirez, 2004; Londoño and Carvajal 
2004; Kurtenbach, 2005). 
 
Another direction of analytical studies is focused on the “effects” and 
the reconfiguration of the conflict. Some works identify the direct and 
indirect costs of the armed conflict, including: Granada and Rojas 
(1995), Bejarano and Echandía (1997), Badel and Trujillo (1998), 
Rubio (1997) and Pinto et al. (2004). Some case studies have shown 
that the guerrillas became ‘hotbeds’ of corruption and inefficiency for 
local governments (Rangel, 1997) or that both the guerrillas and 
paramilitary groups have sought to influence local decision areas, 
and have, in some areas, become figures of authority, power and 
order in local life (González, Bolívar and Vásquez, 2002 and Duncan, 
2006). González, Bolívar and Vásquez (2002) also examine – from a 
theoretical perspective – the effects of conflict on the legitimacy of 
government, particularly the alternative orders emerging side-by-side 
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with the state. Similarly, some concepts have emerged such as “the 
capture of the state” (captura del Estado) and the “co-opted state 
reconfiguration” (reconfiguración cooptada del Estado) proposed by 
Garay et al. (2008), or “armed clientelism” (clientelismo armado) 
defined as the private appropriation of public goods through the 
threat of weapons (Rangel, Borrero and Ramírez, 2004). In the same 
vein, in the first decade of the 21st century, the interest on studying 
the effects of violence on variables that can influence economic and 
social development, such as school enrolment, access to social 
security, child mortality and political participation grew up (Sánchez 
and Díaz, 2007). Some studies have also looked at life expectancy, 
education, human security and personal income (Pnud, 2003). Engel 
et al (2007) used statistical analysis to establish the vulnerabilities of 
specific populations to displacement; and Echeverry (2002) focused 
his work on economic variables exploring the negative impact of the 
conflict on economic growth, investment, consumption, fiscal deficits 
and macroeconomic aspects of public expenditure. Querubín (2003) 
analyzes the impact of conflict, at a regional level (counties), on long 
term economic growth; Sánchez and Chacón (2005) and Rubio 
(2002) are focused on fiscal indicators and how decentralization has 
influenced the armed conflict26. Holmes et al (2007) examines the 
conflict using econometric and cartographic analyses; and Rocha 
(2003) shows the economic impact of drug trafficking. Recently, 
Rettberg (2008) specified the analysis of the direct and indirect costs 
for the private business sector trying to grow in a country in conflict. 
 
The present thesis contributes to this sub-group of analytical works 
by analysing the functioning of some state institutions at local, 
regional and national levels and its impact on the conflict. Working 
with local communities allowed the presentation of data about the 
local violence associated with drug trafficking enabling a balance 
between Nazih (1997) and Sanin (2006) positions reading the conflict 
                                                 
26  One of the few works about the effects of political decisions on the conflict. 
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in Colombia, and in-line with González, Bolívar and Vásquez (2002) 
and Duncan (2006) studies on governance of land by non-state 
groups. 
 
In terms of studies about peace in Colombia, we found studies on the 
national peace processes (such as: Bejarano, A.M. 1990; García-
Durán, 1992; Bejarano, J. 1995; Villamizar, 1997; Chernick, 1999; 
Palacios, 1999; Medina and Sánchez, 2003; Pardo, 2004)27, or 
studies on the regional peace processes (Consejería Presidencial 
para la Política Social, 2002), but few studies are focused on the 
“peace” aspects of the conflict, i.e. the possibilities and obstacles for 
peace in the country from the perspective of conflict theories or 
peace building studies (Bejarano, 1995). This thesis is following the 
path of writing such as that of Alape (1998a) who argues for the 
bottom-up construction of peace processes; Leal, F (1999) compiling 
voices on the past, present and future of peace; Chernick (2000) 
analyzing the position of the actors in the conflict toward peace; 
Bejarano, A.M. (2003) who presents the complexity of advancing any 
peace agreement in Colombia; Departamento Nacional de 
Planeación (1998), Nieto (2001), Corredor (2001), or Llorente et al. 
(2005) worked on the cost of peace; or recently Rettberk’s (2002 and 
2004) analysis of the involvement of the private sector in promoting 
the peace in Colombia.28 So far, the literature about peace and 
conflict in Colombia does not cover the study performed in this thesis 
about reconstruction processes during war driven by the necessity of 
peace. 
 
                                                 
27  We also found studies on specific successful peace processes, but most of 
them are ‘anecdotal’: with M-19 (Zuluaga, 1999), EPL (Villarraga and Plazas, 
1994) – and his reintegration into civilian life (Alape, 1996) – and Quintín Lame 
(Peñaranda, 1999). Studies on the failure of peace negotiations include: Caracas 
and Tlaxcala (Bejarano, 1995; Kline, 2001); Caguán (Valencia, 2002; Pastrana, 
2004). 
28  Equally, in the past few years some authors such as García-Durán (2006) 
or Bouvier (2009) have started to study the local and national peace movement 
from the CINEP database, moving away from the more common focus of national 
peace negotiations. 
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Specifically, this thesis is part of the sub-group of work on the 
Colombian conflict focused on the understanding of the correlation 
between land and conflict in Colombia; such as Moncayo (2008), 
Forero (2008), Patridge (2006), Vidal (2006), Gallón (2006), Fajardo 
(2005), and many others who have argued that the solution to the 
Colombian conflict and to displacement must address the land 
problem in Colombia. Through interviews during the fieldwork, this 
thesis will help construct a “narrative” of the violence and conflict in 
Colombia29; the compilation of testimonies and the direct observation 
from the researcher will contribute to an understanding of what 
happened in this region during this specific period. Also, its analytical 
approach to the fieldwork findings will promote the study of the 
“effects” of government activities to restore normalcy before the end 
of the actual conflict – this approach is in line with the limited studies 
of the effects of political decisions on the Colombian conflict (such as 
Dudley and Murillo [1998] on the relationship between the oil industry 
and the conflict; Sánchez and Chacón [2005] and Rubio [2002] 
analysing how decentralization has influenced the armed conflict; or 
Pecaut [2006] describing how the conflict was handled by previous 
                                                 
29  Many works about the Colombian conflict are predominantly historical 
studies, and we can label most of this work as narrative, without diminishing their 
contributions to an understanding of the Colombian conflict. Some of the trending 
topics by the most significant authors of historical studies are on the bipartisan 
violence or the origins of the conflicts in the 19th century including: Oquist, 1978; 
Sánchez and Meertens, 1983; Gilhodes, 1985; Sánchez, 1985; Comisión de 
Estudios sobre la Violencia, 1995; Palacios, 1995; Pardo, 2004) or studies focused 
on the present violence (Pecaut, 1997; Rangel, 1998; Rubio, 1998). Historical 
recounts of the actors in the conflict include: FARC (Pizarro, 1991; Alape, 1998; 
Ferro and Uribe, 2002; Ortiz, 2005); ELN (Medina Gallego, 1996; Corporación 
Observatorio para la Paz, 2001), and paramilitary groups (Romero, 2003; 
International Crisis Group, 2003; Rangel, 2005; Duncan, 2005). There are also 
studies on the Colombian armed forces such as those of Dávila (1998) and Vargas 
(2002). Many others authors are working on a diversity of topics in the study of 
Colombian conflict: Kirk (1998a), highlighting the problem of refugees; Leal, C. 
(2003) showing the geographical distribution of the conflict; Murillo (2006) who 
discusses tensions between the Colombian government and indigenous 
communities; Youngers (1998) on the relationship between the USA and the 
Colombian conflict; Sánchez (1990) focused on the relationship between politics, 
society and narcotics in the conflict and López and Camacho (2003) exposing the 
growing power of drug dealers in the conflict. Some other authors (such as 
LeGrand, 2003) are rooting the violence in nineteenth and twentieth-century 
events; Chernick (1988), Vargas (1998), Dishman (2001) and Ortiz (2002) examine 
changes in the FARC; Watson (1990), Kirk (1998) and Chernick (1998) study the 
paramilitary groups; and Dudley and Murillo (1998) explore the relationship 
between the oil industry and the Colombian conflict. 
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governments). In terms of the study of “peace aspects” of the conflict, 
this study is seminal. To date, researchers have barely focused their 
work on the reconstruction processes advanced by the Colombian 
government; even less on the non-military protection programs 
 
The “Land and Property Protection Program” (LPPP) 
 
In Colombia during the forties and fifties, and in parallel with 
bipartisan violence spreading across the country, the government 
started what is known as the ‘modernization’ of administrative, 
military and economical apparatus in Colombia. This process is the 
origin of a state-led big-scale strategy of social policies to mitigate or 
to stop violence problems. Its frontline program, in terms of 
reconstruction, was proposed and led, in 1962, by General Alberto 
Ruíz Novoa. The “Plan Lazo”30 was designed to restore order in the 
country, and it was typically focused on addressing armed gangs and 
the so-called “communist threat”, which was described as the attempt 
by foreign countries to destabilize the Colombian government 
through armed revolution based on the discomfort of rural peasants 
with the violence, lived at the time. This plan was mainly a military 
one, but it also established the need to develop civic-military actions 
to improve living conditions in rural areas and to infiltrate and gather 
information about armed groups. This interpretation of the Plan Lazo 
is “(…) not shared by many analysts (…)” (Vargas, 2008:326), 
however it is supported by several well-respected professors such as 
Francisco Leal Buitrago and Armando Borrero. Opposition to this 
interpretation is founded in the mixed developmental and anti-
communist vision of those days: "The developmental vision of 
                                                 
30  The discussion concerning the truth of this operation stems from the name 
itself: often referred to as "Laso" or "Lasso", it evokes a U.S. plan called "Latin 
American Security Operation" which was the main program of U.S. intervention in 
Latin American countries. This program is often compared with recent military 
strategies such as Plan Patriota or Plan Colombia, even if in nature they are totally 
different. The real name is "Lazo (loop)" because, as the name suggests, it was a 
strategy of encircling, uniting and binding (together), and involved various actors 
and objectives not just military ones. 
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General Ruiz was not contrary to his anti-communist ideas, heritage 
of his participation in the Korean War. The General said that 
Communist influence was possible because of the backwardness of 
the society and the problems that this entailed. So the 'Structural 
reform' was required to eradicate subversion and that is why he was 
critical of the lack of reforms by the State” (Leal, 2002:22).31 In 1965, 
General Ruíz was sacked from command of this strategy because 
his success gave him ascendance in the political life of the country 
(Leal, 2002:23), and allowed him to be a strong critic of political 
elites. 
 
This strategy was based on the experiences of the French in the 
Indochina war, the ‘Peace by development’ vision of General Rojas 
Pinilla and the rehabilitation program of President Alberto Lleras, but 
added a key element: the idea of peace through the control of 
violence and the solving of peoples’ needs. It was a huge success, 
as Leal Buitrago observes: “(…) it ended the gangs” (Leal, 
2002:47).32 Later this successful strategy was badly-led by the 
propaganda spread by Congressman Álvaro Gómez Hurtado about 
the “repúblicas independientes”.33 This anti-crime strategy was 
modified to be used against the popular peasant movement, with the 
consequence in 1964 of the creation of the FARC organization after 
the Marquetalia combats. This criminalization of peasants, organized 
in self-defense groups led to a new guerrilla war that continues 
                                                 
31  “La visión desarrollista del General Ruíz no era contraria a sus ideas 
anticomunistas, herencia de su participación en la Guerra de Corea. El General 
afirmaba que la influencia comunista era posible por causa del atraso de la 
sociedad y los problemas que conllevaba. Por eso la ‘Reforma de las estructuras’ 
era requisito para erradicar la subversión y por eso mismo fue crítico de la 
ausencia de reformas por parte del Estado” (Leal, 2002:22). 
32  A detailed account of Plan Lazo can be found in James Henderson’s book: 
La modernización en Colombia: los años de Laureano Gómez, 1889-1965, 
published by Universidad de Antioquia in 2006. The parallel with the infiltration 
process, human and technical intelligence that is currently developed by the 
Colombian government – and which also has been very successful – is evident. 
33  “Independent republics” was a clear and malicious reference to the loss / 
separation of Panama as a result of the ‘Thousand Days War’. Álvaro Gómez 
sought to revive the fear of territorial disintegration resulting from the political wars 
experienced by Colombia at the time. 
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today. From this time until early eighties, this mixture of social policy 
with military action was driven by United States foreign policies in the 
region, particularly with the “Alliance for Progress” strategy. This 
work hand-in-hand of counterinsurgency policies (Gilbert, 2008:6), 
economic policies and state’s presence in the regions was not 
successful in terms of addressing or solving the problems of the 
country. Particularly, the National Front agreement in charge of the 
government decided to separate between rural pacification – with the 
weight of this strategy in charge of the military and without political or 
economic l support –, and urban development – handled by political 
elites. 
 
In terms of social programs, from 1982 to 1986, the so-called 
‘Secretaría de integración popular’ and, from 1986 to 1994, the “Plan 
Nacional de Rehabilitación (National Reconstruction Plan)” were 
designed as mitigation programs for collateral damages of war, but 
not as a developmental strategy. From 1994 the government 
launched the “Red de solidaridad social (Solidarity network)” which is 
the direct antecedent of Acción Social. 
 
As mentioned before, during decades, the country charged the 
Armed forces with the duty of stopping violence but they lacked the 
necessary support and resources – this situation led to paramilitary 
horror in the last two decades of the XXth century, many times with 
the consent or the impotence of state officials (Pizarro, 2004). 
Politically, the country sought peace through dialogue from 1982 until 
today. The last step in this dream was the “Zona de distención del 
Caguán”, from 1999 to 2002, when the country gambled on the 
peace dialogues with the FARC guerrilla, which, finally, proved being 
futile. Since 2002, the government has focused on the military 
strategy with the “Plan Colombia” (supported by the USA), the local 
“Impuesto de Guerra (War fare)”, and the re-installed military strategy 
of territorial control proposed in the sixties by ‘Plan Lazo’. Under the 
leadership of the CCAI – Centro de Coordinación de la Acción 
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Integral – the government and society follow the idea that no military 
action (concentrated in space or sustained in time) will change the 
internal conflict without the whole support of the Colombian state.34 
The logic behind this is quite simple: a main characteristic of the 
Colombian conflict is the so-called ‘state absence’, so, a change in 
the dynamics of the conflict depends on ‘state presence’. The 
strategy has three phases. In the first phase a military strategy of 
territorial control and destruction of drug labs and illicit crops is 
developed. In the second phase the military and police groups take 
control of urban areas and establish defensive positions which in turn 
allow the presence of other state agencies offering educational and 
basic services; the state also provides a budget for economic and 
social rehabilitation of those areas. The last phase is the permanent 
presence of the state in the area, normalizing daily life 
(www.accionsocial.gov.co). In terms of the social programs specially 
designed to help inhabitants of recovered territories, the Colombian 
government has programs such as: ‘Familias Guardabosques 
(Forest-guards families)’, ‘Sustitución de cultivos (illicit crops 
exchange)’, ‘Familias en Acción (Families in Action)’ and 
‘Erradicadores Manuales (Manual illicit crops eradication)’. The 
Acción Social agency leads these programs. 
 
Through this brief summary, we have now arrived to the actual 
context wherein the Colombian government is developing the LPP 
program to solve just one small part of this complex puzzle. Some 
other interesting parts of this strategy are the “Peace and Justice 
Law” (Law 795 of 2005), which is proclaimed as the ‘last’ Pardon 
process in the country; the creation of the CNRR – Comisión 
                                                 
34  CCAI is composed of permanent members: Ministry of Government and 
Justice, of Defense, of Social affairs, of Agriculture with Acción social, ICBF (Child 
Protection agency), Sena (Labour training agency), Fiscalía (Prosecutor office), 
Coldeportes (Competitive and recreational sports agency), and Registraduría 
(Registry office), and sporadic invitation to other Ministry or state agencies such as: 
Planeación nacional (National planning office), DAS (Intelligence agency), Banco 
agrario (Agrarian bank), Consejo Superior de la Judicatura (Justice administration 
agency), Defensoría del pueblo (Civil rights protection office), and any other public 
or private institution as needed. 
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Nacional de Reparación y Reconciliación – by the same law; the co-
governance of the Constitutional Court (facing the displacement 
problem via jurisprudences); and the recent “Victims and Land 
restitution Law” (Law 1448 of 2011)35 which creates the “Unidad 
Administrativa Especial de Gestión de Restitución de Tierras 
Despojadas” (Agency in charge of Land Restitution). To understand 
the importance of the LPPP, it is important to remember that the 
inequity in land distribution in Colombia, fuelled by drug money and 
the unequal distribution of resources, has involved vast 
environmental damage related to the expansion of the agricultural 
frontier and also because of the agricultural practices associated with 
legal crops dedicated only to exportation products or the well-known 
illicit crops. Moreover, this inequity in land distribution has caused or 
has been achieved by the forced displacement of peasant and 
indigenous populations. This process has gone hand-in-hand with an 
urban economic development model which ignored rural issues. This 
situation has fuelled social and armed conflicts in Colombia, leading 
to a systematic use of violence that has prevented – paradoxically, 
as professor Alejandro Reyes points out (2009) – the success of any 
policy trying to solve the problem of land or the social problems of the 
rural population in Colombia. Undeniably, as Moncayo (2008), Forero 
(2008), Patridge (2006), Vidal (2006), Gallón (2006), Fajardo (2005), 
and many others have argued, the solution to the Colombian conflict 
and to displacement must address the land problem in Colombia.  
 
The specific program studied in this thesis, and presented as case 
exemplifying During-war reconstruction, is the "Protección de Tierras 
y Patrimonio de la Población Desplazada” (Protection of Land and 
Property of the Displaced Population) program advanced by the 
                                                 
35  In June 2011 the Colombian government approved the Law 1448 of 2011. 
This law is not about ‘protection of lands’ but ‘restitution’, that is why I am not 
boarding it in full; however it is important to highlight that it is partially the result and 
the necessary step forward of the DWR strategy (in terms of reparation to victims 
and of land restitution) and the LPP program analyzed in this thesis. 
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Colombian government through Acción Social36 – Agencia 
presidencial para la acción social y la cooperación internacional 
(Social Action – Presidential Agency for Social Action and 
International Cooperation).37 The program is operating with a project 
manager, seven national work-teams,38 and nine local work-teams,39 
financed through the modality of International Cooperation. Under 
this modality, resources from the Colombian government are 
supplemented with resources from the World Bank PCF – Post-
Conflict Fund – and various other Cooperation sources, such as: 
USAID, IOM, UNHCR, SIDA, the European Commission, and the 
Canadian Government. The coverage of the program is nationwide. 
The program is focused on the need: "To support the implementation 
of legal, institutional and community property protection of the 
                                                 
36  The "Presidential Agency for Social Action and International Cooperation" 
was created by Decree 2467 in 2005 for the implementation of all social programs 
attached to the Presidency of the Republic, and it also coordinates the 
development of international cooperation policy with The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. In its role as executor of the social policy of the Colombian state it is 
responsible for coordinating inter-agency assistance to vulnerable populations in 
Colombia that are affected by poverty, drug trafficking and violence. In its 
coordinating role for international cooperation it promotes technical and financial 
non-refundable national and international co-operation. The institution was formed 
from the merger of two previous institutions: Red de Solidaridad Social – RSS (the 
Social Solidarity Network) (which was responsible for the Care of Victims of 
Violence, Support for the Displaced Population and Food Security Network 
programs) and Agencia Colombiana de Cooperación Internacional – ACCI (the 
Colombian Agency of International Cooperation). Similarly, Acción Social 
assimilated the Fondo de Inversión para la Paz, FIP (Investment Fund for Peace), 
which funded the social component of Plan Colombia (Families in Action, Ranger 
Families, Productive Projects, Social Infrastructure and Socio-Labour Retraining); 
and the Fondo para la Reconstrucción y el Desarrollo del Eje Cafetero, FOREC 
(created after the 1999 earthquake). This institution is also responsible for 
coordinating the National System for Integral Attention to the Displaced Population 
(Sistema Nacional de Atención Integral a la Población Desplazada – SNAIPD), and 
the system of care for victims of violence. As well as a Director General, Acción 
Social has a Board of Directors. It comprises: the Director of the Administrative 
Department of the Presidency of the Republic, who acts as the chairperson (or his 
deputy); the Minister of Foreign Affairs or the Deputy Minister for Multilateral 
Affairs; and three delegates appointed by the President of the Republic.  
37  From 2011 the government of President Juan Manuel Santos is proposing 
to change the program to the Ministry of Agriculture. 
38  Teams: Protection (dealing with the essence of the program); Legal and 
supportive team in reparation and restoration processes; Monitoring and 
evaluation; Ethnic groups; Regional and local evaluation; Administrative; and, 
Communications. 
39  Teams by regions: Antioquia, Caribe, Centro, Santander and Magdalena 
medio; Chocó; Nariño; Norte de Santander; Tolima-Huila; Valle and Cauca. 
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displaced population, or at risk of displacement, in priority areas of 
the country in order to mitigate the effects of displacement and 
facilitate their socio-economic stabilization" 
(www.accionsocial.gov.co). The beneficiaries are: "Peasants, 
settlers, indigenous and Afro-Colombians who exercise rights to land 
as owners, possessors, holders or occupiers, in a situation of 
imminent risk of displacement or affected by this phenomenon". 
Activities conducted by the program are: 
 
• “Support for the implementation of protective 
measures (individually and collectively) arising from 
the implementation of Law 387 of 1997, Decrees 
2007 of 2001, 250 of 2005, and other rules. 
• Institutional Strengthening: support, outreach, 
awareness, training and advisory services to 
institutions and bodies of SNAIPD with competence 
in the protection of land rights and territory. 
• Community Strengthening: outreach, awareness 
and training to communities, leaders and social 
organizations about land rights and their protection 
mechanisms”. (www.accionsocial.gov.co) 
 
The impact of the program is expressed as: "The development of the 
project will help prevent the occurrence of displacement, generates 
roots in the territory, triggers expedited procedures for the 
adjudication, alienation and certification of lands from INCODER, 
strengthens the institutional capacities of response to this 
phenomenon, facilitates the recognition of rights over land that holds 
the displaced population, and guides the community about the 
mechanisms to protect them". (www.accionsocial.gov.co). By July 
2010, the program had already protected 3,799,386 Ha, covering 
115,494 properties and 142,931 rights of 107,088 people. 
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The particularities of this program for this thesis are summarized as: 
it is a government program that involves a mobilization of resources 
via international cooperation; the agency in charge of the program – 
Acción Social – is responsible for social policy of the Colombian 
State; their actions fall into a state policy that explicitly combines 
security components with development, and there is a legal and 
public policy milieu that can be used to discuss the perceived 
realities acquired ‘in the field’. The combination of these components 
ensures that the thesis is not an 'assessment' of the program or 
policy, but, rather, is researching a case implicated in a policy that 
clearly combines development and security and is done in a conflict 
scenario. Although, it is therefore unnecessary to 'invent' a 
connection between the program and the Colombian conflict it 
remains necessary to investigate how this connection works and 
establish its impacts. To understand the importance of the LPPP, it is 
important to remember that the inequity in land distribution in 
Colombia, fuelled by drug money and the unequal distribution of 
resources, has involved vast environmental damage related to the 
expansion of the agricultural frontier and also because of the 
agricultural practices associated with legal crops for export products 
and, of course, illicit crops. Moreover, this inequity in land distribution 
has caused or has been achieved by the forced displacement of 
peasant and indigenous populations. This process has gone hand-in-
hand with an urban economic development model which ignored 
rural issues. This situation has fuelled social and armed conflicts in 
Colombia, leading to a systematic use of violence that has prevented 
– paradoxically, as professor Alejandro Reyes points out (2009) – the 
success of any policy trying to solve the problem of land or the social 
problems of the rural population in Colombia.  
 
In the present study, the specific case of analysis is the situation of 
the LPP program in the Valle del Cauca region, Colombia; 
specifically in two locations. It is clear that the conflict in the study 
area varies geographically and over time. The capital city of Valle del 
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Cauca is Cali. This was the home of the "Cali Cartel" led by the 
Rodriguez Orejuela brothers. Considered the second largest drug 
trafficker in the country, the group distinguishes itself by maintaining 
a business profile and – unlike Pablo Escobar’s "Medellin Cartel" – 
keeping violence to a minimum during their clashes with the state. 
With the capture, conviction and subsequent extradition to the United 
States of the Rodriguez Orejuela brothers, a second phase began in 
the drug trade in the region. The "Norte del Valle Cartel" is now 
dominant and they are well known for their brutality and violence 
including the use of hired assassins, massacres, kidnappings, 
extortion, arming of paramilitary groups, and the use of terror and 
forced displacement. The violence of these groups of drug traffickers 
is often directed towards Afro-Colombian communities in the North of 
Valle and in Chocó. To the south of the Departamento, FARC are in 
control of drug trafficking and constitute the main source of violence. 
This guerrilla outfit was not historically associated with this area, but 
other guerrillas used to operate from the Cauca to the south of Valle 
and to Cali. Two demobilized groups – Quintin Lame (indigenous 
guerrillas) and M-19 (urban warfare) – fought against the state in this 
region for decades. The arrival of the FARC continues the process of 
expansion of illicit crops from the south-east of the country. 
 
FARC currently concentrates its activity in the port of Buenaventura 
and the south of the country. Currently two hot zones of combat are 
in the area (during the whole period of this research 2008-2011). The 
first one is the entrance point in the so-called Cañón de las 
Hermosas (Las Hermosas Canyon) and the indigenous region of 
Caloto and Caldono towns in Cauca (where heavy combat is 
currently underway); where FARC are trying to connect their 
operations via the central mountains between the center and south of 
the country (Departamentos of Tolima and Huila); and with the 
Farallones de Cali to the west and south of the country 
(Departamentos of Chocó and Cauca). The second one is the exit 
point in the sea coast from the port of Buenaventura to the port of 
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Tumaco. The guerrilla group is responsible for displacements, 
kidnappings and terrorist activities at the center and south of Valle 
del Cauca. The activities of paramilitaries in this region are 
concentrated around the drug trade. Typically this involves groups of 
“sicarios” (hired killers) committing robberies, murders, kidnappings 
and massacres throughout the department following instructions from 
business groups, politicians and the armed forces linked to drug 
cartels. They are responsible for selective displacement (affecting 
individuals more so than communities). Nowadays (2010-2011), 
heavy fighting is occurring in the so-called Cañón de las Garrapatas 
(Las Garrapatas Canyon), where they are hiding the illicit production 
of drugs and the traffic of arms, connecting the central part of the 
Valle del Cauca with Panama and the Urabá Gulf. There is also a 
strong presence of small criminal gangs specialized in committing 
robberies, murders, abductions, threats, counterfeiting, money 
laundering, or providing security to other interest groups. These 
illegal activities are performed as part of their own agenda, or for a 
third-party (for a fee). These operations are conducted from the city 
of Cali, but have links extending abroad (to cities in the U.S. and 
Europe), and northward to the Departamentos of the so-called Eje 
Cafetero. 
 
Historically civil society in the Valle del Cauca is recognized as one 
of the most active, cohesive and progressive in the country. It has a 
strong business sector driven by agro-industry, and is characterized 
by progressive worker-boss relationships (by Colombian standards). 
However, the penetration of the mafia culture from the sixties was 
widespread throughout the Departamento and in all sectors of 
society. This weakness of civil society allows the coexistence of 
violence, as elsewhere in the country. Even more, as Francisco 
Thoumi (2005) argues, the weakness of civil society is causing the 
violence. Colombia is a country of regions, with different control 
centers in each region as well as different geographies and histories. 
It is true that there is a nation called Colombia, which broadly shares 
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general historical lines, some values and symbols, but it is also true 
that in reality there are many "Colombia(s)" within the nation. 
 
The Land and Property Protection Program (LPPP) in Valle del 
Cauca is a program designed by the Colombian government to stop 
the use of small farmers land as a weapon and bounty of war. As it 
will be exposed below, it is a form of during war reconstruction which 
“fits” the proposed definition. 
 
In the next section, I will establish the existing lacuna in academic 
and humanitarian studies about protection of land rights during 
conflict. This kind of reconstruction is the framework of the specific 
state program addressed in my case study. 
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Chapter two:  Conflict and land protection 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Academic studies are usually focused on Restitution of Land Rights 
in post-conflict situations (Estrada, 2002; Leckie, 2003; Davies, 2004; 
Foblets and von Trotha, 2004a; Povrzenic, 2005; Brun, 2005; 
Aursnes and Foley, 2005; Williams, 2005; Leckie, 2006; Leckie, 
2007; Houte, Delmartino and Yi, 2008; Leckie, 2009; Bowden, 2009; 
Ballard, 2010)40 and the reconstruction strategy of Protection of Land 
                                                 
40  Post-war restoration of Property rights under international Law by Hans 
Van Houtte, Bart Delmartino and Iasson Yi is the ‘manual’ on this topic. They cover 
the ‘tributes’ and ‘indemnities’ of ancient history and the middle ages right up to the 
‘legal responsibility and reparation’ in modern wars. Also, it deals with all kind of 
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Rights during warfare has been understudied (Deng, 2003; United 
Nations, 2005). My interest in this particular type of reconstruction is 
linked to its growing importance. From an extensive review of the 
literature and my own personal experience working in this field, I 
argue two highly-significant possible consequences of protecting land 
rights during conflict: 
 
a) One possible consequence is to avoid a type of war, 
consisting in just looting, through the protection of the rights of 
citizens and communities in conflict areas. No-one will be in position 
to initiate a conflict with the single or the main purpose of 
dispossessing other people of their properties. The control over the 
right of property will reduce the ‘opportunistic’ side of conflict. 
Similarly, the war will likely adhere to the field of politics due to the 
impossibility of using force to deprive citizens and communities of 
their property. Military action would be limited to obtaining the 
decisive advantage needed to crush the enemy's military potential, 
thus minimizing genocidal or retaliatory campaigns – if populations 
are convinced that governments support their property rights they 
can also flee without hesitation at the risk of attack.  
 
b) Reduce the post-conflict costs in terms of restitution 
processes, time, money and resources, and suffering for the people 
affected by war. It is important to initiate early proceedings for 
protection because are much more manageable than restitutions 
                                                                                                                            
cases, from domestic settlements to international mass claims programmes, and a 
detailed study of international rules protecting all kinds of property. Compensation 
and restitution are the options in the aftermath of war. When restitution is not 
possible, the other option is compensation. This is a completely different approach, 
because it implies a detachment from the place, the memories and the life-plan. 
“After a war, restitution of property will often be materially, politically, economically 
or legally impossible. Compensation, i.e. the transfer of cash or of goods dissimilar 
to the affected property, is then the appropriate remedy. In fact most contemporary 
international claims programmes have awarded compensation rather than 
restitution to ‘cover any financially assessable damage” (Houtte, 2008:271). In 
many cases, the compensation is seen as a victory for the perpetrators and should 
not be allowed (as in Bosnia, where restitution was mandatory under the peace 
agreements); but it is always a last chance for the dispossessed. 
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and, definitely, will reduce the consequences of violence over people. 
Protection during war will allow an early ending of the war for 
dispossessed people; and may also avoid an interminable 
bureaucratic process of claiming rights that typically lasts several 
years after the conclusion of any peace process. 
 
However, I also propose that these consequences are linked to two 
circumstantial situations: 
  
i) Today, a large number of conflicts are already under way 
before proceedings for protection commence. This means that the 
only option is to start during-war protection, or wait for the end of the 
conflict and initiate the restitution of land rights. 
 
ii) The legal and practical distinctions between those processes 
of reconstruction during-war which are exclusively devoted to military 
purposes, and those which are not, is unclear. This also poses a 
challenge in terms of identifying the effects that both have on the 
populations affected by conflict, and on the conflict itself. 
 
In the following, I will present the specifics of Restitution and 
Protection topics in order to valuate and compare these two kinds of 
reconstruction strategies. 
 
The reconstruction strategy of Restitution of Land Rights 
 
The experience of restitution programs is varied. Commensurate with 
the circumstances of the nation where it develops, the stages of the 
conflict, and available resources, each restitution program may 
achieve its goals, or not. But it is clear that any action must be in 
accordance with the interests and needs of the dispossessed, 
particularly refugees and IDPs. As Cathrine Brun (2005:2) points out: 
“Inappropriate planning can unnecessarily prolong relief stages of 
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humanitarian operations and affect subsequent recovery. Deeper 
understanding is needed of how war, disasters and displacement 
lead to social, political and economic changes that affect people’s 
preferences as to where and how they live. A home becomes a home 
when people have a choice. After a war or disaster people must be 
given the space to express their wishes for the future and to build 
their homes”. The task is to rebuild societies, communities, families 
and personal projects of life. As Povrzenic (2005: 7) observes 
commenting on the Balkans war: “Developing synergy with non-
housing projects is vital. Housing reconstruction is not just a physical 
project but must be a community-driven initiative linked to 
rehabilitation of infrastructure, support of livelihoods, de-mining and 
construction of health facilities, schools, mosques and churches”. 
The task of a restitution program cannot be reduced to the return of 
property or the rebuilding of housing – It is always something more, 
as I am to explain later. 
 
In practice, restitution programs are focused on ‘houses or land 
restitution or compensation’; however, some specific programs on 
restitution of ‘special goods’ are in practice; particularly items such as 
‘art’, ‘religious symbols’, ‘rare or historical goods’. This process 
includes several archaeological or artistic items returned from 
museums, art dealers or seized goods usually from United States 
and Europe in general to countries or individuals. At an international 
level, the ‘Intergovernmental Committee for Promoting the Return of 
Cultural Property to its Countries of Origin or its Restitution in Case 
of Illicit Appropriation’ led by The United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), seeks to establish a 
convention on ‘return, restitution of cultural property’. According to 
the Committee, diplomatic advances in this field include Italy’s 
restitution to Ecuador of 12.000 pre-Columbian objects and to 
Ethiopia the restitution of the Axum Obelisk; or the talks between 
Greece and the UK about the Parthenon marbles; or Turkey and 
Germany on the Bogusköy objects and the sphinx. On specific war-
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related situations, the recent return by Dutch authorities, the Syrian 
Government and the USA customs’ office of many stolen items from 
Iraq during the 2003 war in Iraq; and the continuing efforts of Jewish 
and Russian communities to recover art, jewelry and money stolen 
by Nazi troops during WWII show us that restitution programs always 
do involve the protection of culture and heritage. However, the 
attempt to recover all losses of domestic or personal items is far from 
possible, for three simple reasons: First, they are usually utilized by 
the aggressor in order to solve immediate needs and are just 
‘consumed’. Second, in the case of other long-lasting items the 
owner may not savor their return because the sensation of 
dispossession and the presence of the perpetrator are felt in the item 
itself (as happens in common robbery). Third, the money spent on 
attempting restitution will be higher than the money available for 
compensation. 
 
For the purposes of this thesis, I will focus our analysis of restitution 
programs in practice only to ‘land restitution programs’. Based on a 
survey of the literature I could classify this kind of programs as: a) an 
Agrarian reform; b) a Humanitarian effort; c) a Shelter or Productive 
solution; d) a case of Political will. It is clear that throughout history all 
restitution programs have had mixed elements. For example, after 
the Mexican revolution –1915-1941 – the land restitution program 
was an Agrarian reform guided by a Political will aimed to solve 
Shelter and Productive programs (Estrada, 1992:105-106). As Isabel 
Estrada explains, two simultaneous procedures were in practice after 
the Mexican revolution: restitution and re-distribution (cession / 
dotación) of lands. Although the first was under the political flag of 
revolutionary government, in reality the latter was the main program 
in practice. This amalgam of “compensation”, “land reform” and 
“restitution” helped to minimize some political tensions and the social 
tensions which survived in the post-conflict period. Bosnia after the 
Balkans war is another example. Here, the restitution (both restitution 
and compensation) was developed following the Political will as part 
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of a cease-fire agreement (Leckie, 2007a)41 and as a Humanitarian 
effort to rebuild communities and address human suffering (Williams, 
2005). Consequently it can be suggested that restitution programs 
evidence three possible strands of restitution practices: a) Return of 
land rights to legitimate owners; b) Relocation or compensation42 for 
displaced people; and c) Shelter and productive solutions to 
dispossessed people. In terms of who can benefit from the programs, 
it is interesting to observe the present idea of what is ‘just’ or ‘unjust’ 
for people during a reconstruction period is based on IHL’s 
separation of who is part of the war and who is not and, in that 
sense, who has and who must waive the right to claim compensation 
or restitution based on losses during war. But, at the same time, in 
humanitarian terms, it is not only refugees, IDPs, or not-combatants 
who lose their assets: combatants may do so as well. This challenge 
must be also addressed by governments during post-conflict 
reconstruction if they want to achieve peace. In this sense, the 
Colombian case is paradigmatic because it is working on 
‘demobilization’ and ‘reintegration’ programs for guerrilla and 
paramilitary groups, and the Law 1448 of 2011, law of “Victims and 
land restitution”, discusses compensation programs for all kind of 
                                                 
41  Not only in Bosnia, but also Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guatemala, and several 
others, according to specialized agencies: “Illustrating the growing realisation that 
addressing housing and property restitution rights and justly resolving any related 
housing or property disputes are crucial to long-term peace, a range of peace 
agreements have explicitly included provisions on housing, land and property 
restitution rights for refugees and displaced persons. Though Annex 7 of the 1995 
Dayton Accords ending the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina is the most widely 
known peace agreement enshrining restitution rights, additional agreements 
ending conflict in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guatemala and others incorporate, to 
varying degrees, the housing, land and property restitution rights of refugees and 
displaced persons” (Leckie, 2007:16). 
42  It is important to point out that: “(…) compensation is only viewed as an 
acceptable substitute for the physical recovery of original homes and lands when 
three key conditions are met: 1. When the restoration of housing, land or property 
rights is factually impossible; 2. When those possessing restitution rights voluntarily 
prefer compensation-based solutions; and even then, and; 3. Only following a 
determination to this effect by an independent and impartial tribunal or some 
legitimate and competent body without vested interests in the matters concerned” 
(Leckie, 2007a:25). 
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victims including combatants of all groups (even government troops) 
and their relatives43. 
 
According with the review of literature about restitution programs, I 
could highlight the specifics that must be addressed to evaluate 
them: 
 
—Access to, diffusion and generation of information about land 
losses and about restitution options. 
—Security during any claims process, during compensation or 
restitution, and during return processes. 
—Definition of land property rights, land use rights or dominium. 
—Access to and fulfillment of proper administrative paperwork and 
procedures for restitution processes. 
—Participation and definition of restitution policies and programs. 
 
One general and highly important issue is timing. I will not analyze it 
case by case. Instead, I will present a general rule: timing for 
claiming restitution rights could not be used to target specific sectors 
of IDPs. It is true that each process is different and could establish 
temporal frameworks, but, these could not be used as an excuse for 
religious, ethnic, racial, cultural or national discrimination. No 
discrimination, including discrimination on the grounds of residency, 
citizenship, language, gender, education or mobility. And, without 
doubt, discriminatory practices on right’s access should not be 
permitted. Another important issue is that of ‘inheritance rights’, 
because many of the IDPs are not the original owners. However, as 
                                                 
43  This “Law of victims and Land Restitution” (Law 1448 of 2011) was 
originally presented as two different laws but later became one single proposition. 
It was first presented in 2008 as a project by ex-president Alvaro Uribe, but was 
blocked in Congress. Later, the new President Juan Manuel Santos presented a 
reformed project which was discussed during the latter part of 2010, and was 
approved in June of 2011. The exceptions introduced by the law to the victims’ 
conditions are: close relatives of guerrilla or paramilitary groups killed in combat 
can not claim compensation except in those cases where they were direct victims; 
the law is designed to stop double compensation (administrative and by the law); 
and the law will establish limits to retrospective action –providing compensation for 
cases going back only to 1985 and restitutions of land back only to 1991. 
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noted before, these topics are not studied in detail; instead, I present 
a general rule for the presentation of these particularities when 
approaching cases i.e. that practices should be ‘blind’ to all of these 
potential sources of discrimination. In real life of course, several 
processes of restitution have been implemented leaving thousands of 
victims behind. 
 
Again, I can establish the actors that must be taken into account in 
the case studies: 
 
a) IDPs (whether owners or not) 
b) The State (political leaderships, government staff, and 
program staff) 
c) International Organizations (IO) (observing the process, 
financing the process, helping with the process) 
d) Civil Society (NGOs, victims’ organizations, communitarian 
organizations, communication media) 
e) Perpetrators (spoilers, members of a peace process) 
f) New owners (legal or illegal) – or secondary occupants 
 
As a result I can propose the classification of restitution practices into 
four types based on who leads the process: 
 
1. When the restitution effort is guided by the affected person 
 
In this first case, I establish that the search for the refund is made by 
the person who has lost the property subject to restitution. This 
situation is progressed through traditional legal mechanisms and the 
initiation of a legal proceeding of restitution of lost property. This 
mechanism exists permanently in societies where private property is 
legal and in line with the governments' need to protect that right. An 
example of this type of process after a conflict includes Cambodia, 
where Ballard (2010:463) reports that, in 1995, at least one family 
tried to recover an ancestral land abandoned during the Khmer 
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Rouge regime through legal proceedings. Other cases before the UN 
Human Rights Committee, include “Simunek v. Czech Republic 
(1995) and Adam v. Czech Republic (1996)” (Leckie, 2007a:34). 
Another example is the thousand cases presented by Romanians 
before the European Court of Justice claiming restitution of 
properties nationalized under communism. It should be noted that the 
Romanian case itself is part of a post-war process: in this case part 
of the action of the Soviet Union over the Eastern Europe republics 
during the Cold War. 
 
Turning to specifics, it appears that responsibility for the diffusion and 
generation of information – and access to it – rests solely on the 
owner (or their heirs) who wants to recover the property. They must 
gather information and muster the necessary legal resources. The 
safety of the people involved in these processes must be guaranteed 
by the state as part of its normal duties, as if the process were 
performed by an intermediary (e.g. a lawyer or a collective), thus 
helping to avoid violence because of the claim. What is important in 
this situation is to clarify ‘who is being sued?’ and ‘who must carry 
out or pay the restitution or the compensation?’ In the Cambodian 
case the claim concerned a field of collective use by a community. 
Here, it was important that the community recognized and accepted 
the claimants and incorporated them into the village, and this was 
achieved via the agency of a community elder. In the Romanian case 
it is intended that the government recognizes the rights of those who 
were dispossessed by the former communist regime. The definition 
of property rights, domain or use is the privilege of the judge or the 
courts, which ordered the parties to present arguments and 
documentation to support its decision making.  
 
All proceeedings dependent upon the individuals; and the role of 
government in these cases could be extended to establish some kind 
of ‘Full Stop Law’, or compensation or restitution programs to unlock 
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the judicial system;44 this decision could establish benchmarks for 
compliance. In the absence of state policies or programs, it is then up 
to judicial officers – who handle complaints – and government 
officials – who provide information on registration of land 
dispossession or institutional processes – to provide the information 
necessary to restore the property. However, a key obstacle to this 
type of process is the presence of officials who act on behalf of third 
parties or were part of the process of dispossession under previous 
regimes. The persistence of bureaucracies, related to periods in 
which arbitrary or unlawful45 processes were made against the 
property, any who may control access to documentation that may 
assist in land restitution processes, is a major obstacle to restitution. 
The role of international organizations (IO) could be serving as 
observers on specific cases (if – of course – those cases are 
presented to them) but also, as in the case presented to the 
European Court of Justice, IOs can themselves become impartial 
courts for claims – permanent or ad-hoc. The monitoring and support 
of the media and community organizations serves as a mechanism of 
communication of the existing possibilities for those who have been 
dispossessed, also, as supporters and guarantors of the process. 
Regarding the actions of new owners or of secondary occupants, I 
can say that they will probably become a civil party to the process 
and seek compensation if they lose the case and the property; or will 
try to prove their status as bona fide holders and, therefore, also 
victims in the process (in order to avoid being dispossessed). Such 
cases are likely to only lead to compensation and not restitution. 
                                                 
44  It could be covered by ‘one single rule’ laws, specialized agencies or 
programs, or a ‘cocktail’ of both: “Creating new mechanisms – both judicial and 
quasi-judicial in nature – to find ways of resolving such disputes is increasingly 
commonplace, as the experiences in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Kosovo, Tajikistan, Iraq and elsewhere attest. These mechanisms can be purely 
local, as is the case for example in Iraq, international, as for example in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, or a mixture of both.” (Leckie, 2007a:64). 
45  “An arbitrary act is one with no legal (or lawful) basis and is without 
normative justification. An unlawful act is one which is clearly contrary to the 
relevant law concerned, which can include both national and international legal 
standards” (Leckie, 2007a:19). 
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Offenders usually are not present in these types of cases and their 
activities are limited to disruption, denial or hiding from the processes 
through administrative officials who were party to the crimes. 
 
The cases of Georgia’s, Azerbaijan’s and Sri Lanka’s IDPs illustrate 
some other complexities of this kind of restitution. In Georgia, where 
up to 340,000 IDPs from the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia (supported by Russia) are trying to recover their rights 
to own property and return to their lands their expectations are very 
low, because the separatism was developed in order to ‘separate’ not 
only lands but peoples (DisplacementSolutions, 2008:9). However, 
“Efforts to support property restitution should be pursued 
independently of the preferred durable solution (return or integration)” 
(Aursnes & Foley, 2005:15), because property is a right that should 
not be forgotten. According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring 
Centre – IDMC – the same situation pertains in Azerbaijan where 
IDPs from the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave and neighboring provinces 
under Armenian control are unable to return to their properties. As in 
Georgia, the Azerbaijan Government seeks the return of its citizens 
to the area in dispute, and prevents the integration of its citizens in 
other parts of the nation, because they do not want to admit the loss 
of territories. In Sri Lanka a double displacement (war and natural 
disaster) pushed people to try to recover their lands; however, the 
lack of legal guarantees and lack of security and basic services has 
delayed the process. In both cases, the limited effort by the state to 
support or encourage IDPs to claim their rights was an obstacle to 
successful restitution processes; the role of IOs is limited to 
humanitarian assistance or to enlighten people regarding their 
available options. These cases illustrate some added complexities to 
individual restitution practices: the ethnic component of some 
conflicts and the possibility of mixed natural and human disasters. 
 
In general, I can summarize the problems with this type of process in 
three fundamentals: a) it takes excessive time to achieve a result 
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through the courts; b) the costs must be incurred by the applicant; 
and, c) the lack of impartiality of the bureaucratic apparatus that 
retains control of the courts and information and has previously taken 
part in the dispossession process. However, in general, these types 
of processes occur after long periods of time and not immediately 
after the dispossession. They do not usually imply a humanitarian 
crisis and are seen as cases enrolled in civil and administrative 
courts. The academic study of this type of case has been generally 
limited to lawyers. Their findings should be disseminated to other 
researchers on reconstruction and property restitution topics.  
 
2. When the restitution effort is guided by Community groups 
 
I have identified three types of community groups that usually lead 
processes of restitution: groups of victims, political organizations, and 
organizations of direct community action. Groups of victims can apply 
political pressure or present direct claims as a group before national 
or international courts. Political organizations usually pay attention to 
restitution processes because of the potential political dividends (they 
can campaign around it during elections and they lobby and generate 
institutional pressure to secure approval of state programs, etc.). 
Organizations of direct community action develop restitution 
processes of property by using physical force through denouncement 
campaigns and land occupation. Depending on the conflict, each of 
these organizations has different options vis-à-vis any action 
repertoires.  
 
For example, in political conflicts both victims organizations and 
political organizations are present, as in the case of Guatemala 
(Williams, 2007:43) where URNG – Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional 
Guatemalteca (a guerrilla confederation) – signed for peace in 1996 
with the Government and agreed to programs of land restitution 
supported by indigenous and peasant organizations, which allowed 
them to develop a capacity for political organization. In this case the 
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restitution process was not effective because it was part of a series 
of agreements that were fundamentally about seeking political 
advantage (the political party of the URNG became, in 1999, 
Guatemala’s third political party, before splitting and eventually losing 
significance) and they only benefitted a limited number of victims. As 
the NGO, Displacement Solutions, observes, in practice the peace 
accords were ineffective “with the result that while many repatriating 
refugee communities were able to negotiate the return to their homes 
or allocation of suitable alternative land, IDPs were left to their own 
devices in peri-urban shantytowns” (DisplacementSolutions, 2008:9). 
 
In another example, it appears that in conflicts with social origins 
both victims’ organizations and those involved in direct community 
action are prepared to use force and seize property. This is common 
amongst Colombia’s indigenous afro-descendant and peasant 
organizations, which take lands from landowners and/or expand 
agricultural frontiers via processes of colonization. In this situation 
IDPs, victims and minority groups are forced to obtain land by force 
in order to solve humanitarian crises and meet their productive 
needs. Significantly, these types of processes have been identified 
as a key to understand social conflict in Colombia (Marulanda, 1991). 
Limited productive land compels the peasants to take land by force, 
but these unlawful ‘occupations’ forces peasants to organize 
themselves into armed groups to protect their gains (Varela, 2006). 
Thus, in these cases, the benefits are often short-term and generate 
continuing acts of violence. Further, information about the on-going 
process of occupation is treated as confidential between members of 
the organizations, and its dissemination creates security problems. 
There are no government guarantees in the process of restitution, or 
occupation, and instead groups tend to be victims of state action. 
Only a position of strength (the support of armed groups) or State 
weaknesses allow them to retain the lands they have acquired by 
force. Consequently, occupants are unlikely to keep the lands for 
very long or develop long term community restitutions, except in 
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cases featuring state supported peace or social agreements (where 
the state is usually obliged to compensate the owners who originally 
owned the property). Similarly, where occupation or negotiation 
processes are supported by political organizations, these tend to be 
organizations that arose from a profound change in the conditions of 
the country rather than traditional political parties.  
 
The case of Sudan adds an extra layer of complexity. IDPs in Sudan 
are ‘pawns’, used by the Sudan People’s Liberation Army in the 
south and by the Government of Sudan in the north, to claim 
territories. According to IDMC, the government is either forcing them 
into a non-voluntary settlement in new lands or implementing a policy 
of forced return. Both the SPLA and the government are applying 
different Property Rights: “(…) formal land legislation is firmly in place 
in the Northern part of the country (including Darfur), while customary 
land arrangements are in place in South of Sudan” (Leckie, 
2007a:29). Similarly, but far more radically, in the case of Colombia 
armed groups use IDPs not only to claim territories but as a labour 
source for the production of illicit crops and drugs. Originally, in 
Colombia, the process of colonization or expansion of the agricultural 
frontier depended on social factors such as displacement, poverty or 
marginalization (Giraldo, 1981). However, since the late 70's, this 
dynamic began to change and in the 1980's, the process was 
promoted by armed actors leading to an escalation of violence in the 
1990's (Leal, 1995) as guerrillas and paramilitaries contested territory 
and grassroots support using peasants to occupy uncultivated lands 
or relinquish lands from established landowners. This strategy 
naturally generated social conflicts which allowed guerrillas and 
paramilitaries to justify their presence in the regions and, ultimately, 
the use of violence. Eventually, this strategy ended in the most 
detrimental restitution process imaginable: promoting the occupation 
of land for the planting of illicit crops (cannabis, coca, poppy), in 
which peasants were seen as ‘cannon fodder’ for the armed groups.  
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The role of IOs in these situations must be to act as the guarantor of 
the physical integrity of the dispossessed who have access to these 
social and political processes, as well as verification of compliance 
with any agreement reached. Perpetrators act as spoilers of these 
processes deploying tactics such as group intimidation and the 
assassination of community and political leaders. There are two 
problems with this type of process: a) they are often short-term 
measures, unsustainable and offering highly unsatisfactory 
temporary solutions; b) they generate more violence, benefit a 
minority only and fail to meet the needs of the dispossessed. 
Generally, these types of processes are like ‘waves’ of a deep rooted 
problem in which just the tip of the underlying social crisis is evident. 
Usually they are a manifestation of a humanitarian crisis and are 
treated and studied as social conflicts. Academically this study is 
multidisciplinary, but limited to the social factors behind the 
occupation and to study the stability of the peace process. 
 
3. When the restitution effort is guided by the State 
 
This third scenario is the one properly known as ‘Land restitution 
programs’. These programs are designed as a state plan to solve a 
problem. This type of situation is often studied by scholars interested 
in the issue of Reconstruction. The process consists of defining a 
policy and an implementation program for the Restitution of land by 
the State which includes:  
 Registration or census of victims;  
 Gathering information and evidence;  
 Assessment of living conditions and commencing the removal 
process of new occupants (or the restitution of property if it is 
not occupied);  
 Property restitution and voluntary return.  
 
This scheme is very basic and depends on many complex variables 
according to the nature of the conflict, the quality and quantity of 
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information available and the straightforwardness of the legal and 
bureaucratic requirements of the restorative process. As mentioned, 
these programs can be a mix of policies to develop land reforms, be 
part of a humanitarian effort, a partisan proposal or a shelter or 
productive solution. Similarly, they can establish returnees’ rights to 
property, relocate or compensate those who have lost it, or be a 
temporary or permanent shelter or productive solution. In either case 
the approach is top-down: victims are passive beneficiaries rather 
than actors in the process. To illustrate this, I present an analysis of 
the typologies or scenarios that often occur in Colombia, which is 
based on a review of official information and the working experience 
of the researcher: 
 
1. In the simplest scenario the Government encouraged the 
displaced to return to their places of origin. The Government 
provided appropriate security provisions and victims were invited 
to rebuild their everyday lives. In Colombia, this simple scheme is 
often used when the displacements are of short duration. Strictly 
speaking, victims of displacement have not really lost their 
property and therefore, no restitution is accomplished above and 
beyond people being able to return home. 
2. The next level of complexity occurs when an armed group has 
provoked the displacement and has taken physical possession of 
the property by strength, either occupying it for their benefit or to 
recruit support. In this case, the state must make an armed 
intervention to oust the armed actor unlawfully occupying the 
property. Usually, civilians who support the occupation also leave 
the area, but may sometimes stay and ask for government 
protection. When order is restored the government invites the 
displaced people to return, but not all of them do so for fear of 
being caught in any consequential crossfire. Similarly, when they 
return they find serious damage and losses caused by the 
combat, which in most cases is not compensated. In this 
scenario, there is a temporary loss of property and restitution and 
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return occurs. Possible compensation is given "administratively”, 
meaning that a judge should declare the State responsible and 
guilty for damages and losses attributable to any combat. 
3. When armed or illegal groups in general not only takes physical 
possession but property through a legal instrument, we can 
encounter two situations: there is no previous record of ownership 
of the asset or which does exist. In the first case, armed, political 
or business group register under their name some lands that are 
not recorded, but which have been inhabited and of which people 
have had continuous possession and use during a legally valid 
period of time. In the second situation, an armed actor coerces 
people to relinquish ownership of the land. Victims are usually 
forced to sign documents transferring ownership to a third party, 
typically a dummy owner, with either minimal or no compensation. 
The armed group may also allow rightful owners to stay or force 
them go, depending on the interests that drive them. In both 
cases, the State must return any infringed property rights to a 
state of legality. The unlawful act must be demonstrated and the 
administrative act reversed. Then the state should seek to deliver 
both title and possession to the legitimate owners. However, 
because here the possession and ownership of the land has been 
completely lost it is the most difficult problem to address and is 
associated with most violence. Several problems arise from this 
situation of legal and actual loss of property, involving the new 
owners or the secondary occupants and whether they are 
arbitrary or unlawful owners, dummy owners or bona fide owners. 
The change of ownership of the same property through legal 
documents makes it difficult for the state to establish 
responsibility and good faith of competing claimants and of the 
public officials who presided over the legal transactions etc. The 
complexity and violence of such scenarios make this exactly the 
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kind of restitution that a program of property protection during 
conflict should seek to avoid.46 
 
In general, problems associated with information can lead to policy 
success or failure and should be addressed in four main ways: 
 
a) Information regarding who are the victims. 
b) Information regarding ownership of the property. 
c) Information about the program, the conditions and how to access 
it. 
d) Information about the perpetrators and the propriety of public 
officials. 
 
This means that access to, and promotion and generation of 
information on loss and restitution, and the definition of property, use 
and possession rights may be seriously compromised by the 
absence of reliable information systems and the power that offenders 
still have (e.g. over biased or corrupt institutions). Violence against 
victims (during the claims, compensation, restitution and return 
processes) may also exert pressure on claimants to withdraw from 
the process. In Colombia, such violence has even taken the form of 
targeted killings. In some cases, such as Bosnia, only the 
intervention of the international community in providing security 
allowed large-scale returns (DisplacementSolutions, 2008:9). 
 
One common difficulty has to do with the paperwork requested from 
the victims; generally, this situation requires the support of social 
organizations, the state or the international community to solve it. 
                                                 
46  One specific reference is addressed about “the loss and/or destruction of 
housing and property records and documentation” (Leckie, 2007a:76), identified as 
a “crucial link in the restitution chain” (Leckie, 2007a:76). If is possible to avoid, to 
stop or to protect this destruction of public information the restitution process is 
made easier. Without such protection, the work during the post-conflict period is 
centred on recovery and protection of data. A protection program on this specific 
topic during-war could save money and solve quickly many problems for people in 
the aftermath. This is recommended and promoted by Principle 15 of the Pinheiro 
Principles. 
DWR impact on Conflict PhD in Politics – York David Camargo 
71 
 
Because these proceeedings are not individual or collective claims, 
but state programs, procedures for return are focused on covering 
the largest number of the population. However, victims are not 
necessarily organized or motivated to claim their rights. Similarly, in 
many cases victims distrust processes asking for information and 
self-identification because they know this can be used by 
perpetrators against them; there is a huge barrier of mistrust in these 
programs. 
 
In long-lasting conflicts it is common to find situations where a 
property has changed hands several times, as seen in Afghanistan 
and Colombia. In the case of Afghan refugees seeking to return from 
Pakistan after the fall of the Taliban regime, the International Legal 
Aid Centers (ILACs)47 established by the Norwegian Refugee Council 
faced three major problems: given the absence in Afghanistan of 
formal cadastral systems, the task of ILAC was focused on mediating 
or acting as guarantors between the communities and returning 
families. The second major difficulty concerned cases of multiple 
owners of the same land. In a nation that, over the last five decades, 
has experienced a protracted war, many changes of regimes, 
corruption, looting and neglect, many lands have passed through 
multiple hands, resulting in cases in which several people can argue 
rightful ownership (based on the historic moment that gave them 
                                                 
47  ILACs is a response created as an institutional framework inside a post-
conflict operation. As is explained, UN peace operations could not incorporate into 
their mandate the issue of property restitution: “Operations such as the UN Mission 
in Kosovo (UNMIK) established, administered and managed the Kosovo Housing 
and Property Directorate (HPD) and Housing and Property Claims Commission, 
while a Land and Property Unit within the UN Transitional Authority in East Timor 
(UNTAET) developed detailed proposals for institutionally addressing restitution 
questions. By contrast, peace operations such as the UN Transitional 
Administration in Cambodia (UNTAC) and the UN Assistance Mission in 
Afghanistan (UNAMA) consciously choose not to address restitution issues within 
their mandates” (Handbook, 2007:17). But, instead, IO and NGOs could directly 
develop this topic, as in Afghanistan: “When peace operations do not engage in 
these activities, this does not necessarily mean that restitution issues go 
unanswered in the countries concerned. In Afghanistan, for instance, UNHCR and 
NGOs such as the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) engaged in a variety of 
restitution efforts, including the provision of free legal aid to thousands of returnees 
seeking to return to their original homes and lands and to those seeking to resolve 
ongoing land” (Leckie, 2007a:17). 
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ownership): “Over the last 30 years, for example, a piece of private 
land could have been compulsorily purchased, expropriated or re-
designated as belonging to the Government; granted to another 
individual through a statutory decree; privately transacted between 
different individuals, using official or customary documents; forcibly 
seized or abandoned by its owner and then arbitrarily or unlawfully 
occupied by another party; or sold, leased, exchanged, gifted, 
inherited, or otherwise transferred on to others” (Aursnes & Foley, 
2005:12). The third problem concerns the mix of legal courts, 
religious or tribal courts, and customary law. The lessons learned 
here are those related to the need to incorporate the habits and 
processes of resolving local conflicts within restitution programs. It is 
noted that the current intention of the Afghan government is to create 
a national land registry, but it will be developed in a corrupt 
environment where current tenure of land and property tends not to 
be legitimate; this would equate to a formal system of impunity.  
 
From the IDMC’s perspective, the Colombian case presents two 
situations that hinders their work with IDP’s. The first is the difference 
between the official numbers of displaced – the number of registered 
displaced persons – and the magnitude of the tragedy. The second is 
that “(…) many communities, although not displaced, are effectively 
living under siege and denied the right to freedom of movement, 
which is having an adverse economic impact and makes their current 
position unsustainable” (Aursnes & Foley, 2005:18). Colombia has 
the legal tools to protect IDPs, but has so far failed to do it: “(…) the 
main problems appear to be a lack of resources and political will to 
implement the law, together with a failure to disseminate its 
provisions to State officials” (Aursnes & Foley, 2005:19). The 
government’s main interest is in the return of the displaced, but it has 
been criticised over the safety and welfare provisions for returning 
IDPs – and whether their return has been completely voluntary. The 
main problem in the future concerns the land-reforms that have been 
carried out alongside the displacement, which have created even 
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more profound inequities over who owns what. As in the Afghan 
case, without proper control of the proceedings and policies, and 
without proper mechanisms of support for IDPs, this anomaly could 
become permanent. 
 
The problem with cadastral systems is repeated in Uganda, where 
the IDMC reports that for a large number of IDP’s cases there is no 
documentation to verify the ownership of the land. Much of the land 
tenure system is based on the right to exploit and profit from it, rather 
than legal ownership. This customary tenure should, by law, have 
been extended to legal tenure; however in practice this has not been 
done.  
 
These programs should, according to their focus (land reform, 
humanitarian aid, a government program, or shelter and Productive 
solutions), define the limits of the population that they serve both for 
the restitution and the compensation. The role of IO in these 
situations must be technical adviser and financer of the state on the 
restitution programs, to provide assistance to IDPs regarding the 
procedures, and as a guarantor between parties. Civil society must 
act, also as guarantor, companion and promoter of programs, and 
serve as spokespersons for the communities of victims. Perpetrators 
are very active as spoilers of these policies and commit selective 
murders of victims and also try to control information through their 
contacts inside the government. New owners tend to be, generally, 
part of the process of dispossession and must be sanctioned legally, 
except in those cases where they could demonstrate their good faith 
or the fact that they are also victims. I identify six main problems:  
 
a) Victims are mainly beneficiaries and not actors in the process;  
b) It is necessary to construct a comprehensive program that not only 
restitutes but provides productive support and community work for re-
integration;  
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c) Lack of reliable information systems on both land registry and 
victims’ registry is the biggest administrative obstacle, even without 
the armed conflict. Precarious cadastral systems do not allow the 
identification of ownership or the right to use or to domain lands, this 
is a constant source of local conflicts;  
d) In addition to the previous point, the presence in the public service 
agencies of insiders who have participated in any crimes and/or 
supported the perpetrators reduces the transparency of the process;  
e) Selective violence against victims and their leaders fuels a climate 
of mistrust and reduce the chances of success;  
f) The mistrust of state agencies by victims slows down the process – 
they are reluctant to provide information and to self-identify as a 
victim.  
 
Because this is a top-down process, victims are not necessarily 
motivated to claim rights. These processes are, in general, ones that 
require strong support from the international community; slow and 
very expensive. As already mentioned, these programs are the focus 
of academic research on the subject of restitution. 
 
4. When the restitution effort is part of an internationally endorsed 
peace agreement and/or results from international pressure 
 
This is a variation of the state restitution programs. The main 
difference is that victims are not only beneficiaries but are part of the 
process itself because IO directly supports their claims as part of any 
agreements. The process is led by IO through local organizations 
combining victims, activist and IO functionaries. The Balkans is an 
exemplar. IDMC recounts the Civil Rights Project – CRP experience 
including aid for refugees and IDPs, and people who are at risk of 
displacement. “The CRP was implemented in the context of a huge 
displacement crisis. The issues of integration, return and 
compensation were highly politicized. Legal procedures were 
bureaucratic, repetitive, and hard to understand. The authorities 
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lacked accountability and often acted in an arbitrary fashion. National 
systems of legal aid were almost non-existent. It was in this context 
that the CRP’s service of providing refugees and IDPs with advice on 
issues of access to place of origin, property and tenancy claims, and 
matters hampering the re-establishment of life in place of temporary 
residence, proved to be so vital” (Aursnes & Foley, 2005:6-7). The 
key lesson here was the need to emphasize two points: “(…) help in 
obtaining documents and asserting housing and property rights” 
(Aursnes & Foley, 2005:7).  
 
One particular case involves refugees and expatriates willing to 
return. In those cases it is possible that government to government 
agreements are signed, or agreements between IO running refugee 
programs in the borders, as in Vietnam, Guatemala, DR Congo, 
Mozambique, Rwanda, Cambodia, Angola, Georgia and Burundi 
where specific agreements including property rights restitution were 
reached (Leckie, 2007a:17). The complexity of these situations is 
that not all IDPs or victims are willing to do the same thing, and it is 
hard to develop a program that suits everybody. In general, these 
situations and difficulties are identical to those presented before. The 
difference is in the beneficiary’s level of participation and the fact that 
international intervention helps in terms of building trust between 
parties and improving protection for victims. 
 
The following table summarizes what has been presented in this 
section about property restitution practices: 
 
Table 1: Restitution in practice 
 
 Restitution 
guided by the 
affected 
person 
Restitution 
guided by 
Community 
groups 
Restitution 
guided by the 
State 
Who leads? –The victim –Political –The State 
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parties 
–Victim’s 
organizations 
–Direct action 
organizations 
–In IO 
endorsed 
processes, 
also the IO and 
the victims. 
What happens 
with 
information? 
–Restricted 
–Depends on 
financial 
capabilities 
–Restricted 
–Manipulated 
–Open 
–Complex 
–Subject to 
spoilers 
What happens 
with security? 
–Low problems –Highly 
problematic 
–Not assured 
by the State 
–Very violent 
with selective 
assassination 
–Usually 
international 
intervention is 
needed 
What are the 
administrative 
processes? 
–Administrative 
through courts 
–Usually not 
effective 
–Complex 
–Bureaucratic 
Who else 
intervenes? 
–Judicial 
system 
–International 
courts 
–Original 
owners 
–Perpetrators 
–Civil society 
What are the 
problems? 
–Time 
consuming –
Expensive  
–Internal 
spoilers 
–Short-term 
measures 
–Unsustainable 
–Generates 
more violence 
–Victims are 
passive, except 
in international 
endorsed 
programs 
–Problems with 
cadastral and 
victims 
information 
systems 
–Internal 
spoilers 
–High and 
Selective 
violence 
–Distrust 
Source: Own elaboration. 
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The reconstruction strategy of Protection of Land Rights during 
Warfare 
 
To date, there has been little in-depth study of protection programs. 
However, the importance of these programs is evident, as United 
Nations’ Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon demonstrated when he 
called for a report on the protection of civilians in armed conflict. This 
report was presented to the Security Council on the November 21, 
2007 (SC/9174). John Holmes, Under-Secretary-General for 
Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, introduced 
the Secretary-General's report. He reported on “(…) the critical need 
to address more consistently the impact of conflict on housing, land 
and property” and stated “There was also a critical need to address 
housing, land and property issues much earlier in a conflict to 
prevent violence arising from disputes over them.” Overall, there was 
“the critical need to address more effectively, and much earlier, 
issues of housing, land and property, the resolution of which was 
inevitably linked to the achievement and consolidation of lasting 
peace and the prevention of future violence. Recording losses of 
land, homes or property, upholding rights and entitlements, 
reinforcing the right to return and mediating disputes should become 
standard measures, even while conflict continued.” Consequently: 
“The Secretary-General further recommends addressing the issue of 
housing, and land and property rights by including language in all 
relevant resolutions on the right of displaced persons and refugees to 
return to their homes and places of origin. He also recommends 
addressing non-acceptance of the results of ethnic cleansing or 
sectarian violence; promoting the establishment of effective 
mechanisms at the national level for addressing housing, land and 
property issues; and mandating United Nations peacekeeping and 
other relevant missions to prevent the arbitrary or unlawful 
appropriation or confiscation of land and property, to identify and 
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register land and property abandoned by refugees and displaced 
persons, and to issue ownership documentation where this has been 
lost or destroyed.” 
 
Since there is little in-depth literature on protection programs, the 
possibilities and challenges in advancing such protection presented 
ahead is based on my own research. In order to do this, we depart 
from the model of the International Humanitarian Law (IHL)48, which 
is a set of norms designed to protect non-combatants in the midst of 
war, and to make distinctions between military and non-military 
actions. Even if these norms are part of a humanitarian effort to 
‘humanize’ the war, they are also part of the legal and operational 
framework for recovery efforts in wartime. Analysing its content, I 
established that the strategy of protection in the event of possible 
destruction caused or motivated by a violent armed conflict seeks to 
a) improve security conditions to avoid or mitigate the destruction 
caused by the potential conflict; b) establish, strengthen or update 
the legal mechanisms for registration and control over the property 
right; c) dismantle, store or transport goods with high material, 
spiritual or cultural value that may be vulnerable to looting or 
destruction (this also extends to essential goods within the productive 
system); d) in the event of not being able to dismantle, store or 
transport goods with high material, spiritual or cultural value, a 
protection strategy would seek to strengthen the mechanisms for 
                                                 
48  The International Humanitarian Law (or International Law of Armed 
Conflicts) is constituted by a set of rules that seek to restrict the damage caused by 
armed conflicts. These restrictions stipulate the types of people who should not be 
affected by the war, the places that should not be subject to armed attacks, and the 
types of weapons that can not be used. Its modern origins date back to the 1863 
Lieber Code, which sets out the laws and customs of war, and the Geneva 
Convention of 1864. In 1899 and 1907 The Hague Peace Conferences further 
sought to regulate the methods and means of conducting war. In 1949 these were 
reviewed, updated and constitute a supplement of the Geneva Conventions; being 
converted into four documents that define humanitarian law in the wake of the 
experience of the Second World War. This gave rise to two forms of law: that of 
The Hague, which deals with the conduct of military operations, and Geneva, that 
deals with the protection of war victims. Both branches are combined in a single-
law of Geneva, with the signing of the two Additional Protocols in Geneva in 1977 
so that it now incorporates and updates the previous text of the law of The Hague. 
See: Bowden 2009; Fleck, 2008; Leckie, 2007. 
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disclosure of their existence and emphasize the need for their 
protection and exclusion from destruction; e) introduce specific 
agreements between the parties in contention to exclude, if possible, 
non-military targets from the armed conflict, and requiring 
combatants to abide by international agreements in this regard; f) 
strengthen security measures for ethnic minorities and community 
leaders. In this sense, we define protection as the right that assists 
individuals and populations not only to be protected by the fighter, 
but also that maintains that any prejudice is the direct responsibility 
of the armed group, who has an obligation to protect populations and 
individuals. 
 
International and national laws exist as a frontline defence to limit 
excesses during war; however armed conflict rules tend to deviate 
from the norm. On many occasions special regulations – such as 
emergency powers for local or national authorities – are applied, 
extensive areas of social life are submitted to military control and 
almost every governmental unit is devoted to the war effort and relief. 
Even when these measures are implemented – seeking to control the 
mobility of the population – the reality of war is that, actually, 
irregularities increase. Governments need to shift resources to the 
war effort, the production of goods and services is disrupted, and 
people’s needs for, inter alia, social services may not be met. These 
events increase pressure on manifold social fronts: increases in 
illegal and dangerous construction projects; the flouting of labour 
laws; professions practiced without adequate ’governance’ and 
regulation; medical procedures conducted without proper consent; 
goods are rationed; smuggling and speculation increases; gender 
and familial violence increases and peoples’ mental health 
deteriorates etc. In this context international treaties and laws only 
acquire meaning if the nations and armed groups comply with the 
rules therein. In many cases, their validity depends on whether or not 
there is a formal declaration of war. However, the reality for people 
living in war does not depend on the existence or otherwise of 
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treaties (which, may help), but rather on themselves: their ability as a 
society, community, family or individuals to survive. In the case of 
protracted wars, people learn to survive, produce, maintain, lose and 
restart. 
 
It is clear that Protection programs will have undergone a conceptual 
change by the start of armed conflict: from programs aimed at 
“preventing the destruction” to programs of “reconstruction”. This 
qualitative jump implies that, from once seeking to reduce the 
possibility of destruction, the actions are now aimed at mitigating its 
effects. It is clear that there remains enough room to continue with 
actions in defence of rights to avoid some further destruction. But 
once armed conflict has commenced a change of approach is 
necessary: a) to rebuild the productive capacity affected by the 
fighting and b) to initiate a protection program for those actually 
affected by the destruction. This means that a situation which 
originally was with indeterminate conditions (in the eve of a 
catastrophic event for everyone) has given way to a specific one 
where the populations affected are clearly identifiable. 
 
As there is little in-depth literature on protection programs, the 
possibilities and challenges in advancing such protection presented 
ahead is based on my own research. I propose the following 
parameters: 
 
1. Individual Protection based on private resources.  
 
In the case of individuals who have sufficient resources it is possible 
to protect the property by private security. The protection could be 
implemented by the formation of defensive militias’ or the hiring of 
armed groups in order to resist displacement or even after they are 
displaced (in order to oust the new occupiers). This is a common and 
accepted practice for the protection of property rights. In many 
nations in conflict it is even promoted by the state, who may finance 
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or deliver the weapons, communications equipment, and training for 
them. To a large extent the success of this strategy depends on the 
maintenance of these groups as defensive and not engaging in 
offensive actions. This option is embodied in laws relating to civil 
defence groups, private security contractors, and bodyguards. In 
Latin-America the guerrilla groups from Mexico to Peru originated in 
many cases as self-organized defence groups, as the indigenous 
guerrillas from Chiapas and Guatemala, or the peasant or indigenous 
guerrillas in Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. The same happened with 
many paramilitary groups such as farmers’ paramilitary groups in 
Colombia or the Rondas campesinas in Peru. The problem lies with 
gun-wielding civilians acting as state troops, where the legitimacy 
and legality of their actions is not controlled. Three major problems 
are associated with this strategy. The first is the participation of so-
called "mercenaries" – professional armed groups performing 
offensive actions for payment. The second refers to "paramilitarism", 
where organized groups of citizens and soldiers perform joint 
offensive and defensive military actions, a kind of “dirty war”, and 
where power is concentrated in the hands of one or a small number 
of individuals. The third is the "privatization of security" where 
business groups of contractors concentrate defence activity in areas 
of conflict and replace the presence of troops, thus avoiding financial, 
employment and/or legal restrictions. 
 
2. Individual Protection based on community resources.  
 
It is possible to find support organizations targeting specific 
populations, in accordance with specific membership requirements. 
In many cases these organizations are the result of experiences of 
communities in long-standing conflicts; e.g. aid groups with religious 
or ethnic affiliation, such as the Jewish community, or the Hezbollah' 
social-service branch; and communities in exile, such as the Cubans, 
Chinese and Nepalese groups. These basically act as international 
lobbyists, but can also serve as support networks for the protection of 
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financial assets and property of great material, cultural or spiritual 
value. Or, as in the case of Hezbollah, the organization paid for the 
reconstruction of houses directly affected by the fighting. The actions 
of these kinds of organizations are restricted to a specific group of 
the population, and often have more impact on refugee populations 
than on IDPs – as in Hezbollah, for example, where Lebanon’s 
refugees were the main beneficiaries of the program. 
 
3. Individual or communitarian Protection based on 
national/international – private/public resources.  
 
This covers other possible actions to protect IDPs and is, in a strict-
sense, the focus of attention of possible during-war protection. It 
includes actions to prevent displacement and destruction of property: 
human shields (e.g. Iraq, Palestine, Colombia); humanitarian air 
corridors (e.g. Spain-Chad, Cyprus-Lebanon, NATO-
Albania/Macedonia); militarised zones (e.g. Georgia, Korea, Cyprus) 
and demilitarised zones (e.g. Colombia, Israel). In these cases it 
provides help to people who are in the midst of a conflict, but 
exposes those involved in protection operations to the rigors of war. 
Other international measures include detecting and banning trade in 
looted goods (such as the Interpol task force on art and cultural 
objects) and agreements to restrict trade in products that fuel conflict 
(such as diamonds and illicit drugs). It also encompasses national 
measures, such as the diffusion of information about and training in 
rights (as well as empowerment) and other legal matters for 
communities and public officials. 
 
Numerous other rules or measures are part of the regulatory order in 
war times. These rules are usually identified as "transitional" but can 
become serious problems in the lives of individuals. Sometimes 
foreign citizens are advised to leave the territories in conflict, 
sometimes "individual" or "mass expulsions" are carried out. These 
measures are presented as protective measures (from potential 
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retaliation or outbreaks of violence). Depending on the laws and 
circumstances they may be allowed to leave with some of their 
property, but in others they are given minimum compensation after 
the conflict if unable or unwilling to return. It is also usual to establish 
rules that restrict the mobility,49 visibility and activities of groups of 
individuals (schedules, clothing, access to services and products, 
locations, etc.) seeking to reduce their exposure to possible violence 
because of the impossibility of providing protection. Such measures 
apply to a range of categories, including religion, nationality, 
ethnicity, gender, age and political beliefs/affiliation. In general, these 
actions are contrary to the rights of individuals, even if they are 
presented as protection. They are often part of an exercise in 
discrimination and segregation.50 However, given the conditions of 
conflict, they are preferable to the alternative – women and children 
in conflict areas for example may be at risk of sexual violence or 
forced recruitment, and be forced to live in hiding.51 
                                                 
49  Stepputat (2002:32) goes further and establishes that “During armed 
conflict, mobility and control of mobility are of primary strategic importance for 
everybody involved. The changing patterns of mobility during and after conflict 
should be seen in this context. Displacement of large parts of the population is a 
common feature of armed conflict. Sometimes parties to the conflict use 
displacement as a military strategy for territorial or population control; at other 
times displacement is an outcome of widespread conditions of insecurity and 
impoverishment”. 
50  Cathrine Brun (2003:22) exposes this in the case of Sri Lanka: 
“Categorising someone as an IDP tends to exclude her or him from some 
citizenship rights. In protracted situations of displacement the IDP status of 
displaced populations seems to create a state of permanent impermanence: they 
are out of place and only waiting to return to their home place – an attitude often 
advocated by Sri Lankan authorities wanting to return the displaced in order to 
restore the apparently pre-existing ethnic balance. However, during this waiting 
game IDP’s are not regarded as local citizens of the place where they live and 
consequently are excluded from rights enjoyed by their co-habitants – their hosts. 
In the case of Sri Lanka, these include rights to property, political freedom and 
employment.” Again, Sarah Holt relates how the voting right could not be fulfilled 
because registration was based on the place of residence. 
51  As Lari (2002:39) points, it is a common strategy to use the civil population 
and engage it into the conflict: “UNITA forces use brutal measures to prevent 
people leaving areas under their control. Entire groups are forced to accompany 
UNITA soldiers on hit-and-run attacks. Systematic physical abuse, mutilation of 
limbs and murder are the fate of those suspected of being informers. For its part, 
the government displaces people in order to deprive UNITA of food, labour, fighters 
and sex slaves. Families are intentionally separated, forcing men and male 
adolescents to remain and serve in the pro-government civilian militia. When new 
territory is captured from UNITA, IDPs are prevented from leaving and are forced to 
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The differences between helping people in terms of before and after 
the conflict depend upon the conflict itself including: its duration; 
intensity; tactics and weapons used and level of involvement of the 
civilian population. However, to develop successful programs of 
protection or restoration it is paramount to tackle the causes of 
conflict and its effects, and minimise or eliminate opportunities for 
further conflicts in the wake of the violence that has unfolded. That is, 
the ability to understand and address the program from a security 
approach. It is essential to establish those primary objectives that 
must be in place, both before and after the conflict, in order to 
advance successfully those activities that generate solutions to 
problems, rather than make things worse. 
 
In short, from the perspective of the state, the objectives of protection 
and restitution of housing, land and property rights are equally 
political: one is the decision of to what, when, whom and how 
protection should be afforded, the other is what, when, how and to 
whom restitution should be made. These decisions depend on the 
very structure of society, and reflect conflicts at the root of the 
society. Similarly, the effect is not only the physical reconstruction or 
rehabilitation of the routines of people, but is also one of finding the 
‘space’ needed to allow individuals to assume (or resume if possible) 
their life plans. This also means that it is, for many people and 
societies, an opportunity for change – and should be understood in 
this way, not just as a process of protection or restoration of material 
things. Protection activities should be done in the short term; and be 
oriented to cover the basic elements needed to ensure – as far as 
possible – the largest amount of assets of individuals, the most 
                                                                                                                            
remain while their living conditions progressively deteriorate. IDPs are often taken 
along during foraging expeditions and exposed to risk of UNITA ambushes and 
landmines. Indiscriminate beating, harassment and rape are frequent”. 
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important of all being the protection of life.52 In addition, restitution 
must be done in the long term, restoring not only the family, 
community life or the position of the individual in society, but also 
political rights and the productive capacities of individuals and 
communities. For the state this decision-making process means that 
the protection is planned in uncertainty, and restitution strategies 
develop according to the results of the conflict. However, since it is a 
political decision it also reflects the specificity of its society – in which 
some elements take precedence over others (e.g. the life of the 
individual trumping the common good, or political rights trumping 
self-identification, or the defense of social goods considered more 
important than any other good). Throughout this process the critical 
time for the State is that when violent actions are occurring and 
when, inevitably, communities and individuals are suffering.  
 
Conclusions 
 
The following table presents a thematic comparison of both kinds of 
land reconstruction: 
 
Table 2: Goals of restitution and protection strategies during war 
 
 The strategy of 
restitution, in the case of 
destruction caused or 
motivated by a violent 
armed conflict, seeks to: 
The strategy of 
protection in the event 
of possible destruction 
caused or motivated 
by a violent armed 
                                                 
52  Usually the order of priority is: life; family; community (social goods and 
values); identity; citizenship (political values and rights); property (land first, 
housing second, goods third). In some societies identity is prior to community and 
then citizenship, or prior to citizenship and then community. The differences in the 
order will depend on the type of society, specifically on the position of the concept 
of labour within that society, and the type of work activities (paid or not) that 
individuals are engaged in (in general, individual identities are linked to 
occupation). In industrialised societies identity (worker, employee, professional) 
trumps citizenship and community; in semi-industrial societies community trumps 
citizenship and in poor-industrialized societies identity and citizenship are 
subordinate to community. 
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conflict seeks to: 
Security a) Improve security 
conditions to allow re-
securing of the conditions 
for the protection and 
enjoyment of property, land 
and houses affected in the 
conflict;53 
a) Improve security 
conditions to avoid or 
mitigate the destruction 
caused by the potential 
conflict; 
Legal 
mechanisms 
b) Establish or strengthen 
the legal mechanisms to 
prosecute the existing 
disputes over ownership 
rights and prevent further 
violence; 
b) Establish, strengthen 
or update the legal 
mechanisms for 
registration and control 
over the property right; 
Property c) Resolve disputes over 
property caused by the 
death or disappearance of 
owners; 
c) Dismantle, store or 
transport goods with 
high material, spiritual or 
cultural value that may 
be vulnerable to looting 
or destruction. This also 
extends to essential 
goods within the 
productive system; 
 d) Return to their rightful 
owners any property 
confiscated arbitrarily or 
unlawfully by an armed 
force; 
d) In the event of not 
being able to dismantle, 
store or transport goods 
with high material, 
spiritual or cultural 
value, a protection 
strategy would seek to 
strengthen the 
mechanisms for 
disclosure of their 
existence and 
emphasize the need for 
their protection and 
exclusion from 
destruction; 
 e) Resolve disputes over 
the right of occupation of 
land or houses, and 
resolve problems arising 
e) Introduce specific 
agreements between the 
parties in contention to 
exclude, if possible, non-
military targets from the 
                                                 
53  Reference to “property” includes factories, businesses, industries – all of 
the productive system. 
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from re-settlement; armed conflict, and 
requiring combatants to 
abide by international 
agreements in this 
regard; 
 f) Secure material 
compensation from those 
responsible for the 
violence, which includes: 
nationalize and 
(re)distribute – with or 
without compensation – 
property, land and houses 
which remain unclaimed 
within a set period of time 
after the conflict; or which 
cannot be claimed as 
being owned by a defeated 
force in concordance with 
the existence (or not) of 
the terms of any armistice; 
 
 g) Provide material 
compensation or soft loans 
to revive the productive 
conditions; 
 
 h) In the case of destroyed 
homes, begin the 
rebuilding process, 
according to the needs and 
desires of the owners; 
 
Personal 
security 
i) In the case of persecuted 
minorities, community 
leaders or people who can 
not return to their former 
dwellings for security 
reasons, identify and 
operationalize a process of 
reintegration, either in their 
former communities or in 
new settlements 
(resettlement). 
f) Strengthen security 
measures for ethnic 
minorities and 
community leaders. 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
It is important to clarify that Restitution programs only ensure rights – 
they can not compel the enjoyment or use of the property returned. 
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One of the major obstacles to the success of restitution programs is 
to achieve not only the physical reconstruction of the property but 
effective use of them. Also, the strategy of restitution tends to be 
focused on activities that can be performed after-war, while the 
strategy of protection is concerned with before-war activities. 
However, it is possible and necessary to continue with the protection 
activities during-war. From Table 1 I can posit that, in security terms, 
neither strategy can stop violence or destruction, only try to 
normalize everyday life. I can also observe that the work around legal 
mechanisms is focused on settling differences between claimants in 
order to avoid disputes and, in terms of property, restitution is 
focused on mitigating the ‘mess’ associated with destruction, whilst 
protection strategy is focused on avoiding destruction. In the case of 
personal security the emphasis is on safeguarding the lives and 
productivity of leaders and communities. None of this should be 
surprising: restitution returns and protection protects. The difference 
rests in the conflict itself. 
 
What we have in practice is that compared with the large number of 
protective measures that can begin before the war, the security 
activities during-war – being more specific – are not always possible 
to achieve. The success of implementation depends on available 
resources, capability and discipline of fighting groups and the 
circumstances on the battlefield. In counterpoint to the previous table 
it is possible to identify some variations that occur in practice: 
 
(a) The population's access to food, water and medicine is usually 
permitted in return for cooperation with military intelligence 
e.g. revealing collaborators or information regarding enemy 
presence in a region;  
(b) In the case of registration and control of houses, property and 
individuals, this is achieved through censuses or roadblocks 
that limit mobility or increase control over people's identities, 
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which can at times be mixed with ethnic, racial or religious 
conflicts;  
(c) Similarly, international or internal conflicts today often 
evidence an intermingling of civilians and military combatants. 
In addition, the processes of urbanization experienced in the 
past half century means the possibility that armed forces will 
not be located in urban centres is very low – almost inevitably 
wars are fought in populated areas;  
(d) In the case of minorities and community leaders, the 
protection is often intermingled with measures that request a 
clear bias with the interests of one party in the combat, or 
exclusion zones, or reclusion in confinement camps where it is 
possible to ensure security but at the expense of loss of 
liberty;  
(e) Controlled evacuations are followed by measures that include 
the destruction of the property left behind, which worsens or 
makes impossible the conditions required for the return of the 
displaced. Such evacuations are quite often permanent 
measures of displacement, but unavoidable if the goal is 
protecting life. 
 
All these situations violate the spirit of IHL, which is condensed into 
neutrality, normalcy and protection for non-combatants. For neutrality 
means not taking the side of any of the parties in conflict; not 
committing hostile acts; not being required to provide information; not 
being a victim of retaliation and with assistance not being subject to 
any kind of exchange that breaks this neutrality. Normalcy means the 
right to advance as far as possible the activities of individuals and 
communities, including education and religious, familial, commercial 
and productive practices. Protection is the right that assists 
individuals and populations not only to be protected by the fighter, 
but also that maintains that any prejudice is the direct responsibility 
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of the armed group, who has an obligation to protect populations and 
individuals. 
 
As I discussed before, the rules of law therefore set out what should 
be done, and also provide legal and practical frameworks about how 
it should be done. It is clear from the rules that protecting property 
rights is not lost as a result of the war. The general guarantee for this 
is that people have the right to inhabit their homes and the right to 
keep their possessions and to work their land. However, in cases of 
forced displacement the possibility of realizing this right to property is 
minimised, so it is important to strengthen state programs for the 
protection of these rights with additional effective measures, not just 
military actions. 
 
The aim of the thesis is to analyze the impact of the LPPP in areas 
that have simultaneous Paramilitary, Guerrilla and Drug related 
conflicts. Therefore, in-depth case studies were developed in the 
Valle del Cauca region because – summarizing – it is strategically 
situated in the middle of a chronic conflict between the Colombian 
government and the FARC guerrillas. It is also a core-zone of long-
standing conflict between ancestral communities, large landowners, 
and drug lords. It also features the active presence of one 
paramilitary group (nowadays referred to as Criminal Gangs): “Los 
Rastrojos”. Historically, this region has featured some of the most 
outrageous and bloodiest war and violence that has transformed 
people’s lives. As previously announced, this thesis is a clear 
example of how a single case study allows comparison between sub-
units of analysis (Yin, 1994). Since the proposed analysis is related 
to how the ‘state-led no-military reconstruction during war’ has an 
impact on the conflict, the unit that defines the single case is the 
state. In this way, to conduct an investigation of several cases it 
would be necessary to compare different states. I could also refer to 
several cases if I wish to compare the different effects of various 
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programs of a single state in conflict; which would involve spatial and 
temporal variations. In this thesis I write about a single case study 
because it is just one program in one region in one state. But, it 
features two comparative sets of towns, as will be explained in the 
methodological chapter. 
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Chapter two:  Methodology 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the methodological design 
and the research strategy used to advance this single case study. It 
also presents how the researcher collected, recorded and analysed 
the documentary and ethnographical data. It presents the fieldwork 
design oriented to cover four different locations under conflict in 
Colombia resulting in 118 interviews with 88 different people. The 
four locations were selected after the first fieldtrip and fulfilled both 
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requirements: a pair of towns (one within and one outside the LPPP) 
closes enough to each other to make travel practical and also with 
two different kinds of conflicts in the zone (one pair under FARC 
threat and the other one under paramilitary threat).  
 
In the first section I will present the qualitative approach: field 
research and ethnographic work complemented by documentary 
research. In the second section I will present how I developed the 
fieldwork and associated issues. In the third section I will introduce 
the use of Micro-analysis techniques to analyse the experiences and 
stories collected during the fieldwork. 
 
Fieldwork tools 
 
This section presents the research techniques employed in the 
collection and recording of the data gathered during the three 
fieldworks and the analysis of documents. 
 
Interview research strategy 
Before the first fieldwork the intention was to perform a 
representative number of interviews with peasants within the LPP 
program; also to interview the Directors of the program and the local 
fieldworkers. The second group of interviews was directed to elites 
and IDPs in the control town. A third group was the national army, 
Civil servants and academics who are involved in the territorial 
‘consolidation’ strategy of the Colombian government, in order to 
understand how the conflict was (or was not) affected by the LPP 
program. Following an initial approach it was clear that access to 
LPP program directives would not be granted. But, additionally, 
inside the towns there were many other voices that needed to be 
heard: IDPs outside the program; Peasants who stay in rural lands 
under threat; Victims of violence and people who work with them. In 
this sense, the original idea – to be focused on the effect of the 
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program through the voices of the people inside it – changed to 
evaluate the problem inside the communities; and to obtain a general 
vision of the situation via interviews with national elites and local 
fieldworkers associated with the program.  
 
Accessing people inside communities was via gatekeepers. First I 
visited the Mayor’s office (who, by the way, was never available) and 
the secretary referred me to a number of appropriate officials: the 
Planning office; Umata’s office54 and the Local Government 
Secretary office. Through these officials I gained access to the 
relevant persons in the town. Later I visited the priest55, who was 
extremely useful in order to contact victims and IDPs. Access to 
national elites was made by telephone contact on scheduled dates. 
In general there were always one or two key persons in every town. 
In terms of the local people, they clearly loved their communities but 
were critical with the situation and were generally willing to help an 
outsider to establish the reality of what was happening. 
 
Elite interviews 
The present research is focused on a State-led program, and it 
means accessing state officials. Naturally, elite interviews were 
conducted with national, regional and/or local government 
functionaries. All elite interviews were held face-to-face and access 
was usually granted through third party references. Some elite 
interviews were postponed several times and finally cancelled by the 
interviewee. Reasons for this behaviour are usually related with 
political culture in Colombia, where state officials are not at the 
service of people but typically pursuing their own interests. 
 
Even though it non-governmental leaders may be classed as elites, 
in this research only government functionaries were granted that 
                                                 
54  “Unidad Municipal de Asistencia Técnica Agropecuaria”: It is a government’ 
group working at the local level in agricultural technical assistance. 
55  Catholic priest always; as it is the prevalent religion in Colombia. 
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designation. The reason behind this decision is that the opinions of 
people outside government are important but not necessarily 
representative of the state itself. Non-government participants are 
considered as non-elites. 
 
Open and Semi-structured interviews 
Elite or non-elite interviews could be structured, semi-structured or 
open. In this research some basic proximal research questions were 
held for every interviewee. In the case of elite interviews full research 
on the specifics of the possible topics to discuss was performed 
beforehand, and developed gradually and without ‘script’ during the 
interview. In the case of non-elite interviews, people usually start 
talking openly about different experiences and perceptions; in this 
situation some specific questions were asked in an attempt to 
triangulate information or to solve the basic research questions. This 
conversational style of interview is, frankly, the best possible 
approach with people in Colombia, where a formal inquisitorial 
interview is seen as censorial and linked with authoritarian forms of 
power. At the same time, the structured interview assumes that 
people have something to say about the subject and are ready to 
understand the questions and answer them. 
 
The open and semi-structured interviews are able to capture limited 
knowledge about a situation and personal interpretations; in order to 
reduce the negative effects of singular misunderstandings (bona fide 
or bogus) several persons are interviewed and the information 
triangulated with official, documentary or personal information. 
 
Non-participant observation 
According to Bowling (2002) field-based observation of and 
interaction with the behaviour of people and with the daily life of the 
community provides valuable information with which to understand 
complex situations. Observation is paramount in this case study, 
because it allows comparison between documentary information 
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provided by the government and the reality in the field. Also, via note 
taking the researcher is able to record verbal and non-verbal 
information that helps in the refining of the analysis. 
 
Documentary analysis 
The sources of Documentary information are: governmental 
institutions in Colombia (at national, regional and local level); civil 
society and academic groups. Usually the kinds of documents used 
in this research refer to legal documentation or analytical essays. In 
the specific situations when triangulation of information of data is 
necessary the main sources are newspapers and documentary 
information from civil organizations on the internet. 
 
The fieldworks 
 
The aim of the thesis is to analyse the impact of the LPPP in areas 
that have simultaneous Paramilitary, Guerrilla and Drug related 
conflicts in order to present a case study of during-war reconstruction 
and analyse the implications of this kind of reconstruction. Therefore, 
in-depth case studies were developed in the Valle del Cauca region 
because it is strategically situated in the middle of a chronic conflict 
between the Colombian government and the FARC guerrillas. It is 
also a core-zone of long-standing conflict between ancestral 
communities, large landowners, and drug lords. It also features the 
active presence of one paramilitary group (nowadays referred to as 
Criminal Gangs): “Los Rastrojos”. Historically this region has featured 
some of the most outrageous and bloodiest war and violence that 
has transformed people’s lives. 
 
To analyze the impact of the program in this region it is necessary to 
identify towns that have experienced similar conflicts; towns that are 
part of the program and towns that are not. Two sets of towns 
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(municipalities56) were finally selected in a preliminary field trip in 
spring 2009. In both cases the first town is part of the LPPP for 
internally displaced persons, led by the Colombian government. This 
program has advanced a preventive and a restorative program to 
guard the property rights of inhabitants, heirs, owners, families, and 
communities. The second town in both cases is contiguous to the 
first one and is not part of the program. All four towns have 
experienced extreme violence and are strategically situated in terms 
of Colombia’s internal conflict. Due to security reasons – seeking to 
protect the inhabitants of these towns – both sets were coded as 
North1 – North2 set, and South1– South2 set57. 
 
For the purposes of this investigation, the violence in the area 
studied occurs in two major geographical areas. In the first set of 
municipalities (South1 – South2)58 there is conflict with the FARC 
guerrillas. In the second set of municipalities (North1 – North2)59 
conflict exists with both the guerrillas and with the Paramilitary 
forces. In both, there is pronounced conflict with drug lords. The 
researcher has not established specific interests of the relevant small 
criminal gangs also operating, besides small drug trafficking, 
“sicariato” (contract killings) and prostitution.  
 
During 2009 two fieldwork journeys were conducted into this region, 
each lasting two months; the first between February and March 2009 
and the second between October and December 2009. One year 
                                                 
56  Municipalities are the smallest administrative unit in Colombia. 
57  The code is composed by a geographical distinction North – South; and a 
numerical distinction 1/2. The geographical distinction implies that the first set of 
towns is due North of the second set of towns. The numerical distinction is: towns 
number 1 are part of the land program; towns number 2 are not part of the land 
program. 
58  Both are separated just by 10 minutes, but their histories are quite 
different. Town South1 is pro-government and close to the second largest city in 
the region; Town South2 is pro-guerrilla and oriented toward the mountains. 
59  Again, both are separated just by 15 minutes and have experienced 
different fates. Town North1 is considered a normal and prosperous town in 
Colombia. Town North2 suffered extreme violence at hands of the paramilitary 
groups in conjunction with state actors. 
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later a final fieldwork lasting four months was conducted between 
September and December 2010. The fieldwork budget was self-
financed and comprised air tickets and local expenses. 
 
During the first visit I established contacts, gathered information, and 
defined the possibilities of the study in the zone. The first month was 
spent in Bogotá and Cali studying documentation related to the 
program and establishing contacts for conducting elite interviews with 
national authorities. This was followed in the second month by 
travelling to the seven towns covered by the program in Valle del 
Cauca at the time – The Valle del Cauca has 42 municipalities in 
total. In this exploratory journey 17 interviews were carried; mainly 
with state officials but also with participants in the program during an 
official event held the 12th of March of 2009. The main result of this 
journey was establishing the two sets of towns and the respective 
contacts. 
 
During the second visit, the first month was spent in Bogotá and Cali 
conducting elite interviews. This was followed by three weeks in the 
North1 – North2 locations and three weeks in the South1 – South2 
locations to conduct elite and participant interviews. The main result 
of this journey was the data, impressions on the situation and the 
rhizomatic (as exposed by Deleuze and Guattari) expansion of ideas, 
concepts, and doubts. As a result the thesis suffered a main ‘lurch’. 
From the beginning the prime concept to study the effect of DWR 
was ‘security’. But from the results and the experiences acquired 
during the fieldwork it was absolutely necessary to change this 
primacy for another concept: ‘conflict’. I realize from the interviews 
that security is not only a perception or a variation in the criminal 
statistics, or a government policy, but an ideal and a hope. Instead, 
conflict is an explanation for people of what is going on in their lives, 
as well as a highly elaborated concept for almost everyone in 
Colombia that involves people, policies, social situations and 
solutions. 
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During the third visit I revisited places and people and checked the 
highly publicized military actions against armed groups of the new 
government of President Juan Manuel Santos. But, also, this 
fieldwork coincided with a natural disaster caused by heavy rains. As 
expected, the main result of this final fieldwork (for this research) was 
the consolidation of information and explanatory propositions. 
 
Two different approaches were used to sampling. In the case of elite 
interviews the names were gathered by position held in the 
government. In the case of participants the method used to identify 
them was snowball sampling. Usually the access to elite interviews is 
achieved via third party references. 
 
The advantages found in this region for this study in operative terms 
were the easy access to the municipalities in terms of transportation, 
communication and services. I usually found people to be friendly, 
open and willing to talk in both interviewed groups (the government 
Officials and the participants). In security terms the proximity of both 
sets of towns to big cities was especially helpful; also the strong 
government presence (civil and military) would facilitate easy access 
to help in case of need. My previous knowledge of the region and my 
existing contacts helped me to access elites. Finally, both fieldworks 
were compatible with the time and budget available for the research. 
 
The advantages found in this region for this study in research terms 
were the existence of high levels of focused violence. This violence is 
restricted in terms of time (usually from dusk to dawn) and space 
(outside the municipal area). This allowed the researcher to be in 
contact with the problems but avoid unnecessary risks. Also, it was 
possible to enter into contact with almost all forms of violence in the 
same region: paramilitary, guerrilla, government, drug dealers and 
organized crime. This is currently one of the main military theatres for 
Government, Guerrillas and the new paramilitary-drug dealer groups. 
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Data collection and analysis 
 
Two different kinds of information are handled: documentary and 
ethnographic. The sources of documentary information are: 
governmental institutions in Colombia (at national, regional and local 
level); civil society and academic groups. The sources of 
ethnographic data are the people interviewed during the fieldwork 
and the direct observation of daily life by the researcher. 
 
Institutional data is publicly available. Permission to access private 
data from academic groups and civil society was requested. Access 
to interviewees was personally requested. Prior to and during the 
fieldwork my idea was to anonymise only those I believed to be at 
risk if they were identified as displaced persons and victims of 
violence. However, after the fieldwork I decided to maintain the 
anonymity of all participants due to sensitive information posing 
security risks, including the names of the towns. Only those specific 
persons that provided ‘official’ information via elite interviews are 
named.  
 
The information obtained during interviews was saved via notes 
taken at the time, or coded information for later development. These 
notes were later supplemented with comments on my impressions of 
the interview, and then analysed in the thesis. During the fieldwork 
documents and files were collected. A record of the full fieldwork was 
kept in a log-book. The interviews were open and semi-structured, 
the key questions emerging from the hypothesis, the literature review 
and the accumulation of information from the interviews themselves. 
The exact interview questions and the order of questioning were 
different for each respondent. Following the interviews, the record of 
my impressions as a non-participant observer complemented the 
information given to me by my participants. In many cases cross-
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referencing data generated by different interviews helped to 
elaborate the analysis or provided me with new leads to pursue. In 
total I conducted 118 interviews with 88 people. One person was 
interviewed four times; 8 people were interviewed three times and 11 
people were interviewed twice. All interviews lasted between 30 
minutes and 3 hours. Appendix 1 shows the coded information used 
to identify each interview. The total number of elite interviews was 
44. They were conducted with state officials ranged from the Chiefs 
of national programs to field workers; including 14 national or 
regional government functionaries and 17 local government 
functionaries. The total number of non-elite interviews was 74, 
conducted with 12 representatives of civil society, comprising 
academics, communal leaders and citizens of different backgrounds 
and different socio-economic status. The number also includes the 
interviews held with 30 participants and potential participants. All 
participants were selected on the basis of accessibility using a snow-
ball process, a non-probabilistic sampling procedure. 
 
After the fieldwork the data was coded and organized to perform a 
micro-analysis of the experiences and the stories collected.60 This 
analysis will help to transform local narratives into ‘perceptions’ and 
‘explanations’ about the role of the Colombian’ state in DWR and the 
potential impacts (on conflict) of protecting land rights during war. 
Even though the ethnographic findings usually do not permit 
generalisations, using micro-analysis enables the drawing of some 
conclusions through comparison. Simply stated, this study is an 
attempt to understand – through a case study – whether the 
                                                 
60  According with De Sousa (2010) and Blondel (2010), the use of micro-
analysis in politics should be ‘substantially’ promoted. This technique is very useful 
in order to understand politics as “collective decisions” (Blondel, 2010:24) and 
bringing back political science to the ‘street level’. In this research, concerned with 
the effects of a public policy in specific locations and for specific people, it means 
to work around “private politics” (Blondel, 2010:23, citing Merriam, 1944). This 
study of ‘Private politics’ is working in what is obvious to all, but a micro-analysis 
allows contrasting elite vs. non-elite responses and to understand two other 
meanings of micro-politics: bottom up power and resistance (Spicer, 2006); and 
behavioural practices emerging from collective knowledge (Willner, 2011). 
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theoretical approach proposed for Non-military DWR makes sense. 
As per any political generalization, it is vague, wide, abstract and 
non-empirical: the analysis of the fieldwork findings will help to 
establish if the proposed theory is helpful vis-à-vis explaining, 
organizing or questioning micro-levels of political organization. 
 
The micro-analysis will be performed comparing data from the two 
sets of towns and comparing the elite and non-elite interviews. This 
comparative analysis of the individual responses in their social 
settings will identify similarities and differences; the variations and 
‘gaps’ between real life and top-down political planning – again, to 
compare the bottom-up theoretical and practical political perspectives 
of citizens in two different contexts of the same policy program. In 
that sense the analysis must help to identify transformations and 
obstacles, what is functioning and what is malfunctioning in this 
public policy as it is implemented. This micro-analysis is done 
because in public policies’ analysis it is relevant considering the 
implications of somebody opinion in terms of the policy process, the 
“subjective experience” of a political process (Collins, 2010), and not 
only the mechanical process of some regulated activities but as a 
creative plethora of constantly evolving and concatenated subsidiary 
activities. 
 
I must point out that the single case avoids making generalizations 
but is intended to support the proposed definition and theoretical 
approach to Non-military DWR. In contrast, as Smith (1991:51) 
claims, in comparative case research “Instead of ‘testing’ 
propositions, theory provides a rough ‘map’ to identify those aspects 
of empirical reality which deserve particular attention” and “case 
studies attempt to fill in the details”. This means that I will ‘see’ the 
ethnographic fieldwork looking for what theory needs, and the 
analysis will be focused on supporting the proposed definition.  
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Research biases 
 
Biases affect the validity of the research and may become obstacles 
at various stages of the research. For this work I have identified four 
biases to be discussed and I will introduce some potential mitigation 
options. 
 
The first bias corresponds to the methodological constraints facing all 
research that is financially and temporally limited. Also, in the case of 
ethnographic fieldwork research there are difficulties accessing 
places and people. This research is the first comprehensive and 
complete approach to this phenomenon, but certainly not ‘the final 
one', and is part of longer-term research that will not be restricted to 
a single researcher in a single discipline. 
 
The second bias concerns the limited access to sites or people. As 
discussed in the changes to the collection of data, this sample bias 
should not be ignored but does not constitute an impediment to the 
conclusions presented. 
 
The third one is the first analytical filter presented during the 
interviews by taking notes or notes taken at the time, or based on 
memory and impressions and recorded later. This information is 
recorded not as verbatim transcripts of interviews, but as a set of 
opinions and perceptions that the interviewer will extrapolate from the 
interview. It is not possible to use equipment to record conversations 
because of practical and security reasons. In general, people do not 
have the confidence to speak in front of a recorder, and even if it was 
possible (and absolutely necessary) it would take months of 
negotiation to secure their confidence to do so. In the case of elite 
interviews it was possible that some officials were prepared to be 
recorded, but this risked them being less open. Even unrecorded, 
several of them remained cautious about making comments not in 
accordance with ‘the official line’. 
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Finally, fieldwork in conflict zones can be executed in different ways. 
This specific research was performed ‘hand-in-hand’ with Colombian 
authorities. I am conducting research on and in my own country, 
having a scholarship granted by the Colombian Government. 
Because of my previous knowledge of the region and the people, all 
the fieldwork will be accessible; however, I will be also conditioned by 
my political views of the country. I did not establish any voluntary 
contact with irregular armed factions. Regarding this point, it is 
important to establish how trustworthy elite and non-elite interviewed 
usedo to perceive me. 
 
Clearly I am not a representative of the Colombian government, and 
people did not perceive me as one, but as an academic who 
probably will link their concerns with public or qualified opinion. As an 
outsider, it takes some time to gain confidence in the local 
population, but I was not perceived as a “menace” or an “intruder”. 
My scholarship from the government means nothing in terms of 
gaining access to government officials or having any kind of support 
from government offices; again, it means nothing for local people. 
But it is important to clarify how I was perceived in order to valuate 
access to interviewees and possible answers. 
 
Bias mitigation 
 
It is important to present possible options to mitigate these biases. 
The bias mitigation begins with the identification of bias. It continues 
by warning the readers of the thesis and those consulted during the 
investigation of such biases. And it is complemented by working 
reflexively. This reflexivity involves the continued recognition of the 
researcher’s own attitudes toward the object of research, their beliefs 
or knowledge on the topic, and limitations or deviations implied in 
different research methodologies (Payne and Payne, 2004). As far as 
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conditions allow, interviews and non-participant observation are 
qualitative methods of collecting information in which the researcher 
can go back and review and re-study data on multiple occasions. 
Additionally, methodological constraints are understood as part of a 
research and training process natural to all scientific methods. The 
sample bias has been addressed during the collection and analysis 
of information with a greater emphasis on information compiled by 
the non-participant research method and triangulation of information 
from other respondents. During note taking the researcher is filtering 
and analysing the data from the respondent, and this bias is part of 
the typical conditions of this research. However, since the research 
topic does not require specific data or specific recounting of facts – 
but, rather, views and perceptions – this bias was not considered 
important to this research. With respect to the sponsorship bias and 
the natural orientation of the researcher even though it is 
acknowledged that mine is only an interpretation of a phenomenon, 
not the reality of it. This situation does not undermine validity – which 
ultimately depends on plausible arguments, internal logic and 
methodological consistency. 
 
The following chapters will discuss the impact of ‘state-led non-
military reconstruction during war’ on conflict, through the Colombian 
case of the ‘Land & Property protection’ program for IDPs during 
actual conflict. They will present the results of the fieldwork, and then 
will address the question about the impact of the policies on the 
conflict. The closing chapter of the thesis discusses and makes 
policy recommendations and suggests options for further research. 
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Chapter three: Fieldwork findings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The information in this chapter originates from documentary analysis, 
direct observation and interviews. The interview coding schedule is 
presented at Appendix 1, and references to the reviewed documents 
can be found in the Bibliography chapter. Three fieldtrips were 
conducted in February-March 2009, October-November 2009 and 
October-December 2010. The chapter first presents the findings 
concerning the program itself – its operation and guidance from an 
institutional point of view. I then contrast this information with the 
findings from the fieldwork. The research studies two towns where 
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the program operates within the same region, but faces different 
conflict situations. Each town was paired with another town as a 
control group. Within these towns I interviewed: beneficiaries and 
non-beneficiaries IDPs; Non-displaced rural population (non-
beneficiaries); and state officials. 
 
The towns participating in the program were coded as North1 and 
South1. Control towns were coded as: North2 and South2. This 
codification is also applied to the interviews identifying the residents 
interviewed in South1 as S1, interviewees in South2 as S2; 
interviewees in North1 as N1, and interviewees in North2 as N2. The 
full code of an interviewee consists of: (general number of interview) 
– (population ID) / (meeting number). For example, reference 25-S1 / 
2, refers to the second interview made to interviewee number 25 who 
lives in South1. Officials, researchers, or experts interviewed in cities 
outside the studied towns were coded as follows: BOG-Bogotá; CAL-
Cali; and TUL-Tuluá. 
 
The Land and Property Protection Program in Colombia 
 
The original idea was to interview the Program Director and some of 
its employees – including field officials – within the region. To my 
surprise it was not possible to meet with the Director or with any 
senior officers associated with the program. However, this has not 
limited the research. In the previous chapter I gave an overview of 
the program, in this chapter I present the main points of interest for 
the research about the functioning and institutional orientation of the 
program that were discovered during fieldwork.  
 
Direct contact with central offices 
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I visited the headquarters of the project and I discovered that there is 
fear and distrust of people who seek information about it. This fear 
was confirmed in the field by regional LPPP representative 1-CAL/3 
and in private interviews by the official 28-BOG/2. Both confirmed to 
me that LPP program and Acción Social officials were declared 
military targets by the FARC, and that the Lands Project received 
specific threats in those regions where they operate by unidentified 
armed groups. This is in addition to frequent assassinations, by 
unidentified armed groups, of peasant leaders – there had been 
seven between January and April 2011 – who actively sought the 
restitution of land to their communities. The LPPP offices are not 
signposted and are located in a government building where several 
offices are used by bodies with ties to the Armed Forces. Because I 
was unable to secure an appointment I decided to go directly to the 
office without one, and requested a meeting with the Program 
Director. This was not possible but Doris Elena Alzate Gomez, Head 
of Communications, saw me on the 10th of February – 2009. 
Throughout the interview she repeatedly insisted that I should not 
investigate the project, that it “was not a research subject”, even 
suggesting that it was strange that I knew about the existence of the 
project or that I was interested in it. She made constant enquiries 
regarding "How I knew about them?”. This aggressive and 
uncooperative attitude was maintained throughout the three fieldtrips, 
where they denied me access to any information, did not provide me 
with any reference material (which is actually freely available and 
consisted of 35 publications during 2005-2010), did not answer my 
telephone calls or emails and refused interview requests. The 
interviewee 28-BOG is a technical advisor on the project, and 
through an academic contact he agreed to meet me anonymously in 
October 2009 and again in December 2010. In the interviews it 
became clear that there was an additional factor behind the secrecy 
about the project: autonomy. On the one hand, the project has been 
handled in a technocratic manner, avoiding political interference, 
which was considered advantageous in terms of securing resources 
DWR impact on Conflict PhD in Politics – York David Camargo 
109 
 
from international sources and in order to become a nationally and 
internationally recognised benchmark on land dispossession data. 
On the other hand the program is part of the land and military 
consolidation plans of the Colombian government, and within the 
program there is a strong fear of it being ‘hijacked’ by the military 
strategy – they feel that it could "harm them" and they seek to avoid 
being incorporated in any plan "specifically designed for and looking 
at military objectives.” 
 
The LPPP has two conditions of specific interest to this research: it 
has provided protection measures since 2006, giving "legal security", 
and, since 2009 through the RUPTA – Registro Único de Predios y 
Territorios Abandonados (Unified Registry of Abandoned Land and 
territories) – it has initiated specific restitution processes. 
Respondents 28-BOG/1 and Doris Elena Alzate accept that the 
program contributes to the process called "democratic security" and 
reconstruction of the country from conflict, but both say that it does 
so only tangentially. 
 
Regional contact with program 
 
When directly asked about the program, regional officers 1-CAL and 
2-CAL state that there is considerable technical and management 
strength at the centre, which is very convenient for the purposes of 
the program, but that locally the separation between technical and 
political issues is inconvenient and causes many problems. Mainly 
they maintain that locally the program does not advance because it 
depends on political support from mayors and is operationally 
dependent on work carried out by UMATA – Unidad Municipal de 
Asistencia Técnica Agrícola (Municipal Unit for Agricultural Technical 
Assistance). Acción Social officials assigned to LPP program can not 
engage in any activity aimed at the protection of land without the 
local support of these units. The support depends on the political and 
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economic profile of the municipalities and not really on the problem of 
land or displacement experienced on it. 1-CAL and 2-CAL explained 
that the process is successful if UMATA officials are technical, but 
fails if they are just political-bureaucratic positions; they also suggest 
that it is successful if the municipality is dependent on the rural 
sector, mainly for tourism or rural production. 1-CAL/1 and 2-CAL/1 
provide another key element to understand the impact of the program 
– they indicate that the program develops a process that not only 
involves protection but which also serves to establish a database (the 
RUPTA) with which it is possible to "reconstruct the history of the 
effect of conflict on land property,” which, in turn, can "reflect the 
institutional weakness of the state as it has historically been 
incapable of knowing what is happening in the field, and to pay 
attention to the problems." 
 
I repeatedly asked interviewees 1-CAL, 2-CAL; and local Umata's 
officers’ 13-S1, 14-S1, 31-S2, 38-N1 about the subject of 
"reconstruction.” None were able to relate this concept to the specific 
activities they perform. This shows the breach between policy 
formulated at the central level and the practical activity, in the field, of 
local officials. 9-TUL interviewee, observer of the OAS peace 
mission, stated that in his opinion this is because the centre plays 
with the "semantics of the war," so the idea of 'reconstruction' and 
'post-conflict' generates "golpes de opinión” (this expression refers to 
impacts in the public opinion; something in the media which ‘blows 
your mind’) that support and generate a different picture of military 
strategy. Commenting on this situation, the academic and public 
figure Eduardo Pizarro noted that talking of 'post-conflict' when you 
still have a conflict certainly is part of the "political war", but he 
specifies that it also reflects the government's intention to initiate 
reconstruction activities during the conflict seeking to "avoid a violent 
post-conflict, or at least not so dramatic," like the one experienced in 
Central America. This observation is fully consistent with the 
research conducted in this thesis. 
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Why land-related problems are key? 
 
Asked “Why land is key?” to solving the Colombian conflict, 
respondent 4-BOG (CNRR adviser) said that the issue is "sensitive to 
the extreme", because in Colombia "valuation of the success or 
failure of peace in Colombia will be defined on land issues." For this 
official, a major problem is "the perverse dynamics in the price of 
land in consolidated areas (socially and militarily areas restored by 
the state), where the same illegal actors who have been neutralized, 
or some others, come back and buy lands at low prices or market 
prices" to use them, again, to grow illicit crops, to develop regional 
political power or for money laundering, in what she describe as a 
"peace + coca dynamic." The director of SIMCI – Sistema de 
Información y Monitoreo de Cultivos Ilícitos de Naciones Unidas (UN 
Monitoring and Information System on Illicit Crops), Hyarold Correa, 
supports and explains the dynamics of illicit crops in Colombia, 
where areas with most illicit crops are those in which one of the 
armed actors has consolidated its military and political power – the 
state, the FARC, the BACRIM (Bandas Criminales - Criminal 
Groups), or local drug barons. In these areas "peace is achieved” 
meaning that farmers can cultivate coca and get paid for their 
product (the leaf, coca paste or cocaine) without being exposed to 
abuse or violence – it does not matter that in these areas the 
Colombian Government is conducting eradication programs or the 
state is controlling the area; peasants are growing and producing 
illegally. That is why, as explained below, it is essential not only to 
reach peace but also to achieve control of the drug trade. 
Furthermore, 4-BOG said it is clear that IDPs are the most visible 
victims of the conflict over land, but not the only ones. 1-CAL/2 
considers land protection is essential because armed groups have a 
vested interest in it for the accumulation of wealth (seeking not only 
possession but ownership) and the illicit use of the same: not only 
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illicit crops but to establish communication corridors between areas 
of conflict, so that the land allows them to move and to establish 
supply stations, retreat or advance positions. In this dynamic, 1-
CAL/2 also notes that organized criminals, not listed as armed 
groups, are also involved, developing illegal activities and engaged in 
stealing land by forged-documents. For 1-CAL/2 is clear that the 
control of information and analysis of potential uses of land made by 
the state will transform the conflict, because it alters the emphasis on 
who controls the land; probably “changing the combat areas to its 
original emplacement”: the wastelands of the state – as it was until 
the eighties. 
 
The ‘puppeteer’ in the strategy 
 
Military officers’ 3-BOG, 7-CAL and 80-BOG share the institutional 
doctrine on military and social recovery of the territory. This strategy 
is being conducted and managed in the country by CCAI – Centro 
para la Coordinación de la Acción Integral (Centre for Coordination of 
Integrated Action). The CCAI is a coordinating body within the 
strategy considered as "Consolidation." Within it the idea of 
'reconstruction' and 'post-conflict' is, as the 3-BOG interviewee said, 
"to create the conditions for ending the conflict,” following the 
strategy of “being more efficient as a state," and thus weakening the 
conflict itself. Eduardo Pizarro refers to this aspect by saying that 
there are some "factors that lead to the consolidation of the armed 
factor" in a society, and what the "war does is to exacerbate these 
factors.” Colombian society faces these factors, precisely, to end the 
conflict.  
 
In this sense peace is not something that is negotiated but something 
that is ‘done’. Decisions and state initiatives can end the conflict, but 
these do not deal with the violence. 80-BOG explains the steps taken 
in this strategy: Militarily taking the territory; Transferring security to 
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the different forces; The state (government functions) takes the 
territory; Military control is established in the area and offensive 
actions are taken; and the force is focused on attacking the drug 
trade which is seen as running through all aspects of the Colombian 
conflict. The main problem faced in this civil-military strategy is that 
"people think that violence is a solution to the problems." The history 
of the conflict and the influence of drugs has generated, locally, a 
culture in which it is clear that power is won through violence; it 
focuses on the "profits" and "immediate benefits" and fuels a "Drugs, 
violence and power" cocktail. This situation was reached in 
Colombia, according to 80-BOG, because "the negligence and 
inefficiency of state at a local level, the lack of resources of the 
national state, and the armed groups' interest to keep the misery of 
the peasants"; that is why "the heart of the strategy is to ensure that 
economic and social development stop the empire of the illicit." This 
‘culture of the illicit’ does not produce development; rather it steals 
resources from the local level, so that real business and investment 
moves elsewhere. For this strategy of consolidation to be successful 
according to interviewee 80-BOG for the CCAI “the issue of land 
titling is crucial", because it establishes the agricultural frontier and 
allows joint-working with communities of organized landowners. 
 
The interview conducted the 19th of October of 2009 with Alvaro 
Balcazar, the director of the spearhead reconstruction initiative in La 
Macarena region, allowed further understanding of the meaning of 
such a strategy of territorial consolidation of the Colombian state and 
the role of protecting land. Mr. Balcazar is Head Director of the CFIM 
– Centro de Fusión Integral de la Macarena (Macarena's Center for 
Integrated Work), attached to the CCAI and created in August 2007. 
Confirming the statement made by 80-BOG and 3-BOG he explains 
that after the military control in urban centres the state programs 
enter and this initiates a process of transferring military control to 
police control both to the municipal and rural areas, searching, 
mainly, to eradicate illicit coca crops. The objective of both the CCAI 
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and the CFIM is to coordinate the work of government agencies. His 
responsibilities are: 
 
1. Institutional development, citizenship and governance 
2. Property rights and territorial order 
3. Infrastructure and connectivity 
4. Access to public goods and social services 
5. Business and economic development  
 
This strategy of "security + development and governance" features a 
component of ‘assistance’ that allows the protection of vulnerable 
families and the transition from illicit coca business to lawful business 
activities within the formal economy. He also indicates that this 
strategy is indeed an "integral part in ending the conflict." Based on 
his experience he identifies that the land problem in Colombia is not 
merely about property but about its use: he says that what is 
important is to create and sponsor the conditions for agricultural and 
rural development which, in turn, ensures sustainability – of income – 
for the most vulnerable populations. In the same vein, 28-BOG 
indicates that the land problem in Colombia will not be resolved 
without peasants’ models of association. Alvaro Balcazar indicates 
that the problem "is not to distribute", but "to ensure opportunities 
and build capacity" to strengthen community life. Asked about the 
LPPP he indicates that the problem lies in the separation between 
technical and political aspects, because politics is necessary for the 
development of projects, not the "political dividend" but the "political 
objective” and will always be assuming the "political cost”. In this way 
the interviewee distinguishes between three elements of the political 
life of a nation: the fulfilment of the state objectives (political 
objective), individual or party gains from the state action (political 
dividend), but also the need for an individual or party willing to 
assume the ‘political cost’. In particular he indicates five (5) key 
lessons learned on how to bring the presence of the state – through 
programs – into conflict areas: 
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1) The state is not designed to go where, previously, no state has 
been. So, the state must learn to "relax" their planning and 
spending elements, and to understand that it is not 
establishing all the rules of the game or making all the 
decisions, but rather that it is a shared process. For this, the 
main ally is the International Community whose role should be 
to facilitate ‘flexibility’ in spending and to be a third partner of 
the state to attract local civil society and negotiate with these 
local capacities. 
2) There is no dilemma between ‘security’ or ‘development’ 
regarding which is most important. It is clear that security is 
most essential: without it development is not possible because 
of the possibility that armed actors can challenge the state (by 
force) creating a climate of insecurity and arbitrariness that 
makes development impossible. 
3) During-war Development is possible but it is not sustainable. 
In that sense, to make development sustainable one must 
recover institutional control over the territory and the 
construction of the rule of law. In order to achieve this, it is 
necessary to develop an organizational culture within the state 
to transcend civil-military hostility and to build unity around the 
state. It therefore requires a combination of politics and 
military strategies of consolidation. In this sense the strategy is 
clear: rather than the state temporarily occupying territories in 
order to expel illegal actors and then withdrawing, the state 
must be intent on permanent occupation: only a state that 
remains in the territory and in people’s daily lives – meeting 
their needs and fulfilling its obligations – will create the 
confidence necessary for long term development. 
4) Flexibility is essential to respond to local needs and the state 
should take advantage of every available opportunity to build 
trust. Here, he identifies the main problems for the state, and 
indicates that the specific support from USAID – providing 
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immediate resources which can be used and presented as a 
program of the Colombian government – allows the 
construction and consolidation of the state and the 
development of regions. He notes that, au contraire, the 
cooperation of the European Union is against the recovery of 
the state because it gives primacy to its (the EU’s) own 
interest. FARC exploits this and argues that the Colombian 
Government is subordinated to the International Community, 
reinforcing the idea of a weak and unresponsive state unable 
to meet the needs of its population. 
5) It is necessary to develop and maintain local existing 
structures. Communal forms of self-organization and positive 
leadership in the reclaimed areas must be transformed, 
developed and maintained. In this way communities became 
"active" in their own security and development. 
 
Alvaro Balcazar points out that State-led Integrated Action in 
Colombia is a state policy run by civilians and is not going to change; 
it is not an extension of the military campaign but uses military force 
as an instrument of penetration and consolidation of the state in 
conflict regions. 
 
Daily life in case-study towns South1 and North1 
 
South1 and North1 are part of the LPPP and are different because 
the conflict's main protagonists in South1 are the state and the 
FARC; while in North1 the main protagonists are the state and the 
paramilitaries (now BACRIM – Bandas Criminales ‘Criminal Gangs’). 
The conflict in both towns has a long history – stretching back to the 
1980s – and is responsible for heavy casualties and displaced 
populations. In both towns distrust of the state and its agents is high 
due to: accusations that the civilian population are aiding, or are even 
members or ‘moles’ of, the armed groups; and people in the towns 
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denounce the continued failure of the state and the constant lies, the 
unfulfilled political promises and the theft of state resources that 
occurs both locally, regionally and nationally. Geographically both 
populations are "up the mountain", and are clearly suitable for 
agriculture and are very close (ten or fifteen minutes by car) to 
prosperous intermediate cities. Economically, South1 seems to be 
more active than North1, but in terms of cost of living both appear 
expensive vis-a-vis the perceived incomes of their inhabitants. 
However this assessment possibly applies to the whole country 
because of the exaggerated global increases in food prices in the 
period 2007-2010. In terms of its spatial distribution both towns are 
very similar, having the same institutions (central plaza, church, city 
hall, restaurants, shops, bars, etc.), and a regular bus service, etc. 
The residents of North1 appear a little more open and confident and 
more engaged and integrated with their town than the residents of 
South1. Generally, however, to the outside observer, daily life in both 
case-study towns is practically the same. 
 
Before travelling to the selected towns three major feelings 
dominated: the expectation of poor security conditions (even by the 
standards of a local researcher like me); the expectation of logistical 
difficulties; the prospect of finding enough information from the local 
authorities and little from settlers. My first exploratory trip to the 
investigated towns was surprising. The security situation in the region 
and the towns was higher than expected, compared to the history of 
violence experienced. Likewise, the infrastructure, conditions of 
movement, access to information, and logistical support were highly 
satisfactory. During my second trip, however, when I visited the 
outskirts and vicinities outside the municipal centre and contacted the 
inhabitants, all of the above conditions were inferior. There is no 
authority whatsoever, the only government authority with power to 
access those areas are the military. All the other government entities 
have been threatened or expelled. The rural population lives in fear 
of the night and reject the presence of any outsider. The only access 
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roads are extremely damaged and communications are very poor. 
This contrast between the towns and rural villages caused problems 
in accessing those farmers who were beneficiaries of protective 
measures. But I found in two peasant leaders and a priest the 
necessary support and security guarantees to transit the area and 
talk to people.  
 
In ethical terms this situation of violence in different populations 
confronted me with the responsibilities of academic research in this 
environment of violence. Two of my helpers, the priest  (40-N2 
interviewed) – who granted me access to the rural population 
hostage and victim of the paramilitaries in North2 – and the 
community leader  (30-S1 interviewed) – who explained to me why 
FARC are the sole authority in South1– both motivated me by 
admitting their own powerlessness. They hoped that 'someone' 
would do something for the Colombians. Furthermore, as interviewee 
49-N2 – who described himself as a victim – complained, somehow 'I 
am profiting from their tragedy'. And not only me, but many other 
'academics' passing by and collecting 'data'. This situation perturbed 
me and I resolved to manage the information I collected from them 
not as data but as the memories of human beings, both victims and 
victimizers. 
 
Violence and conflict 
 
It is noteworthy that in all towns a constant police and military 
presence was observed comprising both mobile and fixed 
installations. The fundamental difference in terms of conflict between 
the towns is that in South1 – as previously noted – historically the 
FARC has not carried out urban attacks because it is considered a 
‘bedroom town’. North1 has suffered paramilitary violence within the 
urban area, even though many paramilitary leaders and drug 
traffickers were born and bred there. This can be explained because 
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members of both armed groups respond to two different dynamics: 
seeking membership of the guerrillas in South1 is not done so to 
seek power or revenge against local elites, whereas participating in 
the business of drug trafficking in North1 does have a component of 
revenge, ostentation and personal social ambition. This could 
probably be explained by North1 being famous for its established 
conservative tradition vis-a-vis its customs and social relationships. 
 
During the three fieldworks security risks in North1 and South1 were 
reflected in four situations, listed according to the threat: 
 
a) Shootings and fights 
Although it may seem 'extraordinary' for a European I grew up 
in a country where it is common to hear the sound of firearms 
or street fights. Many of these shots or fights are not a crime 
itself, and probably correspond to behaviours associated with 
alcohol consumption or practices associated with deterring 
thieves or other criminals. However, during my stay in South1 
and South2 I heard machine gunfire from army helicopters 
fighting in the mountains in the evening and early morning; 
heavy gunfire a few blocks from my hostel (in what seemed to 
be a robbery); shots in the morning that took the life of a 
woman who had sued a criminal; and several daytime fights 
due to alcohol consumption. 
 
Although none of these facts caused me physical harm, they 
increased my sense of nervousness regarding my presence 
and my research in those towns. I adopted increased 
precautionary measures, but the fighting in the mountains and 
at military or guerrilla checkpoints in the vicinity of the 
surveyed towns also changed the attitudes of the people I 
interviewed. In most cases it made them more cautious about 
talking and more fearful about my identity. Indeed, spies are 
commonplace when there is fighting nearby: I was informed 
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that in South2 all agencies of the Colombian intelligence are 
active and have infiltrated the ‘floating’ population (traders and 
temporary workers). 
 
b) Combat between the Army and the FARC 
As mentioned in point b) fighting in the mountains could be 
heard at night. Also the presence of subversive infiltrators was 
mentioned and recognizable among the civilian population in 
South1 and rural villages near South2. Apparently strong 
intelligence work in South2 prevented guerrillas from 
appearing in public there. Their clear presence in South1 is 
explained because it is considered a sleepover and hometown 
for many guerrilla fighters. 
 
As the respondent 25-S1, director of a school, explained, 
"many students start crying in class fearing that their parents 
do not return from the mountain." During my fieldwork, combat 
escalated in the towns surrounding South2 with harassment of 
the army and police; the escalation due to the movement of 
troops at the top of the mountain. The 25-S1 interviewee 
recounted how four people came in a taxi asking to 
accompany them to try to smuggle a wounded guerrilla 
through nearby army checkpoints. 
 
Short trips to the towns besieged by the guerrillas and 
travelling the routes connecting the region showed me that 
most of the public places were protected by the army, except 
some stretches which the guerrillas clearly controlled – 
including a bridge destroyed months ago. The attitude of the 
coach driver denoted the rules of the road: drive slowly and be 
careful of burned vehicles or those blocking the roads. In the 
third fieldwork the sieges and combat had intensified and 
restrictions into the area were tighter. 
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c) Restrictions on schedules 
I generally only worked outside my hotel(s) during the daytime. 
In North1, however, security conditions were higher and it was 
possible to be out at night if required. 
 
d) Presence of drug-lords 
In North1 during weekends small and medium sized drug 
barons usually made their presence known at night to display 
their vehicles, their luxuries and money, trying to attract young 
girls. There was a heavy police deterrent presence which 
appeared effective in constraining excessive behaviour. 
 
This situation contrasts with the peaceful and traditional image of life 
presented by the elites in both North1 and South1. Historians 15-S1, 
16-S1, 33-S2; Priests 29-S1, 39-N1; Small Businesswoman 34-S2; 
Fireman 42-N1; and Medium businessman 43-N1 also endorsed this 
image: “This is a good town with good people, almost there are no 
problems and the few problems are caused by migrants, mainly black 
workers or IDPs from other towns”. As the priest 39-N1 on North1 
says: "this is a society with strong family and religious ties, where the 
values of honesty and respect for elders are living every day." For 
this respondent it is clear that "children are educated at home" and 
"all persons in the town know each other." When elites are directly 
asked about the violence in the town they always say: “It is a thing of 
the past.” This image is heavily challenged by this research and I 
interpret this ‘fantasy portrait’ of the local situation as a denial 
response motivated by the wish to 'keep business and economy 
running’ rather than evidence of any  ‘compromise' with any armed or 
political group. What was actually observed during the fieldwork was 
that the conflict is very much alive in all towns; there is a 
concealment of the existence and status of local IDPs and the elites 
and the general population live in fear of a catastrophic event 
produced by violence. For example, during the final drafting of this 
document a bomb attack was made against the offices of the 
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Attorney General's Office in South1. This was not an isolated event 
but it emphasises what has been indicated by respondent 5-S1 about 
the destruction of criminal records, loss of folios in processes and 
little local help with justice when trying to prosecute those 
responsible for violence. Interviewee 44-N1 (Municipal employee) 
indicated that this denial, concealment and failure to cooperate with 
the law also happens in North1 and that it was due to the elites 
allowing the violence because they were directly involved in it; or 
because themselves have incomes from illegal activities. One 
example, a murder, shows not only the degree of complicity but also 
the insensitivity that prevails in these populations. The information 
about this murder was provided by Religious worker 41-N2 and 
confirmed by the municipal employee 44-N1. This murder happened 
in North1 in June 2008. A young drug addict from North2 who had 
recently moved to North1 was tortured throughout the night before 
being killed, his cries were heard by neighbours but no one reported 
the situation or tried to act – they knew that the murderers were 
following orders within what is known as "social cleansing" (Mano 
negra). The boy’s limbs were beaten with an iron rod to break his 
bones, he was tortured for hours (blows, punctures, insults, threats), 
he was maimed on his limbs and face, injected with battery acid 
(referring to his drug addiction), and finally killed. Such practices are 
considered forms of 'warning'. As expected, the actual image found 
and reported in this research about these towns is the opposite of 
that presented by the elites: my conclusion of what ‘daily life’ is like 
for many people is that it resembles a descent into the heart of 
darkness. 
 
It is clear that in North1 and in South1 violence and conflict is 
concentrated in rural areas. This may be partially explained by what 
the Secretary of municipal government in North1 – the civil servant in 
charge of security in the municipality – (interviewee 48-N1) referred 
to as a common practice in the urban municipal areas: “local 
agreements” in which the police negotiate with outlawed armed 
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groups the sites where illegal activities can be exercised: on the 
outskirts, outside the city limits. Police officers seek to convince them 
to "settle their affairs” outside the urban limits because if people are 
found dead inside the town, then the police station commander loses 
his job. Also, the 80-BOG interviewee, an active Army colonel, 
referred to how civilians 'demand' killings by the army. This reflects 
the constant calls for the army to be 'effective' against the violence 
made by the national government. But the demands are local too. 
For example, a municipal representative – the local official 
responsible for protecting the rights of citizens – asked in a municipal 
security committee why the army did not 'leave some dead' on the 
road, stating that this was the reason behind the increased number of 
robberies on the road. As I observed in both towns, life in rural areas 
is dramatic.  
 
In South1 I visited a village with the help of victim 79-S1; this journey 
was very difficult and highly discouraged by many people who 
supported me during the fieldwork. I discovered that the state had 
completely abandoned the village which is instead governed by the 
FARC – even though they do not have their camps there they have 
their informants and are ‘the law’. It was not possible to talk to the 
beneficiaries of the program because, as local peasants’ leader 30-
S1/3 explained to me, this is an area "controlled" by the guerrillas 
who come and go at will, and the presence of any stranger is used as 
a “pretext to settle discord among the community". This means that 
mere suspicion (like talking to any outsider) is prosecuted by the 
guerrillas via a "revolutionary trial" and this is manipulated by feuding 
neighbours as a way of winning private disputes or privileges. In this 
community they are not experiencing violence everyday, but they are 
living the conflict, which means that everything is perceived as a 
threat against them or could be used by someone as an excuse to 
hurt someone. Because of this guerrilla and community law, 
speaking to any resident of the community immediately puts him/her 
at risk. During the trip (a one hour drive into the mountains) Elected 
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Peasants community representative 20-S1/2 and local peasants 
leader 30-S1/2 told me that the struggle for land in the region is 
linked to economic interests, basically "paramilitary groups in the 
service of landowners want the top of the mountains as a source of 
water for sugar cane crops”, and guerrillas need land for their military 
movements. "The region is a point of intersection and departure 
between the centre and south of the country." In the month prior to 
my visit selective killings of peasants had occurred, according to the 
account given by 30-S1: "armed men with list in hand killed 3 people 
50 meters from a military checkpoint." Likewise, victim 70-S1 referred 
to the theft of livestock in the region which "coincidentally" happens 
when there is military presence in the area. From the official point of 
view, local Umata's servants 13-S1 and 14-S1 fully confirmed the 
threats against Acción Social, the LPPP and any state presence in 
rural areas, discouraging my trip to this area and indicating that the 
guerrillas kill those officers who dare to go uphill and they throw their 
bodies on the road, leaving them as a warning to others. 
 
In North1 the situation was not as dramatic, but was nonetheless 
similar. With the help of municipal employee 44-N1 it was possible to 
accompany 53-N1, a local politician, in a meeting with farmers 
organized by the IMCA–Instituto Mayor Campesino61 to a mountain 
village an hour-and-a-half away from North1. The roads were in an 
even worse condition than those leading to South1. Upon arriving at 
the meeting point – a village school – it was possible to talk with 
some farmers and to check that they did not live under the same 
‘restrictions’ as the inhabitants of South1 but they also live with 
uncertainty. They felt much more able to talk; they showed me the 
lands recently taken by the paramilitaries for illegal crops and they 
told me how they now have to make detours of between two to four 
hours to reach the other side of the mountain because the 
paramilitaries have issued ‘no trespassing’ orders on several rural 
                                                 
61  Colombian NGO working in peasant training. 
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roads. They also fear that the paramilitaries are seeking to recruit the 
village youth and that the paramilitaries’ appetite for land will not 
stop. Their stories of massacres and land problems are mixed up 
with accounts of family problems and disputes over illegal business, 
with a lot of money and a lot of poverty in the middle. This creates a 
climate of anxiety and uncertainty about the future, hence the interest 
of the IMCA and the local politician to meet and engage with the 
peasants. According to 53-N1 and driver 54-N1 the security forces 
are not authorized to venture far into this area. Along the road there 
are many abandoned houses with signs that indicate that they are 
"armed traps", which means they are bomb-houses, just as signs of 
"danger" and guns were painted on the walls of buildings, indicating 
that anyone who dares to return or inhabit the site will be killed. In a 
conversation with the driver of the "chiva” (typical rural bus), 54-N1 
said the route ended two hours ahead and reached a plateau where 
only “fear” and the paramilitaries rule. Coincidentally, 54-N1 drives 
one of the buses in which one of the worst murderers in the region – 
Henry Loaiza known as "El Alacrán" (The Scorpion) – began his 
public life as driver’s assistant. 
 
It is clear that the LPPP itself is a military target for illegal armed 
groups, so too Acción Social, the state, their institutions or any form 
of help or support to the local population. It is clear that the LPPP do 
not meet specific military objectives, in fact it is unrelated with the 
military conflict in the area and neither accompanies, or is 
accompanied by, military actions. Drug trafficking is a major problem 
affecting rural areas, because illicit crops and the consolidation of 
violence corridors threatens the possession and use of rural land. 
 
Groups of inhabitants 
 
The peasant group beneficiaries in North1 (beneficiaries living in his 
land) with whom I had an opportunity to speak expressed several 
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concerns. I was pleasantly surprised with their organizational skills 
and the considerable knowledge they have not only about the conflict 
but about their specific situation and the role of the state. They are 
people who care about their well-being and are trying to improve their 
lives and those of their children. The same was observed in South1 
after talking with 20-S1, a peasant leader. They are all interested in 
progressing their lives and establishing better ones for their families. 
However, they experience constant problems with neighbours 
(especially landlords) and they complain about the absence of the 
state. Additionally, they have to deal with armed groups who attack, 
rob and murder them. A cycle of misery, poverty and violence is 
evident. They are not full citizens; their relationship with the state is 
contingent, fragmented, and complex. They wish constant attention, 
information, a state presence but they do not receive it; and when 
they do receive it, it is incomplete or not useful. In the specific case of 
LPPP they are worried by the legal instability of the Colombian state, 
always fearing that any approach or offer by the state will bring 
greater evils. Legalizing their ownership of land or participating in the 
program is seen as a development that will complicate their lives. 
This evaluation is shared by poor and wealthy rural inhabitants alike. 
A group of farmers in North1 told me that they were given some land 
in an area where a massacre had occurred and via the LPPP they 
achieved legal rights over these territories; but now the original 
owners have reappeared and are forcing the farmers to leave, 
preventing them from working the land by destroying crops, homes 
and possessions.  
 
On the other hand, another group of displaced peasants (living in 
North1 but not beneficiaries of LPPP) told me that now that they have 
returned to their land they want to protect it with the help of LPPP, to 
prevent being displaced again. They had not sought the assistance 
of LPPP until then because they did not see the need – but the return 
of illegal actors has prompted them to do so. Nevertheless, they do 
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not see the physical presence of the program in the area and this 
leads them to doubt its effectiveness. 
 
Although it was not possible to talk with beneficiaries of the program 
in South1, the 20-S1 peasant leader stated that the biggest concern 
in the area was how to generate sustainable livelihoods from the 
land. The peasant want property rights to the land so that they can 
live off it, but this requires the presence of the state or investment in 
regional development. He also shows that peasants in the region do 
not understand the protective measures. The state was absent from 
their lives for many years during which time they were at the mercy of 
the paramilitaries. They are now demanding government support for 
a much wider range of problems above and beyond the program’s 
remit, they do not understand it and are unclear about "how (the 
program) benefits them." In particular he indicated that a large 
number of occupants of public lands (State, or abandoned) are 
experiencing legal troubles and receive no support from the local 
administration. In this area, because the territory is ‘governed’ by the 
FARC, it is not possible to organize the community – or let them self-
organize – in order to make these claims or to decide on issues of 
ownership. For example, the sale of some lands by local farmers to 
some indigenous families (who wanted to move away from the top of 
the mountain) was not authorised – the order was: "we do not want 
indigenous people here, and we (the Farc) only authorize land sales 
between members of the community." The dispute between 
indigenous people and peasants centres on the exploitation of 
natural resources, in particular water. Over-exploitation of poor soils 
and poor farming practices has led to very low soil productivity, which 
increases poverty. These lands are not productive in revenue terms 
because of the high costs of fertilizers, transportation costs, low trade 
prices and extortion payments. Out-dated farming practices and 
conflicts over land use therefore combine to produce subsistence-
level livelihoods antithetical to generating profits and encouraging 
new business. 
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Displaced people living in the municipal centers can be displaced 
from other regions or from the same region. The differences are 
enormous. The displaced from other regions are visible and they 
have access to the benefits of LPPP (seeking the protection of 
abandoned land in their municipalities of origin), they also receive 
support from the state and have special guarantees derived from 
their IDP status. However they are viewed by elites as a source of 
problems and insecurity for their municipality, as discussed earlier. 
On the other hand the displaced from elsewhere within the 
municipality that inhabit the town are invisible to both the state and 
the community. The account of 24-S1, a displaced peasant, is 
typical: 
 
"I was living in the top of the mountain, I have five (5) children from 
two marriages; my oldest son is 8 years old and the youngest 10 
months. With my husband we had a dairy farm with few cows, 
producing milk and cheese, we had no public services.” Following 
threats by gunmen (they did not know which illegal armed group they 
belonged to) they became displaced 8 months ago. The husband 
registered the complaint and remained in town because life there is 
better and his children could improve their study. Five (5) months ago 
her husband was killed. "He was killed by a friend. They were 
drinking alcohol, have a discussion, the friend took the gun and shot 
him four (4) times, he came alive to hospital and died there because 
they did not notice he had an intestinal injury." She was left alone 
with the children, "the friend who shot him fled but still sending 
money to his family, and he has a small baby too. The husband also 
carried a gun, but that day was not." Now that she is alone she is 
assisted by the family and some friends. I ask her why she does not 
get help from the government, to which she is entitled: "She is not to 
beg" and she is tired of paperwork, and of asking for help when 
"nothing is solved." She has received no aid from "Families in 
Action”, or help as a consequence of her IDP status, or aid as a 
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single parent woman (from either of three government welfare 
programs.) She has a job and says that "it is economical to live in 
town," but she does not earn enough. She still has land in the 
mountains, but the farm produces very little ... "not like when my 
husband lived and worked the farm." 
 
The story of hotel worker 45-N1 is similar: she works as a cleaner 
every day, without rest, without social security, without meals during 
eight (8) or more hours per day. She earns between one (1) and five 
(5) US dollars per day, depending on how many clients the business 
has. But she says she is happy because the job is one of the best in 
the local labor market. She speaks fearfully when asked about the 
conflict and drug trafficking. She hesitates, first mentioning a name, 
then telling a story of neighbours and acquaintances that became 
rich overnight. She speaks of luxury cars and parties lasting several 
days. She speaks of "the owner of the army", and she is speaking 
literally of the former owner of an entire battalion of the Colombian 
army. Suddenly she remembers that he was very bad, very violent, 
and she remains silent. She feels she has said too much. I ask her 
about her land and she says she does not own it anymore having 
sold it to the owner of everything: Diego Montoya. She has no more 
land and now works tirelessly and is without a future. 
 
Those ‘sub-groups’ of internal displaced people are facing different 
problems. Some are beneficiaries of the program and are occupying 
their land, and are worried by the consequences of this decision; 
some others are not beneficiaries living in this land and they are 
worried of losing this land and wish to enter the program; some IDPs 
of the region are now inhabitants of the municipalities and have left 
the land, they are not sure if entering the LPPP is a good decision; 
finally some IDPs are displaced from other regions and may or may 
not be beneficiaries of the program, but in general will seek to enter 
the program. 
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Based on the interviews and observation, I can point out some 
specifics of the social status of each group of IDPs in those towns. 
Peasants living in this land are not seen by the town as IDPs, even if 
they share many of the risks and the characteristics. IDPs from the 
same municipality are often seen as peasants who wish to change 
their status to city workers, or as criminals hidden in town. IDPs from 
other regions are seen as victims of violence but, at the same time, 
as a problem for the town. 
 
Local Administration 
 
13-S1 and 14-S1 Umata’s servants are responsible for LPPP at a 
local level in South1 and collaborate with other national government 
programs for care and assistance to peasants and IDPs. They say 
that recent displacement in the area began in 2000 and continued 
until 2003 with the paramilitary violence. Since 2004 IDPs have been 
returning to the area sponsored by the national government, they are 
returning after the demobilization of armed groups: this zone 
currently features protection measures. Returnees found their lands 
and their homes ‘marked’ with the trail of death: destruction of 
property and the land turned into cemeteries. They found over 500 
mass graves in this single region. The LPPP measure of ‘legal 
protection’ prevented that heirs of this age of terror took possession 
over abandoned land; there is political pressure on and within the 
municipal administration to lift the protective measures, seeking to 
legalize illegal possession of land. The administrative problems of the 
municipality are the same as in the rest of the country and are due to 
a discredited political class that make promises during elections and 
fail to deliver when in government. But they note that there are 
peasants with a history of resistance to violence and conflict, and 
resistance to political corruption. However, their leaders are in fear of 
the armed actors and the criminal’s ability to act with impunity. They 
have alternative political proposals but they do not want to run for 
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government. On the other hand, the indigenous peoples have 
managed to self-organize and recover some areas, but this puts 
them in direct conflict with peasants. There are also large numbers of 
Afro-Colombians arriving looking for work on sugarcane plantations, 
some of whom are displaced by the conflict whilst some are 
economic migrants from outside the region. 13-S1 reported that he 
tries to help displaced peasants because "in every displaced I see 
my own story." He himself was displaced from a village in the 
municipality by the actions of the military, by the bombings and the 
combat that historically have occurred there. Both respondents 
indicated there is no advantage in self-identifying as a displaced 
person, first because the humanitarian emergency aid does not 
arrive; second, because access to benefits or government assistance 
programs is very difficult; and thirdly, because of "social stigma: it is a 
political risk, the economic benefit is so little, and there is an absurd 
amount of paperwork involved." 
 
During the first interview in October 2009 both public officials (13-S1 
and 14-S1) advised me against travelling to the villages, and taught 
me a basic rule of survival: "what is seen there, it stays there. Life 
depends on what you say." As government officials they feel isolated, 
abandoned by the government, unsupported and yet forced to do 
their job. Each Colombian officer is the state itself: he/she has all the 
responsibility and is ‘the state’ in every situation. The second lesson 
they taught me is something that as a Colombian national I was 
already aware of – the problem of displacement, violence, conflict, 
poverty and land did not start a decade or two ago, but more than 
eighty years ago. The inhabitants of these villages and towns are 
themselves the displaced children or grandchildren of IDPs of 
yesteryear. Indeed, I am the son of a couple displaced by violence 
during the 1940s. 
 
In an interview with 13-S1 I asked what makes LPPP work in diverse 
municipalities? According to 13-S1 "quality and willingness to work of 
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civil servants" and "the existence of groups, organizations or local 
associations" are important. His view on the LPPP was clear: "the 
project does not protect land's inhabitants, but those with the 
property title." He considers this a great disadvantage and something 
that causes problems. It is difficult to for the state to act if those who 
control a given territory are actors such as the FARC: they "pass by 
one, two or three, in civil crews doing intelligence. Although they do 
not reside within the territory they are the ones who rule." On how it 
was possible to declare protection in the area, he indicated that it 
started with an initiative by his office, which in 2004: 
 
"(…) contacted the project, and with the Acción 
Social Officer went to a village to do a pilot project; 
whilst there they were stopped by the paramilitaries 
who said they do not authorize such work. But 
farmers in neighbouring villages to the paramilitary 
area requested the protection measure. As a result, 
in South1 the protective program was a direct action 
of the LPPP, only 30% of the beneficiaries 
understand and welcome it; to another 30% it is a 
nuisance and just bothers them; the other 40% did 
not understand it at all."  
 
When they accessed the protection they were informed that the next 
step in the program would be a titling process. When I returned in 
December 2010 the situation remained the same, so six years later 
there has been no regularization of the land for about 300 families in 
need. Asked about the immediate needs of the peasants he tells me 
that various projects are proposed each year but never implemented 
(even though the budget is spent): water, schools, health and roads. 
He tells me that the most important project for the peasantry would 
be roads: "they would be happy if roads are fixed." An important 
lesson from the program appears to be that the protection measure 
punishes displaced secondary occupants because it puts an end to 
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the traditional historical mechanism of possession. But, on the other 
hand, it may be the best way to begin to organize, regulate and 
govern the territory if it could be made immediate, widespread and 
mandatory in specific rural areas following an inventory of land 
ownership and use; because it would not only maintain and protect 
possession but would allow the inventory and the regularization of 
the territory. It could be a largely agrarian reform and land 
consolidation process in areas of military and state intervention. 
 
My experience with 38-N1 Umata’s official in charge of the local 
LPPP in North1 was totally opposite. For this person the job is just a 
bureaucratic post that was offered. She does not have any technical 
knowledge; she is very afraid because she is not from the region and 
is frightened by the violence that exists there. Previously she was 
unemployed for some time and she has a family to support – which is 
the reason why she accepted the job. She did not volunteer any 
information without the presence of local government secretary 48-
N1. From the little information obtained it was apparent that the 
protective measures were taken because "at the top of the mountain 
there is a land problem with the timber companies, mainly 
SmurfitKappa Carton de Colombia SA,” which had been causing 
displacement (a view also expressed by the priest 40-N2, and 
religious worker respondent 41-N2). In this region it was possible not 
only to protect the land but also to establish legal ownership and 
usage. 48-N1 says the LPPP do not prevent displacement and drug 
lords continue to acquire land for illicit crops. However, the measure 
"has been welcomed by peasants, and this has served to win the 
confidence of peasants in the state." For local government the project 
is important because they believe they can "generate resources 
through tourism, this is a town that has no major sources of income 
and is ruined by drug money; particularly the rural sector." He 
identifies five priorities to improve the lives of the community: "1) 
Access to credit at lower cost; establish fair wages and jobs with 
benefits (health, pension); 2) that the government fulfils its promises 
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and stops corruption; 3) reduce costs of transport to the villages; 4) 
reduce prices of raw materials and 5) generate a wider choice of, and 
access to, products." 
 
It is clear from these meetings that there is a tension between the 
technical management of the program and its political direction – but 
also that the combination of both is required to make it work. In 
South1 the program is hindered by a political problem centred on the 
municipal government, even though there is considerable technical 
resource available. In North1 there is significant political interest but 
(as expressed by municipal employee 44-N1 and victim 57-N1) every 
time a peasant goes to UMATA office, where the official 38-N1 is 
employed, "they are not seen, heard, or they are at risk of being 
mistreated." From these interviews, it appears that the problem is not 
the dichotomy between the use and the ownership of land; but the 
solution of the land problems in the area is specifically ‘giving land 
titles to who uses it or who lives by it.’ 
 
Comparative daily life in control towns South2 and North2 
 
South2 and North2 are not part of LPP program and are studied as 
control towns of South1 and North1. Importantly, both towns have 
suffered more armed conflict than their counterparts. In both towns 
the mistrust towards the state and its agents is higher and in North2 
this is extended to academics and journalists, whom they regard as 
‘vultures of their misfortune’ – people who profit by investigating 
others’ tragedies. Geographically both towns are in the mountains 
and agriculture is the main industry. However, the economy of North2 
is struggling, whilst the South2 economy is characterised by 
significant levels of trade and economic activity. In both towns people 
differ from the inhabitants of South1 and North1 by being much more 
cautious, closed and suspicious, as well as pessimistic. To an 
outside observer the four populations are quite similar, with the 
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biggest difference being the notorious worsening living conditions in 
South2 and North2. 
 
Violence and conflict 
 
As recounted before, during the three fieldworks security risks in the 
four towns were reflected in four situations (Shootings and fights; 
Combat between the Army and the Farc; Restrictions on schedules; 
Presence of drug lords), plus in North2 and South2 two other security 
risks emerged.  
  
a) Presence of the paramilitary group “Los Rastrojos” 
During the fieldwork the presence of these armed groups in 
the town North2 was clear. Although I did not receive direct 
threats, I was constantly notified of the various precautions 
that I should follow, equally of the possibility of being watched 
or followed during my time in the town. For the same reason I 
was advised against spending the evening in the town or 
staying overnight. With regards to moving around the town, I 
was asked to restrict my movements to specific sites. I was 
discouraged from contacting the local police authorities in any 
way. 
 
b) Restrictions on accommodation 
In the North2 town I was unable to stay overnight for the 
simple reason that all the hotels and other lodging places 
belong to the paramilitaries. In fact it was not easy to identify a 
site where I could even take lunch quietly. The wisest course 
of action is to avoid questions regarding why one is in the 
region; if this is not possible, the best option is to say 
something general mentioning that you work at a university 
and that you are conducting research, trying not to enter into 
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details and allowing people to reach their own conclusions 
about who you are. 
 
As noted before, the security agencies of the Colombian state are 
embedded in South2. In contrast, in North2 there are just a few 
policemen entrenched in their barracks, which do not interact with the 
inhabitants. They are not refused services (such as food in a 
restaurant, or the sale of goods in stores) but no one trusts them. 
The military presence is sporadic and usually at the request of the 
mayor but is unwanted by the population. This attitude is the result of 
two decades of barbarity by the paramilitaries allied with government 
agents, whilst the rest of the government – and the country at large – 
chose to ignore what was happening. This legacy of violence is 
illustrated by religious worker 41-N2: "in the celebrations of 
Halloween kids usually dress up as nurse, doctor, farmer, fireman, 
civil defense, priest or lawyer. None choose to dress as police or 
military." The heroes of North2 children are those who gave their 
lives to save others, and they identify the murderers as the military 
and police forces. 
 
The war in South2 is constant; in neighbouring communities battles 
are fought and peace processes have been signed. Over the last 
thirty years the town has been subjected to three (3) guerrilla attacks 
mainly to rob banks. Although its economy is vibrant, according to 
Small Businesswoman 34-S2 South2 is under the "law of the bullet." 
I visited South2 twice during 2009 but it was not possible to visit it 
during my third fieldtrip because the violence had worsened. Near 
this town one day I saw a military post and the next time I went there 
the post had disappeared: some of the soldiers had been killed and 
the remaining troops were pursuing the murderers into the 
mountains; and yet, people's lives continue without problems. 
Midway are the indigenous reservations, towns abandoned by the 
state, with roads in deplorable conditions and bridges destroyed by 
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mad men. Whilst crossing these lands there is no cell phone signal. 
The same happens uphill in South1 and North2. 
 
Elites in South2 and North2 do not present an ideal image of their 
towns, they do not pretend to be 'peaceful’ towns, but they mention 
that the evils "come from long time ago but recently are being 
overcome." In South2, the peasant 32-S2 and historian and 
businessman 33-S2 reported that problems definitely exist but there 
are "not many" and it is part of an "acquired fame." This town was the 
victim of 'imported' paramilitary terror by invitation of local political 
leaders, who were imprisoned or are fleeing justice, according to the 
story referred by the municipal official 37-N1: "In the rural areas is 
where paramilitarism happened, it was invited by one of the former 
mayors. They were located in police headquarters and in the 
neighbourhoods; they were patrolling the region, left their trail of 
death and returned to town." For North2 there is disagreement 
between those who simply prefer to forget and move on, and others 
who call for the paying of respect and remembrance. 
 
The presence of soldiers, tanks, trenches and machine guns in the 
vicinity of South2 did not scary me. They are part of the landscape 
and the reality of a country in conflict. But, what horrifies me is what 
was seen, felt and heard on the trip to rural North2. Thanks to the 
efforts, courage and protection extended to me by the 40-N2 priest I 
was able to travel to the farthest point in this zone where the last 
civilized human beings were residing – the land ahead is populated 
by their jailers and the demons. The trip takes more than one hour 
uphill along a road that according to the state does not exist (which 
indicates either the disorder of the state or the power of violent 
people). Before starting this specific journey a woman told me her 
experience of how hard it is to continue walking the road when 
someone lies by the roadside, tied up, wounded, and tortured; a 
human being (whose identity or story you may or may not know) 
shouting, pleading for help and for his life: as expected, you feel 
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impotent, cowardice and guilt, but human. Less than ten minutes 
later we crossed a beautiful waterfall called "The Bank", famous as 
the site where debtors and small-time criminals were hung: hence its 
name (the place where you pay). Later there are large farms with 
luxurious buildings, pool, horses, metal fences and big fields full of 
banana and coffee crops. It is surprising to see these castles – this 
was the first time I had done so in this region – but at their sides are 
small abandoned and demolished farms. When we reached the 
village, at the entrance waiting for us were young children of seven or 
eight years old, with communication radios to report anything 
strange. They are ‘campaneros’ (‘whistle-blowers’ / watchers) 
belonging to the paramilitary group "Los Rastrojos." Beside them are 
men with high boots and outerwear, flirting with girls, patrolling on 
motorcycles and horses and receiving messages from the other ones 
in the middle of town; the ones drinking and issuing orders, people 
who are not from the town. All of them are young and have the face 
of death. 
 
According to the driver 62-N2 the authorities are aware of such 
situations: "they know everything", many brave people "consistently 
denounce it”, “they know the situation of the population but they 
tolerate them (the paramilitaries), negotiate with them, accept them”, 
in the meantime “the people in the town resist, or have to endure 
them". Mass is attended by women, children, a few old men, and one 
young man. The church is the last refuge for the life of these people. 
It is not Catholicism, not the church as an institution that is important, 
but, rather, that little building which remains in the town, fulfilling their 
sacred needs; and the monthly attendance of the priest bringing the 
mass and connecting them with that other world in which we live. 
When I have a chance to talk to these fellow citizens abandoned by 
our society, I ask them “What do you want?”, and a man answers: 
"do not let them forget us." 
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Administration and people 
 
South2, as mentioned before, has experienced significant problems 
with public administration. Not only the need for a constant presence 
of security agencies but the discrediting of municipal officials by the 
paramilitaries and corruption charges. The state's presence begins to 
be felt because kidnappings are decreasing and the value of property 
is rising. According to local planning officer 27-S1 (commenting on 
the problem in South2, with which he was familiar through friends) it 
is "political will, not resources". He believes that the town is not 
progressing and the problems remain unsolved because of political 
disputes. Asked about the possibility of implementing the LPPP in 
South2 he said that “there are no longer small farmers or IDPs land 
owners”, because all the rural areas were purchased a century ago 
by the sugar industry. But actually he acknowledges that small 
farmers are at risk because paramilitary groups generate 
displacement. He said that because the paramilitaries are also in the 
urban centre they are forcing IDPs to flee outside the town before 
accessing authorities, which is why local IDPs are beyond the reach 
of the local administration. Additionally, it is possible that 
paramilitaries control some of the town’s officials; or that public 
officials are negligent, or that the Mayor's policy directive does not 
allow the local administration to record the numbers or names of the 
IDPs or to provide local IDPs with the required documents proving 
the displacement situation. As a consequence, the displaced from 
South2 are in South1 or in other towns. This information was 
confirmed both by the priest 29-S1 and by official 13-S1. The 
information about agro-industrial landowners was confirmed by 
historian 33-S2 who told me that since the early twentieth century 
much rural land has largely belonged to the sugar mills. 
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The natives of both towns inhabit the top of the mountains62; they do 
not have access to public transport, and must endure long walks in 
order to reach the roads. They remain on indigenous reservations 
and live subsistence livelihoods. They are in the middle of combat 
areas: in both regions there are high-mountain battalions of the army 
that provide protection and assistance in their daily lives, but this 
means that groups outside the law view indigenous peoples with 
suspicion, considering them and the military as ‘complicit’. Their 
living conditions are miserable, a product of the constant 
displacement they have suffered – they who once were former 
masters of the territory. The dynamics of displacement is one of 
poverty and constant violence, where the peasant displaces the 
indigenous, and the landowner and the industrial lords displace the 
peasant. Initially, all groups were able to be accommodated in the 
fertile and comfortable valley; then the peasants and the landlords 
pushed the indigenous peoples onto the slopes; then the landowner 
pushed the peasants further into indigenous lands forcing the 
indigenous populations to move to the top of the mountain. 
Throughout my academic career I have had the opportunity to visit 
several indigenous reservations and talk to different communities. 
However, the deplorable conditions of the communities observed in 
North2 and South2 were the worst I had seen. These rural peoples 
are concerned with the process of identity construction and they are 
invoking the Colombian Constitution of 1991. In North2 the 
indigenous population is seeking to become peasants, and peasants 
in South2 have become indigenous people. The process in North2 
has two faces: Some indigenous people are tempted by the easy 
money available from drug trafficking and are seeking to buy or to 
appropriate land to produce illegal crops or are involved in money 
laundering, leaving behind their ancestral traditions and community 
ties. Some are tired of belonging to poor indigenous communities 
and are trying to acquire agricultural skills. In contrast, in South2 the 
                                                 
62  Indigenous population inhabiting in high mountains (between 2000 to 4000 
meters) who lives in communities settled more than two hours away from any road. 
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peasants have recovered indigenous identities and have achieved 
rights to communally protected ancestral lands. It is true that they too 
grow illegal crops in areas outside the reserves but they do so within 
a cycle of subsistence and not for enrichment. Within the 1991 
Constitution key identities are noted such as: the black, the 
indigenous, the women, the internal displaced, the victims, the 
peasants, etc; identities that correspond to a vision of the state where 
the recognition of minorities and multiculturalism replaces the 
nationalism of being "Colombian." In this regard the 18-CAL official 
said that not only has the constitutional vision changed identities, but 
that they have also been transformed by violence, drug trafficking 
and conflict. She indicates that it is not only ancestral peasants who 
now link their identities to the land, it is also the peasant who sees 
"the land as a commodity that makes money." Regional government 
adviser 19-CAL indicates that while there is an evil side in this 
process of identity classification, there is also a positive side 
including the legalization of the Afro-Colombian culture: the 
recognition of their land, their way of life as a community, its ways, 
customs and ideas. But division also exists amongst the black 
workers in the cane fields, because they are part of an "association 
of producers" who traditionally confronts the "peasantry." In South2 
this is evident because the peasant does not have the strength and 
endurance for working with cane, but he has the technique to farm 
his own soil, whilst black people are the ones who have the physical 
strength to harvest and have migrated for over 40 years seeking 
employment in the cane fields, and also black workers are 
employees (salaries, security, stability, benefits). In this way four 
groups of people have different relationships with the land that once 
were indistinguishable from their ethnicity, and instead related to their 
position within the system of production. Today the two situations are 
mixed, so that peasants in South2 identify themselves as indigenous 
to maintain their productive relationship of subsistence with the soil; 
the afros are employees who depend on no change from the 
traditional process of cane harvesting; the owners of the land (white 
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and mixed-race) only see it as part of an extractive process. Recently 
there have been several cane cutters’ strikes in response to the 
proposed introduction of machinery which may lead directly to job 
losses. This is a difficult situation in which the peasants feel 
disadvantaged again and note that black people can be interested in 
their lands to continue their ways of life.  
 
Social researcher and anthropologist Clara Galeano graciously 
shared her knowledge and experience of this "social bomb" in the 
South1 and South2 area. She describes the area as a geographic 
crossroads of ancient indigenous people from South2, and the 
presence of white people coming from South1 direction, and black 
people coming from the South2 direction. She explains that this 
confluence of ethnicities is due to the vision of land by the state and 
employers as a "bounty" of war. In this break of "social networking" 
the violence became unity, both by the ethnic, social and racial 
composition of armed groups operating outside the law and by the 
identities of the victims. 
 
The crucial question is “What should be the role of the state and local 
government in this situation?” Clearly the state can not sponsor or be 
the partner of violent people. The legitimate exercise of violence by 
the state must be accompanied by a land use policy that respects 
Colombia’s constitutional multiculturalism, but nevertheless it must 
generate new common identities that allow the different human 
groups to coexist and live peaceful and productive lives. In North2 
the state has failed in all its opportunities to help the civilian 
population. The "victims and perpetrators" live together, as the priest 
40-N2 said: the local government has no vision and management 
capacity, they only develop actions "for the moment." He indicates 
that they need an "administrator" to resolve underlying problems 
such as repairing the "social fabric" and building a "sense of 
belonging”. But, at the same time, the North2 people themselves 
prioritise their own "personal interests" over those of the "community" 
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– this disunity is identified as one of the barriers to improving living 
conditions and regaining local control. There are a lot of young 
people recruited for prostitution and drug trafficking, and it remains 
the "law of silence", so everyone knows about these evils but all can 
justify it because of the money. The respondent states that this is 
part of the “Paisa mentality” and contrasts it with the "Vallunos 
mentality" of North1, referring to the Departments of Valle (vallunos) 
and Antioquia and Great Caldas (paisa) people. It is interesting to 
note that the South populations indicated an ethnic component in the 
governance problems, while in the North the populations indicated a 
regional component. 
 
According to religious worker 41-N2 there is currently "fear of 
commitment" by the civilian population as a result of the massacres 
that have occurred in the area in the past, many of which were based 
on information obtained under torture that led to wrong charges, or 
problems between neighbours who spread false rumours. Regarding 
the actions of the national government this is characterised as 
"welfare clientelism", which has no real positive impact on the social 
fabric but responds to the country's electoral dynamics. Worse, in 
North2 there is a generation of orphans who have lost their parents in 
massacres or who have simply "disappeared". According to the priest 
40-N2/2 this "generation gap" means that when the children grow up 
they will leave the town and never return – why would they return to a 
place where they have nothing, especially one where tragedy has 
befallen so many of its people? According to 41-N2/3: there is a 
"trade with the victims"; and in this ‘commerce’ dignity is lost. The 
people in the town now ask only: "what do you bring?", "What do you 
give?", selling his tragedy and seeking immediate economic benefits. 
Recent changes to the local administration occurred when one of the 
victims of the conflict was elected as the local mayor. Thus, at the 
same time as my fieldwork the local government has sought to 
reintroduce some order into the town. The first act was to challenge 
the impunity enjoyed by the paramilitaries during the previous 
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administrations. In this regard the Representative of the public 
service and civil rights defender 50-N2 comments that they have 
made considerable effort to improve safety and to remove the armed 
groups from local life. However he adds that "the solution is 
necessarily a permanent military presence, the location of an Army 
battalion at the top of the mountain to safe rural areas." In the urban 
area they rotate police officers every 6-12 months so they cannot get 
too cosy with the drug traffickers. These initiatives, for now, have 
seen the community more prepared to denounce the violence and 
even provide the police with the names and addresses of the 
perpetrators (41-N2 commented that murderers have started to 
remove or change the name plaques of their houses so that the 
authorities cannot easily find them, which is a sign that they are 
genuinely fearful of arrest). Economically they are seeking to revive 
local tourism and trade, but have had little support from the 
community. Asked why they have not entered the LPP program they 
say that they did not know about it, but they would be interested 
because regionally there are problems associated with land rights 
and usage which they do not know how to solve. Information about 
LPPP was sent to the previous administration but its relationship with 
illegal armed groups prevented its participation in the program. 
During my third fieldtrip I found that the process had already started 
with preliminary identification of land and beneficiaries to enter the 
program. 
 
Very kindly the peasant victim 51-N2 allowed me to meet his family 
and showed me their land. He is a young man who lives with his 
second wife, his mother and three young children. Their land is on 
the mountainside beside the road, which is a great advantage for 
them. However this is also a problem because he has received many 
threats forcing him to sell the land. The fencing around his land is 
frequently broken and cattle are deliberately herded in to ruin their 
crops. I ask him about whether he has turned to the local authorities 
to help solve this and he says that in the villages: "people do not 
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report." Indeed, almost all of his peasant friends are also threatened 
but do not want to attract publicity or attention to their plight. They 
live in constant fear. In the midst of their poverty, the young farmer 
and his family dream of a better future for their children and they go 
up and down the mountain every day to school. At the school I find 
two young men who are dedicated to teaching children and bringing 
joy into their lives, 60-N2 and 61-N2. Both are victims who lost their 
parents in massacres. According to 60-N2 the rural indigenous 
peoples are in a ‘peasants-in-training’ process, in which there are 
indeed problems of loss of identity. But most indigenous peoples are 
in this process because their reserves are extremely poor and they 
want to learn how to grow and construct sustainable livelihoods. He 
explains that the natives of the area are "collectors" rather than 
producers, and that this has caused many problems with the farmers 
who accuse them of 'stealing' what they think nature has given freely. 
Asked about the farmers and what happens to their lands, he says 
that the children at school describe the land where they live as fields 
with hundreds of holes in the ground, a few lonely trees and full of 
human bones – so, they do not want to cultivate it or live in it, they do 
not want to "grow in the cemeteries." 
 
From these interviews, there again appears to be the twin 
problematic of technical management of the program vs. the political 
handling of it. In South2 historian 33-S2 says there are "no land or 
peasants to be protected"; which contradicts information from 
planning officer 35-S2 who reports that the displaced are ignored in 
this town. On the other hand, in North2 the change from a corrupt 
administration to a committed one revealed why the area was not 
participating. Similarly, from the interviews it is clear that the problem 
about land is more complex than a tension between ‘use’ or 
‘ownership’, it is also about its inhabitants and memory. 
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Chapter four:  Analizing the impact of DWR on 
conflict 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The key purpose of this research was to examine, via single case-
study, whether or not non-military state-led programs developed to 
help civil populations during conflict impacts on the conflict; and 
whether the impact is positive or negative. The rationality for this is 
that studies on activities of reconstruction after armed conflicts 
usually include assessments of the positive and negative impacts of 
such activities on the conflict itself, and around these studies there 
has evolved a solid consensus in academia and field-work practice 
that peace can be built through proper reconstruction programs 
(Lake, 1990; Ikenberry, 2001; Arévalo, 2002; Darby and Mac Ginty, 
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2003; Donini, NIland and Wermester, 2004; Foblets and von Trotha, 
2004a; Barakat, 2004a; Paris, 2004; June and Verkoren, 2004; 
Bryden and Hängsi, 2005; Ankersen, 2007; Mac Ginty and 
Richmond, 2009; Muggah, 2009). However, a similar level of 
scholarly interest does not exist regarding reconstruction during 
warfare (Barry and Jeffreys, 2002; Looney, 2006). Such 
reconstruction is conflated with notions which regard it as being part 
of a war effort and commanded by the military or political necessity. 
In this vein, the study of reconstruction activities as Protection of 
Housing, Land and Property rights for internally displaced persons 
(IDP) has been forgotten by academia. In this context, the studies of 
reconstruction efforts to help IDP are particularly critical: IDP are 
especially vulnerable to violence, and for them reconstruction efforts 
in the middle of war could be a significant milestone. Every effort to 
protect their Houses, Lands and Properties could reduce their 
exposure to dispossession from ancestral lands, and reduce the risk 
of poverty. Crucially, the consequences of the absence of ‘during-war 
reconstruction efforts’, or the consequences of ‘failed reconstruction 
attempts’, could be protracted in the aftermath of war, e.g. with long 
lasting legal processes or with personal conflicts with new settlers – 
and, in the worst situations, be associated with a spiralling of 
violence.  
 
In the previous chapter I exposed the ethnographic work of this 
thesis around the “Land and Property Protection Program” (LPPP) 
lead by the Colombian government in two sets of towns in Valle del 
Cauca region. This “narrative” of the violence and conflict in 
Colombia during a specific period of time in a specific region is 
constructed in order to help our understanding of the correlation 
between land and conflict in Colombia and how the LPP program 
could affect this dynamic. This study of an exemplar case of a 
successful reconstruction strategy in the middle of the war will help to 
note complexities or singularities that are ‘unique’ in some 
characteristics but, at the same time, could be useful as a model or 
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generalisation for certain other cases. In that sense it is important to 
present the inferences about the role and interest of the Colombian 
state in advancing reconstruction programs during war, and its 
potential impact in the Colombian conflict. This study of the “effects” 
of government activities to restore normalcy before the end of the 
actual conflict, particularly the study of the reconstruction processes 
advanced by the Colombian government, is seminal. 
 
As presented in the Methodology chapter the use of micro-analysis of 
the data will help to understand how the LPP program is formed by 
“collective decisions” (Blondel, 2010:24) from the central and local 
level, and by users’ perceptions and practices. Also, the contrast of 
elite responses against non-elite responses, and contrasting 
responses of individuals inside sub-groups of the population 
facilitates an understanding of bottom up micro-politics (Spicer, 2006) 
and some of the behavioural practices emerging from collective 
knowledge (Willner, 2011). As stated before, this transformation of 
local narratives into perceptions and explanations does not permit 
generalisation(s), but performing the micro-analysis does allow us to 
draw some conclusions through comparison. In the following I will 
expose in a structured way the logic of the perceptions and 
explanations present in the micro-data. 
 
From “desk politics” to “street politics” 
 
The LPP is a program designed by the Colombian government to 
protect the land and property of peasants at risk of being displaced or 
peasants already displaced. This forced displacement is part of a war 
strategy used by parties in conflict (mainly Farc guerrilla and 
paramilitary groups) to achieve control over a territory. The LPPP is 
not intended to stop displacement but to stop the dispossession of 
land by illegal actors. As labelled here, this During-war 
Reconstruction strategy of Protection of land property during the 
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conflict is not seeking military outcomes but, rather, is a special 
administrative program of the government to deal with a specific 
situation during the conflict in order to maintain legitimacy. The 
program is focused on specific locations spread nationwide. 
 
People and Conflict 
 
From the collected data in this thesis it is clear that the Colombian 
Government is not using the Reconstruction strategy of ‘Protection of 
land rights during warfare’ as part of the war effort against any of the 
actors of the conflict (the FARC guerrillas, Paramilitary groups, or 
drug-lords). Again, the government do not manage the program 
differently in relation to any of the actors in the conflict. Further, I 
discovered that the program does not affect the status of any of the 
armed actors in the conflict. This analysis is supported by the data on 
conflict in the studied area. Table 3 shows data from 
DAS/Observatorio DDHH/CERAC between 1998 and 2011 regarding 
the number of armed actions from illegal groups in the studied towns.  
 
Table 3: Number of armed actions by illegal groups 1998-2011 
Year Colombia 
Valle del 
Cauca South1 South2 North1 North2 
1998 988 64 1 0 1 0 
1999 957 58 0 0 0 0 
2000 1213 85 2 1 0 0 
2001 1040 34 0 1 1 1 
2002 1441 26 2 1 0 0 
2003 1415 49 1 4 0 0 
2004 849 47 2 3 4 0 
2005 972 71 0 4 0 2 
2006 994 157 2 9 0 0 
2007 531 65 3 3 0 1 
2008 379 44 0 0 0 0 
2009 644 28 0 0 0 0 
2010 734 31 0 1 1 0 
2011 794 56 1 1 1 0 
 
12951 815 11 26 6 3 
Source: DAS/Observatorio DDHH/CERAC – 2011. Own elaboration. 
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In the 1998 to 2011 period armed actions by illegal groups in South2 
constituted 56% of all such armed actions in the selected group of 
towns, 3.2% of all such armed actions in Valle del Cauca, and 0.2% 
of all such armed actions in Colombia. For South1 the figures are: 
24%; 1.3% and 0.08%. For North1: 13%; 0.7% and 0.04%. For 
North2: 6%; 0.4% and 0.02%. 
  
In the studied period of 2007-2010 the numbers were: 4 actions in 
South2, 3 in South1, 1 in North1, and 1 in North2; in Valle del Cauca 
168 and 2288 nationwide. Such actions in South2 constituted 44% of 
armed actions between the selected group of towns; 2.4% of all such 
armed actions in Valle del Cauca, and 0.2% of all such armed 
actions in Colombia. For South1 the 2007-2010 figures are: 33%, 
1.8% and 0.1%. For North1: 11%; 0.6% and 0.04%. For North2: 
11%; 0.6% and 0.04%. 
 
The data shows an ascending tendency nationwide (in the period of 
study) but a descending one in Valle del Cauca. For all four towns 
the tendency is the same as the department’s tendency: a 
descending number of actions by illegal groups; without any 
difference between the four towns. This data is clear in terms of zero 
difference between towns with the LPP program and towns without 
the program. As stated before, there is no hard evidence of 
differential treatment in military terms in any of these towns and no 
evident impact of the LPP program on illegal armed actors’ activities.  
 
Data from DAS/Observatorio DDHH/CERAC between 1998 and 2011 
regarding the number of armed actions from Colombian armed forces 
is shown in Table 4. It is important to note that there is no-direct 
relation between data in Table 3 and Table 4, inter alia: armed 
actions by illegal armed actors are not necessarily followed by Armed 
forces’ response. 
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Table 4: Number of armed actions by Colombian armed forces  
1998-2011 
Year Colombia 
Valle del 
Cauca South1 South2 North1 North2 
1998 363 16 0 0 0 0 
1999 479 17 0 1 0 0 
2000 625 33 1 2 0 0 
2001 765 18 0 1 0 0 
2002 1361 34 0 1 0 0 
2003 2002 31 1 2 0 2 
2004 1700 49 1 3 2 1 
2005 1477 49 0 4 1 2 
2006 1941 40 0 9 0 0 
2007 1831 50 0 2 0 0 
2008 646 11 0 2 1 0 
2009 409 6 0 0 1 0 
2010 487 9 0 6 0 0 
2011 454 14 3 7 0 0 
 
14540 377 6 39 5 5 
Source: DAS/Observatorio DDHH/CERAC - 2011. Own elaboration. 
 
For South2 the figure of 39 represents 71% of all actions in the 
selected group of towns, 10.3% of all actions in Valle del Cauca, and 
0.3% of all actions in Colombia. For South1 the figures are: 11%; 
1.6% and 0.04%. For both North1 and North2: 9%; 1.3% and 0.03%. 
In the studied period of 2007-2010 the numbers were: 10 operations 
in South2, 0 in South1, 2 in North1, and 0 in North2; in Valle del 
Cauca 76 and 3373 nationwide. Meaning for South2 83% of such 
actions between the selected group of towns, 13% of such actions in 
Valle del Cauca, and 0.3% of all such actions in Colombia. For 
North1 the figures are: 17%; 2.6% and 0.06%. 
 
This data is consistent with the reflections on the escalation of 
combat in South2, and with North2 interviewees expressing ‘no 
effective presence’ of the Colombian army in the region. The data 
also indicates no ‘special’ military treatment in South1 and North1, 
the LPPP towns. However, it is possible to state that the program 
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affects the conflict itself by affecting the collective dynamics of 
population groups inside municipalities.  
 
Some of the people are affected because they do not access the 
information through ignorance of the law and the conditions of 
protection, or people who are bona fide occupying lands, because 
they are secondary occupants and, based on the protective 
measures, the previous owners end up being the real beneficiaries of 
the applied legislation. On the other hand, for the IDP living outside 
municipalities of origin the LPPP is providing opportunities for the 
restitution or the improvement of socio-economic conditions, but not 
for those living in the areas of conflict. Owners who left the area can 
now legally recover the land by government action. They are 
generally displaced middle-class farmers who have followed and 
rebuilt their economic lives in the city or in other rural areas without 
conflict. Also I did find evidence in South1 & North1 which suggest 
that LPPP has stopped some of the dispossession processes, or has 
stopped certain illegal beneficiaries from enjoying the spoils of war. 
 
Equally, the LPPP is affecting the conflict in three other ways. At the 
individual level it is changing the traditional right of property by 
possession that many small settlers follow when taking, working and 
living off the land. They are now exposed to the risk of losing their 
property and their livelihoods – which is a constant cause of 
Colombia's conflict. Locally, the LPPP could empower the state and 
be used to develop relationships with the peasantry in order to gain 
the trust of local people (as long as it is used efficiently and is 
properly exploited politically); however there does not appear any 
intention to conduct the program in this way. It is at the national level 
that I detect the greatest impact on the strategy of war and peace, 
and therefore the greatest possible impact on the conflict itself, 
though at the time of this research the impact is small. The RUPTA 
and the information about what has happened in the territory with 
ownership of the land and violence will allow the state to recover the 
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memory of what happened and to act on the territory, planning and 
enhance the state’s capacity for action, probably in the framework of 
the Law 1448 of 2011. However, this result leads to increased local 
violence (targeted killings of popular leaders63 and officials), and 
encounters obstacles in the form of officials, politicians and other 
elites who were or are beneficiaries of the dispossession, acting 
contrary to their public office duties. 
 
Some other dynamics of the program in the territory could be 
generating new variables in the conflict. In particular, small settlers 
probably could not get traditional possession of abandoned lands 
because the LPP program specifically seeks protection and 
restoration of abandoned lands to the original owner. There has also 
been an increase in selective killings at a local level, not only as 
forms of intimidation, but as ways to maintain or strengthen control 
over local governments and their officials. Furthermore, even if is not 
the result of the LPPP, the relationship problems between indigenous 
peoples and peasants, and between peasants and Afro-Colombians 
over the possession of the land and its use will probably end up 
affecting the program itself. 
 
Land and conflict 
 
In terms of the relationship between land and conflict, my research 
established two big situations which require the attention of state and 
society on the control over the territory. The first is related to the 
regulation of domestic production capacity and settlement of people 
who can access state services and exercise their citizenship. The 
second is the control over the land-use by illegal armed groups in the 
                                                 
63  At national level, Yolanda Izquierdo Berrío, Freddy Abel Espitia were 
murdered in the last week of January 2007; Alexánder Quintero, Rogelio Martínez 
and Albeiro Valdéz in two different weeks of May 2010. Those names of 
Colombian peasants are five in a list of at least 45 or 65 in the period elapsed 2005 
(after Paramilitary demobilization process) to 2011. More than 1.400 victims have 
reported direct threats. (Rojas, 2010). Data is not available at local level. 
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territory, either as land-strips of violence or land for illicit crops. The 
land issue is central to the possibility of obtaining peace in Colombia 
and to the solution of structural problems that feed and define the 
conflict. Something striking about this is the fact that the LPPP 
became a military objective of the illegal armed actors. In the four 
populations it was documented how not only LPPP but any state 
program that seeks to improve the living conditions of local people 
becomes a military target by illegal groups. This point reinforces 
theories showing how the war of illegal armed groups against the 
state military forces is totally against the state and society as a 
whole. By all means I can attest that there was no evidence 
suggesting that the LPPP meets any military objectives openly or 
secretly, making clear that, and according with International 
Humanitarian Law,64 it could not be targeted as a military objective. A 
strong explanation of this animosity of armed actors against the LPP 
program could be related to the drug business. This illicit activity is 
interested in lands because they are growing illicit crops and they are 
handling violence corridors; however, land strips are most associated 
with generating violence more so than illicit crops. Legal and illegal 
armed actors are concentrated in the corridors of violence and this is 
where the greatest displacement and land dispossessions happen. 
Areas of illicit crops controls peasant growers with a minimal armed 
presence because illicit crops do not ‘move’ as fast as corridors of 
violence; and the cultivation of illicit crops correlate more closely with 
                                                 
64  The International Humanitarian Law (or International Law of Armed 
Conflicts) is constituted by a set of rules that seek to restrict the damage caused by 
armed conflicts. These restrictions stipulate the types of people who should not be 
affected by the war, the places that should not be subject to armed attacks, and the 
types of weapons that can not be used. Its modern origins date back to the 1863 
Lieber Code, which sets out the laws and customs of war, and the Geneva 
Convention of 1864. In 1899 and 1907 The Hague Peace Conferences further 
sought to regulate the methods and means of conducting war. In 1949 these were 
reviewed, updated and constitute a supplement of the Geneva Conventions; being 
converted into four documents that define humanitarian law in the wake of the 
experience of the Second World War. This gave rise to two forms of law: that of 
The Hague, which deals with the conduct of military operations, and Geneva, that 
deals with the protection of war victims. Both branches are combined in a single-
law of Geneva, with the signing of the two Additional Protocols in Geneva in 1977 
so that it now incorporates and updates the previous text of the law of The Hague. 
See: Bowden 2009; Fleck, 2008; Leckie, 2007. 
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the productive use of the land than with dispossession. On the other 
hand, land strips of violence need to be ‘shadow’ lands to allow fast 
and secure mobilization.65 
 
The roles of the state and local government in this situation could not 
be ambiguous: security, law and government; the traditional functions 
of the state. Regarding what was found in the fieldwork, it appears 
necessary to change, reassess and improve the status of local 
administrative officials who have become the sole embodiment of the 
state – and its duties – towards its citizens. The abandonment of 
local public servants increases their vulnerability and powerlessness 
to address issues such as violence, corruption and injustice 
rendering effective government impossible in Colombia. This 
situation is experienced by the administrative and judicial officials 
and police. This implies and supports the idea of a disconnection 
between the territory and its government. The first task in order to 
change this situation depends on the ability of the state to acquire 
and control information about what happens in local life. The second 
task is related to the professionalization of local officials and the 
coordination of inter-agency activities (as the CCAI is intending to do) 
and municipal inter-activities (which does not happen because of 
political differences, neighbourhood problems and the struggle for 
resources.) In terms of land handling, I posit that the problem is not 
the dichotomy between use and ownership, but a problem of titling 
the current holders, a topic that is part of what is known as 'land 
reform'. Again, in terms of the people living on the land it is 
necessary to distinguish between Indigenous populations, Afro-
                                                 
65 According with UNODC/Simci, Valle del Cauca department is not an important 
coca cultivation zone, except for Buenaventura region (84% of coca crops in the 
Department) in the Pacific coast (far from the area of study) (UNODC, 2011a:81). 
Also, in its 2011 review on coca crops, it says: “La mayor parte del área cultivada 
(77%) sigue concentrada en ocho departamentos: Nariño, Cauca, Guaviare, 
Antioquia, Putumayo, Córdoba, Bolívar y Chocó” (UNODC, 2011:9). [“Most 
cultivated area (77%) remains concentrated in eight Departments: Nariño, Cauca, 
Guaviare, Antioquia, Putumayo, Córdoba, Bolívar and Chocó”.]. Valle del Cauca is 
connected to Cauca and Putumayo through land crossing mountains which 
constitutes a passageway for drug business from inlands to sea coast. 
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Colombian populations, and small, medium and large farmers. 
Similarly it is necessary to distinguish between three types of 
displaced people (local and foreign beneficiaries and the non-
beneficiary population), and a type of population that yet does not 
experience displacement: farmers who remain in conflict territories. 
Amongst these groups I established who needs the LPPP the most, 
giving priority to farmers who stayed on their land and local IDPs 
(non-beneficiaries); for Indigenous and Afro-Colombian populations 
the law works with protection of communal lands. 
 
The hard data on displacement do not show any impact of the LPP 
program preventing displacement. A major problem regarding the 
number of displaced is that there is no reliable data, nor data on the 
reality of displacement. RUPD – Registro Único de Población 
Desplazada (National Register of Displaced Population) data is 
shown in Table 566. It is interesting to note that there is no evident 
correlation between illegal armed groups’ actions (Table 3) or 
Colombian Armed Forces actions (Table 4) and displacement 
(Tables 5 and 6); basically, the problem is that data on displacement 
is not reliable, as stated before. 
 
Table 5: Number of IDP according with town of origin - RUPD  
1997-2010 
Year Colombia 
Valle del 
Cauca South1 South2 North1 North2 
1997 211.532 872 7 11 47 203 
1998 87.786 361 0 1 0 0 
1999 107.949 3.185 13 0 6 35 
2000 298.553 11.573 20 37 20 30 
2001 402.815 18.643 250 670 72 48 
2002 458.480 9.390 165 738 47 67 
2003 260.555 19.312 442 125 28 74 
2004 238.419 5.191 99 113 153 134 
2005 272.520 7.290 115 178 200 183 
2006 291.480 16.991 101 400 414 201 
                                                 
66  The RUPD is the official database about displacement, and is administered 
by the government. 
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2007 328.581 20.915 203 366 187 253 
2008 285.151 19.779 205 298 279 159 
2009 165.541 7.719 89 214 108 120 
2010 87.990 4.190 52 71 52 28 
 
3.497.352 145.411 1.761 3.222 1.613 1.535 
Source: RUPD - 2010. Own elaboration. 
 
According to the Observatorio de Derechos Humanos (Observatory 
on Human Rights)67 the data for the same period is as shown in 
Table 6. 
 
Table 6: Number of IDP according with town of origin – Observatorio 
de Derechos Humanos 1997-2010 
Year Colombia 
Valle del 
Cauca South1 South2 North1 North2 
1997 157.811 349 8 0 3 30 
1998 143.942 741 5 6 7 4 
1999 164.164 5.164 21 16 11 48 
2000 373.922 11.349 25 53 43 62 
2001 504.286 21.057 276 937 97 78 
2002 572.463 10.782 188 813 75 93 
2003 335.389 26.005 499 160 45 97 
2004 315.342 6.805 121 130 196 168 
2005 348.034 9.428 133 241 270 219 
2006 365.506 20.476 117 471 496 240 
2007 401.390 24.185 235 404 231 273 
2008 359.360 22.339 240 329 324 197 
2009 197.879 9.322 114 256 138 140 
2010 150.143 7.940 131 160 95 93 
 
4.389.631 175.942 2.113 3.976 2.031 1.742 
Source: Observatorio DDHH/CERAC - 2011. Own elaboration. 
 
The precise numbers of newly displaced people is difficult to 
establish precisely. According to CODHES – Consultoría para los 
derechos humanos y el desplazamiento, a national NGO dedicated 
to the subject, in the Sistema institucional de Información sobre 
desplazamiento, conflicto armado y derechos humanos (Institutional 
Information System on displacement, armed conflict and human 
                                                 
67  The observatory is an institution under command of the Presidency. 
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rights) – SISDHES (updated to April 2009) there were 380,863 in 
2008; according to RUPD – Registro Único de Población Desplazada 
(National Register of Displaced Population) 285,151; and according 
to Observatorio de DDHH 359,360. In terms of the total number of 
displaced persons in the Departmento of Valle del Cauca the same 
organisations report figures of 280,041; 145,411 and 175,942 
respectively. Because the numbers are so dissimilar we can try 
checking tendencies; during the window of study (2007-2010) the 
number of registered displaced people is nationally, regionally and 
locally decreasing. One explanation is the change in the rules for 
registering in the RUPD. Since 2009 displaced persons could enter 
the register regardless of the amount of time elapsed since the 
displacement (previously limited to a maximum of six months after 
the displacement); also, the system now registers displacement 
before 2000 (it was previously prohibited from doing so). Because of 
this, the number of displaced persons does not equate to the real 
number of persons displaced in that specific year; but probably does 
reflect the overall number of people in displacement condition. 
Consequently, tendencies (comparing all data) do not reflect any 
substantial change in displacement problems in South1 or North1 
compared with national, regional or South2, North2 tendencies. 
 
The significance of this data is related with the dispossession of land. 
According with the Comisión de Seguimiento a la Política Pública 
sobre el Desplazamiento Forzado (Comisión, 2009:11) up to 2008 
more than five million hectares were abandoned (5.504.517 Has), 
affecting more than 40% of people registered on the RUPD 
(1,200,000), and at least another 85,000 families (340,000 people) 
not registered up to 2008. This situation leads to loss of land, crops, 
animals, houses, social networking, education, food and health; and 
accompanies various other sufferings including assassinations, 
intimidation, sexual violence, mutilation, etc. These numbers can be 
expected to increase during the next years. The work of the LPP 
program allowed, up to 2010, the protection of 3,799,386 hectares 
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(Proyecto tierras, 2010:19); however, with the available information it 
is impossible to establish the impact of the project or to cross data 
between dispossession and protection. Only when restitution 
processes begin will it be possible to try to establish any correlations. 
Nevertheless, as is implicitly understood, any displacement could 
lead to leaving of the land, and protection of land maybe could 
prevent long lasting restitution processes; probably the biggest 
achievement so-far of the LPP program. 
 
Politics and conflict 
 
This research described a conflict relationship between technical and 
political aspects of the program, because impact of politics occurs 
locally. It is clear that it is not possible to develop the project without 
the cooperation of two elements: the technical capacity of UMATA 
officials and political support of the municipal government. It has 
been established that the impact of the program is reduced 
specifically because the separation of technical and political aspects 
does not allow LPPP to reach all those in need. The failure in this 
technical/political relationship constitutes a huge limitation in terms of 
potential beneficiaries’ access to the project, as noted in North1 and 
South1. This separation is correlated with the relationship between 
the Political dividend, the Political objectives and the Political cost (as 
expressed by Alvaro Balcazar about the CFIM). It was found that the 
towns most sensitive to external pressure, i.e., those that receive 
their income from sources such as tourism and external investment 
capital, are more likely to develop the program (as evidenced in 
North1). This is explained as a political cost related to the problem of 
displacement, which leads to reduced municipal revenue sources 
and thus public perception of the local mayor. It is clear that the 
political cost is not defined by either adopting or not adopting the 
program. Regarding the political dividend, I did not find attempts to 
capitalize it. This is probably because it is hard to achieve a political 
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dividend from a project focused on care for victims of violence, since 
local application would involve recognition of local violence. 
However, it is noteworthy that the issue of displacement and violence 
itself is incorporated in all local government plans, both in North1 & 2, 
and South1 & 2. 
 
Moving from the specifics of the LPP program, this research also 
identified some key lessons from the CFIM. It should be noted that 
the CFIM lessons were useful as a guide for the fieldwork, but it is 
not possible to generalise from them. However, from these lessons 
the main help for LPP program is concerned with the need to develop 
the technical, administrative and political aspects of the project. 
Nevertheless, as noted at the time, what is defended most from the 
’centre’ is technical strength, this in order to prevent the project from 
becoming a spoil of the electoral process. I note in this respect that 
political involvement must be present at some level of government, 
whether at the local, regional or national level. This political impetus 
must unlock and accelerate the work. As a suggestion it is possible 
to introduce the idea of establishing an extensive and mandatory 
protective measure following a legal ruling of the High Courts or from 
a law gestated in the Congress or by the Presidency of the Republic.  
 
In terms of the relationship between flexibility in local action and the 
role of international cooperation, several interviewees referred to 
difficulties both in accessing and controlling public resources at a 
local level such as basic services or humanitarian assistance. In the 
areas studied there were no specific programs of international 
cooperation in progress. However, taking into account the degree of 
corruption observed, international support of state-led investment 
and initiatives would be helpful in terms of protecting victims. 
However, international actors should be equal or subsidiary partners 
rather than the dominant actors in any program since a key problem 
is precisely the crisis of confidence in the state. The international 
community could act as a companion or guardian, but should not 
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replace government action which would risk increasing further the 
distance between people and the state. In terms of working with local 
organization I did not find strong evidence that this is a 'necessary' 
element, though it may be 'appropriate' – in fact, the only evidence 
found during fieldwork is the South1 process in which the application 
of the legal protective measure followed a request by farmers to 
protect their lands. 
  
Regarding the relationship between security and development, this 
research found out that while recognizing the great economic, social 
and human progress made by people living in the midst of war, it is 
clear that there are limits to what can be achieved in such 
circumstances. Moreover, I can say that progress is possible with 
violence, but not with conflict. Data on homicides (Figure 1) shows 
the highest levels of violence in the four towns: 
 
 
Figure 1: Homicide rates 1998-2011 
 
Source of data: DANE - 2011. Rates: Own elaboration. 
 
These high levels of violence allowed us to differentiate between 
development in the midst of violence, development in the midst of 
conflict, and development without violence and conflict. That 
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differentiation illuminates 'degrees' of development that might be 
achievable and the 'types' of development possible. Arguments were 
presented on several occasions where it was clear that in areas 
where the conflict is halted quick economic and social development 
can be achieved in relation to legal or illegal activities. Similarly, all 
the advances achieved in the absence of conflict, either with or 
without violence, can be reversed at the onset of the conflict. In this 
sense, it is not possible to generate development through policies 
and investments devoted exclusively to 'solve' or 'attack' the causes 
of conflict, and it is instead necessary to achieve levels of security 
before going further to tackle the causes of conflict in an area. 
Otherwise, rather than attacking the causes of conflict, such actions 
merely generate incentives for armed action. On the other hand, 
without doubt it is possible to capitalize development during conflict, 
but it needs to be redirected within legal channels; in such 
circumstances the security strategy must prioritise the recognition of 
former rights, organizational forms and profits obtained by the local 
population over traditional ethical or legal considerations. Of course, 
at the same time, it is necessary to attack any attempt to continue or 
deepen traditional illegal actions in the area. However, in this intent it 
is clear that the state must always balance their decisions in favour of 
victims and not just arrest and prosecute the perpetrators. The state 
should return identified goods to their rightful owners; but in the case 
of victims who have been able to achieve some degree of stability 
albeit at the expense of others – as is the case of secondary 
occupants – the state must seek mechanisms to ensure that victims 
can maintain their gains but also compensation for those who may be 
affected by such special protection. 
 
This ‘capitalization’ of development during conflict depends on local 
stability. Power and political control in the territory is undoubtedly a 
key long-term matter, but it is not clear that this is an alternative 
means of halting the spiral of violence. It was noted that it is possible 
to achieve both stability and development without stopping violence. 
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In this sense the issue of violence does not refer only to local 
stability, but a set of factors that start from state building, continue 
with the local support and move towards the creation of the 
conditions in which individuals can live peacefully in society – 
conditions that are initially absent and in fact are configured as 
causes of the conflict and violence, and fuelling their growth. So, 
long-term development does not mean stopping the processes of 
violence. Other factors such as justice, security, full citizenship and 
good local government are probably more important.  
 
Finally, it was observed that any advance of territorial consolidation 
of public policies during conflict needs to be founded on the 
confidence of local people in the state. As observed in North1 and 
North2, it is not possible to develop any protection or restoration 
process if the state is seen as the enemy. 
 
Summary of LPPP micro-analysis 
 
It was observed that the Land and property rights protection program 
is not stopping the spiral of violence – actually it is not correlated with 
the violence in the country. This implies that the legal protection of 
property has no direct correlation to the attenuation or escalation of 
violence in the region. It is clear that the dynamics of violence are 
indeed linked to the land problem, as has been argued, but do not 
specifically respond to the titling or legal protection of land. With 
respect to the relationship of the LPPP in Valle del Cauca, Colombia, 
as part of a during-war reconstruction strategy to win the war, it is 
clear that the role of the program is part of the DWR strategy but only 
at the national level, not at the regional or local level. This means that 
it is possible to establish the existence of a non-military-led state 
DWR program, but the question remains whether this correlation is 
effective in practice. Because the correlation between the variables 
exists only at the operational national level, not locally, I can argue 
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that this link is political or theoretical but not practical or instrumental, 
because the actions of the program are local. Furthermore, in the 
specific case studied it was found that this national correlation also 
responds to long-term goals that are likely to make the LPPP support 
the strategy practically and instrumentally. As noted above, 
registration of properties in the RUPTA can reconstruct what 
happened with the land and plan and build the capacity of state 
action in the territory. In that sense, the LPPP anticipates DWR 
protection measures (through legal security) and has initiated actions 
of DWR restitution. Additionally, it generates a ‘memory system’ 
about the conflict and can thus solve one of the factors of conflict i.e. 
institutional weakness. Again, this “primal” presence of the state is 
building confidence and future credibility in land ‘restitution’ or land 
‘protection’ functions of the state.  
 
As mentioned above, an impact on violence was not identified or was 
considered minimal. The impacts on the conflict were found to be a 
mixture of positive and negative. The positive impacts are medium 
and long term if the state can generate more information about the 
living conditions in the area and retrieve memories of what happened 
with the land problems. The negative impacts are observed indirectly 
because of the situation of groups that are not included in the 
protection of land by the project; specifically the peasants who stay in 
conflict zones, some indigenous peoples that are becoming settled 
peasant owners and Afro-Colombian people (most workers who 
become farmers in sugarcane regions – where it is likely the 
traditional system of cane harvesting will disappear). The LPPP 
directly affects the secondary occupants of land, because legal 
protection of abandoned land stops colonization based on 
possession laws; feeding one of the initial causes of Colombian 
armed conflict – land distribution inequality. 
 
This micro-analysis found that there is a huge gap between desk 
politics and street politics in the case of the LPP program in Valle del 
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Cauca, Colombia. This gap is concerned with a top-down political 
planning approach which is ineffective at the local level which is 
instead characterised by: disinformation, local unreadiness, personal 
interest of local elites, and mistrust in the state. These all affect 
potential beneficiaries’ access to this program. On the other hand, 
undesirable effects in the social life of communities, violence, second 
displacements, neglected groups of inhabitants, and abandonment of 
local functionaries by the central government are working against this 
public policy. The subjective experience is diverse, but at the centre 
of this policy are the micro-politics of dynamic forces inside each 
studied municipality. 
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Chapter five:  Conclusions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“And… Where was 
the government 
when the massacres 
happened?”  
 
Victim 49-N2 
 
In today’s context the importance of studying the impacts of 
reconstruction activities during warfare is increasing. Most 
contemporary conflicts can be described as chronic, with multiple 
episodes of open or discreet violence. The result of these episodes 
of violence leads to the destruction of property and of the social 
fabric, and also generates internal displacement. Several protracted 
DWR impact on Conflict PhD in Politics – York David Camargo 
167 
 
conflicts in key regions show a mixture of ‘economic, social, military 
and political’ interests that are advancing the necessity of 
“normalizing” daily life via ‘preventive war’ or ‘fast-track peace’; 
including Iraq, Colombia and Afghanistan. The necessity and the 
existence of ongoing reconstruction activities during war can no 
longer be ignored by academia, even if studies may or may not 
conclude that such reconstruction is just part of the war effort and 
must be subordinated to military studies.  
 
In this scenario, studies of reconstruction efforts to help IDPs are 
particularly critical. IDPs are especially vulnerable to violence, and for 
them all reconstruction efforts in the middle of war could be a 
significant milestone. In particular, the effort to protect their houses, 
lands and properties could reduce their exposure to dispossession 
from ancestral lands, and the increased risk of poverty. Significantly, 
the consequences of the absence of ‘during-war reconstruction 
efforts’, or the consequences of ‘failed reconstruction attempts’, could 
be protracted in the aftermath of war, e.g. with long lasting legal 
processes or with personal conflicts with new settlers – and, in the 
worst situations – including Colombia – with a “spiral of violence” 
(Rubio, 2004)68. 
                                                 
68  This term refers to the continuous and relentless violence in Colombia that 
started with the vacuum of power resulting from the War of Independence in 1810. 
This process occurs not only as a constant repetition of civil wars and fruitless 
struggles for national power, and is also replicated at the micro level. At the macro 
level it is concerned with the control of central power and resources of the State, 
and at the micro level with the control of local power and lands. This spiral of 
violence linked to land leads to a constant process of dispossession of the small 
landowner or tenant (smallholder) and family vendettas build up around the 
territory as a symbol of power (landlords). The spiral, in the case of small farmers, 
is expressed in terms of its migration to colonize the agricultural frontiers (State 
wasteland), displacing the indigenous and natural inhabitant, and which then has to 
face again the power of the landowner after the expansion of the agricultural 
frontier. But this power is not consolidated in the landowner, but instead develops 
further into a spiral of violence because it has to face both local and national 
rivalries between families and peasant movements. The only ones who always lose 
their natural territory are the indigenous people (Houghton, 2008). In the last two 
decades since the recognition of black territories and the agricultural expansion 
into the Colombian Pacific, black people are increasingly living with this violence 
(Procuraduria, 2009). Also, these displacements do not always lead to a 
consolidation of ownership over the abandoned field. This allows the arrival of new 
settlers in abandoned properties – who can enter in litigation proceedings on the 
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In light of these considerations, and due to the fact that such 
programs exist in the midst of armed conflict – a backcloth of 
violence and confrontations over power – the aim of this thesis was 
focused on discussing the impact of ‘protection of land rights’ 
activities developed by the Colombian government during present 
conflict in stopping any escalation of violence, and mitigating the 
effects of war on internally displaced persons in two sets of towns in 
the Valle del Cauca region. This empirical thesis demonstrated the 
existence of and studied a State-led non-military DWR program 
which – as defined – is not used for military purposes by the state 
and whose final goal must be to repair the political link between 
citizens and the state. As discussed previously I did not find any 
indication that the LPP program is used for military purposes by the 
state. I found that it is part of a national policy formulated with the aim 
of militarily defeating the illegal armed groups, but I did not find any 
evidence which suggests that the LPPP actually meets military 
objectives against the armed groups operating outside the law. It was 
found that the LPPP seeks to restore confidence in the state, either 
by approaching populations that historically have been abandoned by 
the state and trying to win back their confidence; or returning 
property rights to those from whom it was unjustly removed. This 
research can be seen as ‘a step forward’ in an understudied subject 
and tries to shed light on the problem for present and future 
research. 
 
The case study involved field research and ethnographic work 
complemented by documentary research. A substantial literature 
review on the Colombian conflict, reconstruction issues and land 
protection programs plus fieldwork with communities in four 
Colombian towns and 118 interviews with authorities, peasants, 
academics and local elites addressing a live topic – a moving target – 
                                                                                                                            
property – and a return to violence. 
DWR impact on Conflict PhD in Politics – York David Camargo 
169 
 
was challenging. In terms of the recorded information the research 
shows what is really happening in the field, which can then also be 
contrasted with official reports. The use of Micro-analysis techniques 
to analyse the experiences and stories collected during the fieldwork 
advanced the idea of a huge gap between central politics designed 
by the Colombian government and the local implementation of the 
LPP program in Valle del Cauca, Colombia. This gap between the 
top-down policy design and the reality in the field could be studied 
following some specifics: a) disinformation; b) local unreadiness; c) 
personal interest of local elites; d) mistrust in the state; e) 
undesirable effects in the social life of communities; and f) central 
government’s abandonment of local functionaries. The goal in this 
case has never been to conduct an in-depth study of the program, 
but from the findings of this research it is possible to advance some 
policy recommendations to address these issues and these are 
presented at the end of this chapter.  
 
Addressing a specific part of the Colombian conflict contributes to the 
narrative approach of the conflict in Valle del Cauca, following 
Oquist’s (1978) suggestion of studying separately regional conflicts; 
accordingly, this empirical work reinforces explanations of local 
dystopia in terms of government absence of authority and follows in 
the steps of González, Bolívar and Vásquez (2002) and Duncan 
(2006) by recording the voice of the vanquished (Reyes-Mate, 1991); 
and it is part of the sub-group of studies on the effects of political 
decisions on the Colombian conflict (as per Dudley and Murillo, 1998; 
Rubio, 2002; Sánchez and Chacón, 2005; Pecaut, 2006). 
Additionally, exploring the conflict from the well established 
perspective of land issues (as per Nazih, 1997; Gilhodes, 1974; 
LeGrand, 1984; Reyes, 1987; 2009; Reyes and A.M. Bejarano, 1988; 
Fajardo, 2005; Patridge, 2006; Vidal, 2006; Gallón, 2006; Forero, 
2008; Moncayo et al, 2008) and the innovative approach from 
reconstruction studies advanced in Bejarano’s (1995) proposition of 
working in peacebuilding studies, adding to this proposal the analysis 
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of effects on conflict of reconstruction activities during war. In this 
specific case study I established a strong causal relationship 
between the Colombian armed conflict and the problems of 
possession, use and culture around the soil. Two specific situations 
were established on the land problem and the conflict: the corridors 
of violence and the illicit crops. On the other hand, the abandonment 
by the state of the citizens living in those areas is evident, and it 
causes many social problems and fuels conflict, giving space to 
illegal armed groups; slowing down or preventing military actions 
against illegal armed groups; hindering the rule of law and weakening 
the link between the state and its citizens, preventing compliance 
with political goals. Also the situation of the co-existence of three 
human groups who require but have no land is specific to the 
Colombian case, and cannot be generalised to other contexts.  
 
In terms of reconstruction studies, the most important conceptual 
findings in this thesis concerns the arguments presented about the 
term ‘reconstruction’ itself. The thesis presents a distinction between 
reconstruction due to accidental events and reconstruction due to 
war actions; the characteristics of proactive and reactive 
reconstruction; and a critical evaluation of the use of the terms ‘post-
war’ and ‘during-war’ reconstruction. It was shown that war-related 
reconstruction activities are not opposed to war but complement it, 
allowing us to understand its political meaning and distinguish it from 
a purely technical characterization. Reconstruction is an activity that 
provides itself opportunities to intervene in conflicts, developing the 
political and military objectives of war or changing the outcome of the 
war itself. Finally I conceptualized what is meant by state-led non-
military reconstruction during war: The reconstruction activity 
developed by the state in the middle of war with the purpose of 
supporting the essential link between citizens and the state, and 
political life. On the way to reaching this definition I also gave 
definitions of: ‘what is reconstruction?’; ‘what is post-war 
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reconstruction?’; ‘what is during-war reconstruction?’ and ‘what is 
military and non-military during-war reconstruction?’ 
 
Regarding the issue of the reconstruction strategy of Protection of 
Land Rights during warfare (Deng, 2003; United Nations, 2005) this 
empirical research is seminal. 
 
With regard to the qualitative approach of this empirical thesis – field 
research and ethnographic work complemented by documentary 
research – this work has demonstrated the value of comparative 
analysis between towns that are part of the program in two different 
contexts of violence, and the richness of data provided by the use of 
control towns that are not part of the program. The validation of the 
main lines of analysis defined from the institutional vision of the 
program revealed other people living with the land and conflict 
problem (indigenous, afro, peasants) that complements the focus on 
IDPs; and contributes to discourses regarding the LPPP’s impact on 
conflict and the overall relationship between the Non-military DWR 
and the use of military force – even extending it to a discussion on 
the prevalence of military action over social action. The thesis also 
validates the idea of studying the DWR program vis-a-vis its technical 
and political components, as suggested by Alvaro Balcazar in his 
interview. Following De Sousa’s (2010) and Blondel’s (2010) 
suggestion, the use of micro-analysis in politics was very useful in 
order to work around the so-called “private politics” (Blondel, 
2010:23; drawing on Merriam, 1944). Particularly in this work of 
comparative micro-analysis, the contrast of elite vs. non-elite 
responses, local vs. regional and national actors, and cross-case 
comparison between the two sets of towns was key to understanding 
the functioning and the effects of the LPP program as the result of 
“collective decisions” (Blondel, 2010:24) enhancing our 
understanding of the political decision-making processes. 
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New research directions 
 
1. During-war reconstruction should be studied in detail by academia. 
It is not enough to focus efforts on Post-war reconstruction. Even 
more, the complexity of ‘Reconstruction’, including and differentiating 
between natural and man-made disasters, must achieve a proper 
balance between political science studies emphasizing the political 
aspect and the technical elements of reconstruction programs. 
 
2. The study and design of Protection programs is essential to 
advance not only in terms of the rationality behind its necessity but 
also in terms of reinforcing the role of the state as primary protector 
of private property in society. The absence of studies about and 
programs to protect private property is feeding conflicts between 
individuals and diminishing the state’s capacity to be accepted as a 
valid mediator in society. 
 
3. The LPPP is a highly valuable object of research for academia. So 
too is the general context of Colombia’s consolidation politics with: 
CCAI, ‘Ley de Víctimas y Tierras’, RUPTA and certain other 
protective and restorative programs all worthy of study by academia. 
Research on the regional and local program, on the technical 
command from the national level and their involvement with the 
national strategy are all topics of research that should be addressed. 
As a promising source of future research I suggest here the five key 
lessons presented by Alvaro Balcazar about the CFIC: a) the state is 
not designed to go where previously no state has been; b) there is no 
dilemma between security or development about which is the most 
important: security is a requirement for development; c) during-war 
development is possible but it is not sustainable; d) flexibility is 
essential to respond to local needs and the state should take 
advantage of every available opportunity to build that trust; e) it is 
necessary to build and maintain local existing structures. 
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4. On the specifics of the Colombian conflict it is essential to study 
the dual behaviour of ‘violence corridors’ and ‘illicit crops’ in the 
context of land problems. Also, the complexity of rural territories must 
be better appreciated and move beyond the ‘agrarian problem’ by 
including an appreciation of ethnic and cultural diversity, and state 
actions which privilege local elites, and unsatisfactory territorial 
conquest. Finally, it is necessary to address the suggestion that 
military action, programs and politics prevail over social action, 
programs and politics when the state tries to regain control over the 
territory in conflict; and the strong suggestion that technical and 
political components of a DWR program needs to be addressed both 
as part of any research in the topic and as part of a policy design. 
 
5. Using micro-analysis in political science is decisive in ethnographic 
work focused on the study of public policies in action. It will help to 
understand the everyday implementation of public policies not as an 
instruction which leads to an action but as a profusion of collateral 
activities affecting and affected by the political life inside targeted 
communities. Both, macro-aggregations, meso-descriptions and 
micro-analysis will enhance and will lead future qualitative political 
science research. 
 
Policy recommendations to the Colombian government 
 
The main actor in the conflict in Colombia is the state. The 
Colombian state is the primary armed force in the conflict, and it is in 
charge of controlling illegal businesses, justice, controlling the 
territory and legislation to compensate for existing inequalities in the 
distribution of income and resources. Historically, it has been 
geographically concentrated on the central Andean region and 
absent in the periphery of the country. Also, it is labelled as weak and 
unable to fulfil all its duties. In addition it is clearly ‘biased’ or 
‘captured’ by the personal interests of dominant families and private 
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interests against the public mission. This cocktail mitigates the 
achievement of its designated goals and the results are always 
‘mixed’ or null in terms of territorial control, administration of justice or 
distribution/generation of wealth. The Colombian state is also 
responsible for developing poverty relief policies, and the promotion 
of political openness needed to allow necessary political and social 
change. The success or failure of the state in any of these policy 
domains affects the conflict. As victim 49-N2 said, the state must 
identify itself with and commit to protect the people even during the 
darkest times of conflict. The state’s physical presence but also its 
protective robe is required at all times if the political connection 
between citizens and the state is to be maintained. In this thesis I 
argued that DWR is the key element to protect, maintain, and 
(probably) restore that link. 
 
Fernando Medina advances the hypothesis that “(…) the high levels 
of political violence that exist in Colombia today can be better 
understood as the result of a failed peasant revolution, matched by 
the inability of the state to widen the scope of social, economic and 
political citizenship.” (2009:93); and, more specifically, that the 
‘Agrarian conflict’ “(…) the social conflict stemming from the pattern 
of tenure and use of the land as an economic asset (…)” (2009:3) 
should be singularized as one of the root causes of the conflict. This 
double failure in terms of wealth redistribution and political 
ineffectiveness is – without doubt – part of the Colombian conflict. 
However, this double failure is the failure of the whole society, not 
only a few specific political actors. It is clear that the state in 
Colombia has been shaped by the elite to serve their interests: but 
other actors in the conflict, as well as civil society, are partially 
represented in the system. The Colombian state is not functioning as 
a single entity: it is fragmented into various components. These 
include: justice, procurators, armed forces, national and regional 
administrations, the Senate, House of Representatives and 
ministries. On numerous occasions one of the armed groups has co-
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managed some part of the state machinery. Around the struggle to 
control part of the state the various conflicting parties are taking 
opportunities to advance their own interests: land, impunity, earnings, 
legislation, etc. The Colombian State is, as Thoumy says: "a bounty" 
(2005:172). 
 
In the case of rural areas I identified that their problems are not 
limited to rural peasant/ land issues but should instead be 
understood as territorial problems. In this research we have seen that 
territorial control, through the program of consolidation of the 
Colombian government and agrarian reform, are fundamental to 
advancing the development of rural areas and to solve their 
problems. However, these two processes do not resolve all the rural 
problems, for it have been identified that: a) there is no total territorial 
settlement and there is no model for such colonization, which b) 
makes it equally unsatisfactory. Although this requires more 
extensive analysis, in principle it seems that arguments that tend to 
reduce the Colombian rural problem to a simple historical 
confrontation between tradition and modernity, in which peasants are 
fighting to sustain their way of life (such as that proposed by Medina, 
2009), cannot respond to all the variables of the problem. The 
problem described in this research about the clashes and tensions 
between Afro-descendants, indigenous people and peasants in the 
studied area is not satisfied by a single explanation of peasant 
movements, because clearly they are not the only inhabitants of rural 
areas. The violence in these rural areas, and the violence associated 
with land issues in general, is much more complex and should be 
described in greater detail. I challenge the idea of “failed peasant 
revolutions” (Medina, 2009) and I advance the idea of capitalist 
confrontations in rural areas fuelled by failed colonization processes. 
That is why in the studied regions it is clear that economic 
competition of the market is combined with violence: locally, state 
action is seen as directed to support – with force – some legal local 
elites against the illegal ones. Unfortunately, this practice distances 
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the possibility of recognizing the state as a legitimate local mediator 
of conflicts in society. This explains why people in the rural areas 
ask: “Why they did not come back to take the dead from the 
graves?”; why rural children invite you to show you where the "holes" 
are; why priests cross themselves when passing trees, bends in the 
road and waterfalls; why farmers prefer to forget some areas of their 
farms, and why the mourners remain hopeful of someday seeing a 
car from the ‘Fiscalía’ (prosecutor office) to recover “the remains of 
their people”. They keep waiting and hoping for the state. At the 
same time progress in the regions does not stop: local elites prefer to 
leave things ‘quiet’, they say “there is no need to revive so much 
pain” or to unearth hatreds, and they say that the dead “are things of 
the past”. For these elites the state is protecting them from present 
dangers and, undoubtedly, from the revenge of the past. Meanwhile, 
the Colombian state machine continues to build or ‘consolidate’ some 
territories without the support, the participation or the involvement of 
their inhabitants. 
 
In that sense, this research has shown the importance of three 
interrelated elements: the absence of the central state in the 
territories; the construction of productive economic systems based on 
individual enterprise and a system of violence which regulates it. This 
system of violence is based on: a) a core of tradition focused on key 
figures representing ‘order’, b) collective imaginary memories joining 
together different events in a single narrative order that replaces 
historical objectivity, and c) a single system of existence and 
representation based on economic power. This economic system is 
developed under a form of violence uncontrolled by the state but 
which seems to be sustainable. These findings are an additional 
result of this work and should be explored in more detail in the future. 
 
On land restitution or protection, I studied the situation of protecting 
land rights of internally displaced persons during war and I am 
arguing in favour of the protection programs and against those of 
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restitution in the case of IDPs. The basis of the argument rests on 
four points, with the first three supported by this research and the 
latter rejected: a) property is a right to be protected immediately to 
prevent further violence; b) protection is an effective, rapid and 
practical way to solve problems detected in the case of restitution 
(time, money and resources, and suffering for the people affected by 
war), as are the second occupants or the inability to prove 
ownership; c) it allows quick identification, care for and inclusion of 
victims in protection and assistance programs; d) its potential to 
reduce the violence or to reduce the effects of conflict in society has 
not been validated by this study. Regarding the Colombian conflict 
this research has shown that measures of protection of internally 
displaced people in Colombia, rather than protect their rights as 
citizens (albeit in very specific situations) is in reality reclassifying 
displaced people into differential categories of citizenship; partly as a 
consequence of 'positive discrimination', but mainly in the idea of 
differential identity construction. These differential identities generate 
three problems. First, a double victimization for those who are 
displaced but not officially catered for, and obviously therefore not in 
receipt of benefits and socially discriminated against. Secondly, the 
condition of the identity of ‘displaced person’ is counterproductive 
because it does not promote solutions to the problems which 
generated the displacement, but rather solutions comprising of rapid 
humanitarian assistance or welfare plans, which leads to delays in 
the repair of the social fabric; delays to the individuals’ 
(re)incorporation into productive systems and delays vis-à-vis the 
acquisition of improvements to overcome the condition of 
displacement. Finally, this differential identity promotes a welfare 
culture and replaces the natural link of constant feedback between 
the social and the political networks with paternalism, which replaces 
the state's responsibility in favour of commercialism. 
 
Finally, regarding the Colombian armed conflict, it was shown that 
the greatest achievement of the "democratic security" policy during 
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the government of Álvaro Uribe Vélez was not that of the state 
regaining control over violence, but rather reasserting the legitimacy 
of the use of violence by the state: Colombians now accept that the 
state must use violence. However, this is misunderstood by some 
civil authorities and local elites in certain areas who perceive it as 
violence directed by the state against specific group(s) within the 
population, or discriminating in favour of the protection of specific 
parts of an area. This clearly distinguishes between the violence and 
the conflict. As interviewee 40-N2 argues: in Colombia there has 
been imposed a culture that justifies all the dead, all the murder, and 
all crimes; many of them for the sake of what civilians designate as 
‘security’. According to Alvaro Balcazar it is clear that security in 
Colombia is in the hands of civilians and requires civilians to engage 
in it actively, because the military are only a fundamental instrument 
of the same, but not the architects. 
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Appendix 1: Interviewees list 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In this appendix I present the interview coding schedule. It includes 
the list of coding and no-coding references with the date of the 
interview. As explained in Chapter five, the towns participating in the 
program were coded as North1 and South1. Control towns were 
coded as: North2 and South2. This codification is also applied to the 
interviews identifying the residents interviewed in South1 as S1, 
interviewees in South2 as S2; interviewees in North1 as N1, and 
interviewees in North2 as N2. The full code of an interviewee 
consists of: (general number of interview) – (population ID) / (meeting 
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number). For example, reference 25-S1 / 2, refers to the second 
interview made to interviewee number 25 who lives in South1. 
Officials, researchers, or experts interviewed in cities outside the 
studied towns were coded as follows: BOG-Bogotá; CAL-Cali; and 
TUL-Tuluá. 
Table 7: List of no-coded interviews 
#  Dates Location Self-identification 
1 10-Feb-09 Bogotá 
Doris Elena Alzate Gómez - Communication officer 
LPPP 
2 
18-Feb-09 / 
11-Nov-09 / 
21-Nov-09 Cali 
Clara Galeano - Social researcher - Anthropologist, 
specialist on violence and IDPs 
3 12-Mar-09 / 
21-Nov-09 Cali Natalia Suárez - academic 
4 19-Mar-09 Bogotá Eduardo Pizarro - Head of CNRR 
5 19-Oct-09 Bogotá Alvaro Balcazar - Head of CCI-La Macarena 
6 21-Oct-10 Cali Julio Vidal - Businessman 
7 
03-Nov-10 / 
09-Nov-10 Bogotá Armando Borrero - Academic 
8 
24-Nov-10 / 
26-Nov-10 Bogotá Hyarold Correa - Head of SIMCI 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
Sub-total number of interviewees: 8 
Sub-total number of elite interviews: 5 
Sub-total number of non-elite interviews: 8 
Sub-total number of interviews: 13 
Coded list 
Denied Scheduled interviews 
 
Table 8: List of no-performed interviews 
#  Dates Location Self-identification 
1  N/A Bogotá Head of Land Proyect 
 2 N/A South2 Mayor 
 3 N/A South1 Mayor 
 4 N/A North1 Mayor 
 5 N/A North2 Mayor 
Source: Own elaboration. 
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Sub-total number of interviewees: 0 
Sub-total number of interviews: 0 
 
Realized Scheduled interviews 
 
Table 9: List of coded interviews. Own elaboration. 
#  Dates Location Code Self-identification 
1 
19-Feb-09 / 
4-Mar-09 / 
 9-Oct-09 / 
20-Nov-09 Cali 1-CAL Regional LPPP representative 
2 
19-Feb-09 / 
12-Mar-09 Cali 2-CAL Regional LPPP representative 
3 24-Feb-09 Bogotá 3-BOG Army Coronel - CCAI 
4 26-Feb-09 Bogotá 4-BOG CNRR adviser 
5 06-Mar-09 South1 5-S1 Local worker for prosecutor's office  
6 06-Mar-09 South1 6-S1 Worker on Local Planning office 
7 11-Mar-09 Cali 7-CAL Army Major - III Brigade 
8 12-Mar-09 Tuluá 8-TUL Businessman 
9 12-Mar-09 Tuluá 9-TUL OAS observer 
10 12-Mar-09 Tuluá 10-TUL Rural worker - victim 
11 12-Mar-09 Tuluá 11-TUL Rural worker - victim 
12 
18-Mar-09 / 
15-Oct-09 Bogotá 
12-
BOG National worker for prosecutor's office  
13 
7-Oct-09 / 
20-Oct-09 / 
24-Nov-09 South1 13-S1 Local Umata's head 
14 
7-Oct-09 / 
10-Oct-09 South1 14-S1 Local Umata's worker 
15 08-Oct-09 South1 15-S1 Historian 
16 
8-Oct-09 / 
14-Oct-09 South1 16-S1 Historian - Former local mayor 
17 08-Oct-09 South1 17-S1 
Local Government Secretary / 
Secretario de Gobierno municipal 
18 09-Oct-09 Cali 
18-
CAL 
Head of Regional government 
International affairs' office 
19 09-Oct-09 Cali 
19-
CAL Regional government adviser 
20 
10-Oct-09 / 
16-Nov-09 / 
23-Nov-09 South1 20-S1 
Elected Peasants community 
representative 
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21 10-Oct-09 South1 21-S1 
Elected Peasants community 
representative 
22 11-Oct-09 South2 22-S2 Policeman 
23 11-Oct-09 South2 23-S2 
Local Government Secretary / 
Secretario de Gobierno municipal 
24 12-Oct-09 South1 24-S1 Hotel worker 
25 13-Oct-09 South1 25-S1 Head of Local school 
26 13-Oct-09 South2 26-S2 Priest 
27 14-Oct-09 South1 27-S1 Worker on Local Planning office 
28 
17-Oct-09 / 
29-Oct-10 Bogotá 
28-
BOG Worker on Land project 
29 21-Oct-09 South1 29-S1 Priest 
30 
22-Oct-09 / 
16-Nov-09 / 
23-Nov-09 South1 30-S1 Local Peasants leader  
31 22-Oct-09 South2 31-S2 Local Umata's head 
32 22-Oct-09 South2 32-S2 Rural worker 
33 23-Oct-09 South2 33-S2 Historian 
34 23-Oct-09 South2 34-S2 Small Businesswoman 
35 23-Oct-09 South2 35-S2 Worker on Local Planning office 
36 24-Oct-09 South2 36-S2 IDP from Pacific coast 
37 26-Oct-09 North1 37-N1 Head of Local Planning office 
38 
26-Oct-09 / 
30-Oct-09 / 
5-Nov-09 North1 38-N1 Local Umata's head 
39 26-Oct-09 North1 39-N1 Priest 
40 
27-Oct-09 / 
3-Nov-09 / 
14-Nov-09 North2 40-N2 Priest 
41 
27-Oct-09 / 
29-Oct-09 / 
4-Nov-09 North2 41-N2 Religious worker 
42 28-Oct-09 North1 42-N1 Fireman 
43 
28-Oct-09 / 
7-Nov-09 North1 43-N1 Medium businessman 
44 
28-Oct-09 / 
7-Nov-09 / 
12-Nov-09 North1 44-N1 Municipal employee 
45 30-Oct-09 North1 45-N1 Hotel worker 
46 03-Nov-09 North2 46-N2 Policeman 
47 03-Nov-09 North2 47-N2 Victim 
48 05-Nov-09 North1 48-N1 
Local Government Secretary / 
Secretario de Gobierno municipal 
49 06-Nov-09 North2 49-N2 Religious worker -victim 
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50 06-Nov-09 North2 50-N2 
Representative of the Public service 
and civil rights defender / Personera 
51 06-Nov-09 North2 51-N2 Rural worker - victim 
52 06-Nov-09 North2 52-N2 
Local Government Secretary / 
Secretario de Gobierno municipal 
53 07-Nov-09 North1 53-N1 Local politician 
54 07-Nov-09 North1 54-N1 Driver 
55 07-Nov-09 North1 55-N1 Head of IMCA 
56 
7-Nov-09 / 
10-Nov-09 North1 56-N1 Rural worker - victim 
57 07-Nov-09 North1 57-N1 Rural worker - victim 
58 07-Nov-09 North1 58-N1 Rural worker - victim 
59 07-Nov-09 North1 59-N1 Rural worker - victim 
60 
9-Nov-09 / 
14-Nov-09 North2 60-N2 Social worker - victim 
61 09-Nov-09 North2 61-N2 Social worker - victim 
62 14-Nov-09 North2 62-N2 Driver 
63 14-Nov-09 North2 63-N2 Rural worker - victim 
64 14-Nov-09 North2 64-N2 Rural worker - victim 
65 14-Nov-09 North2 65-N2 Rural worker - victim 
66 14-Nov-09 North2 66-N2 Rural worker - victim 
67 14-Nov-09 North2 67-N2 Rural worker - victim 
68 14-Nov-09 North2 68-N2 Rural worker - victim 
69 14-Nov-09 North2 69-N2 Rural worker - victim 
70 16-Nov-09 South1 70-S1 Minor businesswoman - victim 
71 17-Nov-09 South1 71-S1 Minor businessman 
72 18-Nov-09 South2 72-S2 Hotel worker 
73 18-Nov-09 South2 73-S2 Minor businesswoman 
74 18-Nov-09 South2 74-S2 Minor businessman 
75 19-Nov-09 South2 75-S2 Peasants representative 
76 19-Nov-09 South2 76-S2 Peasants representative 
77 19-Nov-09 South2 77-S2 Rural worker 
78 21-Nov-09 Cali 
78-
CAL Artist 
79 23-Nov-09 South1 79-S1 Local Peasants leader - victim 
80 26-Nov-09 Bogotá 
80-
BOG Army Coronel - CCAI 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
Sub-total number of interviewees: 80 
Sub-total number of elite interviews: 39 
Sub-total number of non-elite interviews: 66 
Sub-total number of interviews: 105 
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Totals 
 
The total number of interviewees is eighty eight (88); from those eight 
(8) interviewees were recorded without codes, and eighty (80) with 
codes. The main reason for coding was to protect the real name of 
both set of towns.  
 
The distinction between elite or non-elite interviews is based on 
government participation. The total number of elite interviews is forty 
four (44), and the non-elite interviews is seventy four (74); this sum in 
total: one hundred eighteen (118) interviews. 
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List of Abbreviations 
 
IDP  –  Internally Displaced People 
PWR  –  Post-war Reconstruction 
DWR  –  During war Reconstruction 
LPPP  –  Land and Property Protection Program (Colombian 
government) 
IHL  –  International Humanitarian Law 
PRDU  –  Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit 
(University of York) 
DDR –  Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration 
USSR  –  Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Soviet Union) 
WWI  –  First World War 
WWII  –  Second World War 
UNRRA  –   United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration 
COHRE  –  Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions 
UNESCO  –  United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization 
UNODC  –  United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
SIMCI  –  Sistema de Información y Monitoreo de Cultivos Ilícitos 
de Naciones Unidas (UN Monitoring and Information 
System on Illicit Crops) 
URNG  –  Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca 
(Guatemala’s national revolutionary union – guerrilla 
and political movement) 
NGO  –  Non-Governmental Organization 
IO  –  International Organization 
ILAC  –  International Legal Aid Centers (Operated by the 
Norwegian Refugee Council) 
IDMC  –  Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (Operated by 
the Norwegian Refugee Council) 
CRP  –  Civil Rights Project (From the IDMC) 
OCHA –  United Nations Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs 
PCF  –  World Bank Post-Conflict Fund  
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USAID  –  United States Agency for International Development 
IOM  –  International Organization for Migrations 
UNHCR  –  United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
SIDA  –  Swedish International Development Cooperation 
Agency 
IMCA –  Instituto Mayor Campesino (Colombian NGO working in 
peasant training) 
CODHES  –  Consultoría para los derechos humanos y el 
desplazamiento (Colombian NGO on Displacement and 
Human Rights) 
SISDHES  –  Sistema institucional de Información sobre 
desplazamiento, conflicto armado y derechos humanos 
(Colombian Institutional Information System on 
displacement, armed conflict and human rights – 
Operated by CODHES) 
RUPTA  –  Registro Único de Predios y Territorios Abandonados 
(Colombian Unified Registry of Abandoned Land and 
territories) 
RUPD  –  Registro Único de Población Desplazada (National 
Register of Displaced Population) 
CERAC  –  Centro de Recursos para el Análisis de Conflictos 
(Conflict Analysis Resource Center) 
UMATA  –  Unidad Municipal de Asistencia Técnica Agrícola 
(Colombian Municipal Unit for Agricultural Technical 
Assistance) 
Acción Social – Agencia presidencial para la acción social y la 
cooperación internacional (Colombian Presidential 
Agency for Social Action and International Cooperation)  
CCAI  –  Centro de Coordinación de la Acción integral (Centre 
for Coordination of Integrated Action) 
CFIM  –  Centro de Fusión Integral de la Macarena ( Colombian 
Macarena's Center for Integrated Work) 
CNRR  –  Comisión Nacional de Reparación y Reconciliación 
(Colombian National Commision for Reparation and 
Reconciliation) 
RSS  –  Red de Solidaridad Social (Colombian Social Solidarity 
Network) 
ACCI  –  Agencia Colombiana de Cooperación Internacional 
(Colombian Agency of International Cooperation) 
FIP  –  Fondo de Inversión para la Paz (Colombian Investment 
Fund for Peace) 
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FOREC  –  Fondo para la Reconstrucción y el Desarrollo del Eje 
Cafetero (Colombian Coffee region Reconstruction and 
Development Fund) 
INCODER –  Instituto Colombiano para el Desarrollo Rural 
(Colombian Institut for the Rural Development) 
SNAIPD  –  Sistema Nacional de Atención Integral a la Población 
Desplazada (Colombian National System for Integral 
Attention to the Displaced Population) 
FARC  –  Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia 
(Colombia’ revolutionary army – Guerrilla organization) 
BACRIM  –  Bandas Criminales (Colombian Criminal Gangs  – 
Paramilitary and criminal groups) 
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